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"With all the defects, with all the failures that we can check up against it, the U.N.
still represents man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for
the battlefield."
-- President Dwight D. Eisenhower'
Overview
The United Nations, created after World War II, has as its basic raison d'etre, "to rid the
world and successive generations of the scourge of war." However, since its inception in 1945,
the United Nations ("UN") and the world have witnessed a number of large-scale human rights
violations and atrocities, most of which have ended with little or no intervention of any kind
from the UN. Although preserving the peace and protecting human rights were two major goals
contemplated in the framework of the UN Charter, it also appears that a third, the notion of the
protection of the sovereignty of independent states, has for most of the sixty plus years of the
UN's existence, taken precedence over the other two.
The problem that the Charter did not contemplate all those years ago, (although arguably,
it should have) was the question, does a state cease to act within the purview of its sovereignty
when it either causes harm to or fails to protect the citizens of its state? This raises an interesting
problem, as the vast majority of armed conflicts are not those that occur between states; instead,
they are internal conflicts that for the most part, claim innocent civilians rather than soldiers, as
casualties and victims. This also raises yet another question that many scholars and jurists would
have to tussle with for the next six decades - that is, what takes precedence - sovereignty or
human rights?
The question of sovereignty vs. human rights is a classic "chicken and egg" dilemma.
One the one hand, Article 2 (4) of the Charter constitutes a basic proscription on the use and
even the threat of use of force that in some manner violates the territorial integrity or political
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independence of state, or that in some way transgresses the purposes of the United Nations?
However, on the other hand, Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter obligate each UN member to take
"joint and separate action to ensure the universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms.,,3
Unfortunately, this creates a conflict within the Charter itself as between the core
objectives of maintenance of human rights for all peoples and preservation of state sovereignty,
when a situation such as the ongoing crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan arises,4 that is, when a
state actually deprives its citizenry of fundamental human rights. 5 This conflict in tum raises a
number of difficult questions: Do certain acts, even if they are the most heinous crimes
imaginable, remain within the sovereign prerogatives and jurisdiction of the state? Do they pose
any actual military threat to world peace? If not, is the United Nations still empowered to act?
What if the Security Council opts not to act - should tens of thousands or even millions of people
die from violence, starvation and disease for the sake of sovereignty?6 Furthermore, if the
Security Council did not act and other states decided to act under the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, was this to be deemed an illegal assault on sovereignty?
All of these excellent questions were raised, in essence, time and time again by former

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who posited that the sovereignty did not include a right of a
state to deprive its citizens of the basic human rights to which each person is entitled. As
I

Paul Kennedy, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE UNITED NAnONS 47, (Random
~ous~ Pubs., 2006).
Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to Protect": Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness ofArmed
{ntervention, 47 Va. 1. Int'l L. 693, 702 (2007).
Id at 702-703, citing U.N. Charter, Arts. 55 and 56. Article 55 (c) provides in part, that "the United Nations shall
P~0r.n0te ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
~I~tmction as to race, sex, language or religion." Article 56 provides that "All Members pledge themselves to take
JAO~t and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
rhcle 55 •"
4
The
5
humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan began in 2003, and has been ongoing ever since.
l
6 d at 703 .
Id

4

indicated herein, former Secretary-General Annan could be deemed as a "reformer," as he
constantly strived to redefine and recreate the role of the UN, as well as have the UN itself lc;:.k
at its role in the international community. The former Secretary-General became quite
outspoken after the massacre in Rwanda in 1994 as well as after the ethnic cleansing atrocities
that occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo from 1997-1999.
The former Secretary-General made a number of addresses to the UN body at large,
authored a number of reports and commissioned a number of panels which will be discussed
herein, that prompts the UN and the international community to review and address the rights
and responsibilities inherent in sovereignty, in light of the number of humanitarian crises and
atrocities taking place in the modem world. Not only was he looking for an answer as to
whether sovereignty allowed a government to commit such human rights abuses against its own
people, but he was also looking to proactive measures the UN could take to bring such abuses to
an end, and how the UN could reform itself to prevent such abuses from ever happening again.
Also, as a backdrop to these questions raised by the former Secretary-General, was the
notion that armed intervention outside of the UN's authorization was an illegal assault on
sovereignty. Scholars since the beginning of the concept of the state that originated with the
Treaty of Westphalia, have questioned what limits were placed upon sovereignty, and whether
sovereignty permitted a government to commit serious crimes against its own people.
Grotius, as well as many others who have followed, have argued that sovereignty does
not permit such gross abuses of human rights to be perpetrated with impunity. However, few
have actually spoken of the consequences for such abuses of power. Although in the early years
of the UN the Genocide Convention was drafted and ratified, others, such as non-interventionists
took the view even if the government was committing serious crimes and other human rights

5

abuses against its own people, nevertheless, Article 2 (4) provided a basic proscription against
the use or the threat of use of force that in some way violates either the territorial integrity or the
7

political independence of states. What the international system needed was the legal basis to
intervene to stop such serious crimes and human rights abuses that a state perpetrated against its
own people.
One doctrine that arose after the former Secretary-General raised hard questions of the
international community was the doctrine of the "responsibility to protect." The former
Secretary-General questioned repeatedly whether the notion of sovereignty should allow a
government to commit human rights abuses against its own citizens with impunity. It was clear
that the former Secretary-General opined that it did not. However, the question was how to
reconcile the protection of state sovereignty with the protection of human rights.
In 2001, as a result of these and other hard questions raised by the former SecretaryGeneral, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ("ICISS") issued a
report entitled, "The Responsibility to Protect." The Report was an astounding breakthrough
which finally reconciled the two seemingly opposing goals of the UN Charter, protection of
sovereignty and the promotion of human rights, in that it conceptualizes sovereignty in terms of
governmental responsibility. In other words, the Report promoted rethinking sovereignty as

responsibility that fosters serious implications as to a state's responsibility to its people. For one,
the Report indicated that the responsibility to protect suggests that state officials are responsible
for policies that ensure the protection of their citizens and the promotion of their welfare. 8
Second, the Report implies that governments are responsible not only to their own nationals, but

7

8

See Joyner, supra note 1 at 702.
Id. at 706.

6

to the international community.9 Third, "sovereignty as responsibility" means that governmeE~
officials are responsible for their own policy decisions and are accountable for their own
.

actIOns.
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A series of reports by the Secretary-General himself and by appointed panels lent
credibility to the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. Until 2005, it was uncertain whether
the responsibility to protect would in fact be adopted by the international community. At the
2005 World Summit, the adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document by the General
Assembly seemed at last, to indicate universal acceptance that the Security Council could act
under the various provisions of the UN Charter to protect innocent people from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, whether such crimes were perpetrated by
other governments, or even their own. The General Assembly accepted the position adopted by
the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in its 2004 Report,
that the responsibility to protect was in fact an "emerging norm." The Security Council agreed
and a year later in April 2006, adopted this position as well.
While the doctrine of the responsibility to protect has evolved from its humble
beginnings as an aspiration voiced by former Secretary-General Annan to the status of a norm in
the process of becoming a viable legal principle, II in its first test thus far - the crisis in Darfur, it
has not met expectations. The reason is not so much for failures in the doctrine, for the ICISS
crafted a very detailed report which the UN could easily utilize as a roadmap for authorizing
armed intervention. However, the failure lies with the unwillingness of the UN to utilize the
Report in the way it was intended, or to take any other drastic action, to end the crisis. Although
the Security Council referred the humanitarian crisis in Darfur to the ICC prosecutor, currently

7

there is great international pressure for him not to go forward with prosecution of Sudan's
president, Omar al-Bashir.

12

The other unknown is that Kofi Annan is no longer Secretary-General of the United
Nations, and thus, no longer is there the level of activism to push for the UN to undertake needed
reforms to prevent, prosecute and ameliorate such humanitarian crises. Thus far, SecretaryGeneral Ban-ki Moon has made some statements of dismay about recent attacks and has called
for all parties to commit to a cessation of hostilities. However, the few statements SecretaryGeneral Ban has made do not rise to the level of reformist activism of Kofi Annan that the UN
has had in the previous ten years prior to his term. Nevertheless, it is still early in SecretaryGeneral Ban's tenure. It is hoped that Secretary-General Ban will continue the hard work started
by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and push for the needed reforms of the UN to
authorize intervention under strict guidelines mentioned herein where necessary, either
unilaterally or multilaterally, not only put an end to the current on-going humanitarian crisis in
Darfur, but to also prevent another crisis from starting.
It is said that "in the midst of chaos, is opportunity." With the humanitarian crisis in

Darfur, the United Nations has been presented with a golden opportunity, to reevaluate how the
international community views human rights, how it fits in with sovereignty, and how the UN
can and should join an evolving international system and make human rights once again, the
primary consideration of the international community and international relations. With that will
come a return to the raison d'etre for which the United Nations was created, and a return to its
intended role as the beacon of the international community that stands for all that we hoped it
II

12

Id. at 704 •

One World US, "Don't Arrest Sudan President, Say African Leaders, .. Jan. 30 2009,
h!!p:llus. oneworld.netiarticIe/359831-dont-arrest-sudan-president-say-african-leaders, (last visited Feb. 13,2009);

8

would, the protector of human rights, the arbiter of sovereign nations and the promoter of
international peace and prosperity.

see also, AIIAfrica.com, "Sudan: Africa Urges Suspension ofBashir Arrest Warrant," Feb. 12,2009,
htto:llallafrica.com!stories/2009021203 51.html, (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
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CHAPTER ONE:

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GREATEST HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

"In the midst of chaos - is opportunity."
-- Unknown
I.

Introduction
Since early 2003, the western Darfur region ofthe Sudan has been subjected to a massive

campaign of ethnic violence that has claimed the lives of almost 400,000 civilians, and has
created nearly 2 million internally-displaced refugees or refugees that have fled to camps in
neighboring Chad. 13 The humanitarian crisis in Darfur presents one of the greatest challenges to
the international community since the coordinated massacre of over 800,000 people in Rwanda
in one-hundred days in 1994.

14

The mass murder of national, ethnic and tribal groups at the

hands of the predominantly Arab Sudanese government and the pro-Arab, government-backed
militias, known as the janjaweed, 15 is deemed responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of
black Sudanese in the region.
Despite the unmistakable tragedy that has occurred and continues to occur, the
international community has utterly failed to respond. The United Nations (either the Security
Councilor the General Assembly) has taken almost no leadership role in abating or even
stopping the crisis. Debate over whether the term "genocide" should be used to describe the
ethnic cleansing and displacement of nearly a half of a million people in Sudan has essentially
deterred any type of humanitarian intervention from other nations that have signed or ratified the

13

UN News Center, Huge Challenges Remain in Darfur and Chad UN Aid Chief Tells Security Council, (Dec. 3,
~008), www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD==29182&Cr=darfur&Crl==chad, (last visited Feb. 14,2009).
Jeff Fleischer, Shake Hands With the Devil: An Interview With Romeo Dallaire, MOTHER JONES, (Jan. 25, 2005),

~:/!,:ww.motherjones.comlcgi-binlprint articie.pl?urI==www.motherjones.com. (last visited Dec. 2, 2006) .

. OngInally referred to the nomadic Arab bandits who rode on horses and camels, enriching themselves by stealing
lIvestock and attacking black Africans. "Jaan" means "evil" in Arabic, and 'yawad' means "horse", roughly
~nslating 'yanjaweed' as "evil horseman." Although there are numerous variations on the spelling of the word as
It IS a rough translation of Arabic, 'yanjaweed" will be used herein.

II

Genocide Convention. 16 Although the U.S. government has referred to the crisis as "genocic:c, .
the United Nations and the rest of the world continue to show great reluctance to do so, and haye
utterly failed to respond in a timely manner that could have prevented countless deaths and
ended the violence. 17
Despite the tragedy that has occurred over the past six years due to inaction, the United
Nations, as the world's arbiter, could reclaim the ideal of acting as the world's "beacon" of
international peace and security if it took an immediate stand to end the crisis. A number of
significant events have occurred since the crisis began that in fact establish a "roadmap" in
which the crisis can be abated and future crises could be avoided, which will be discussed herein.
The very relevance and existence of the United Nations has been under a "full-frontal assault"
from the last eight years of the Bush Administration, who viewed the United Nations as a
roadblock to U.S. domination of the world's regions, and worked to undermine its purpose and
relevance, to thereby lead to its eventual demise. Under the new administration of US. President
Barack Obama, there is hope that the U.S. will again pledge support for the United Nations, and
thereby set an example as a powerful nation that not only supports its existence, but will lead the
rest of the international community in strengthening its role in maintaining international peace
and security.
This author posits that if the United Nations as a body followed the path laid by the
previous Secretary General and took a strong stand against genocide by taking bold new action
now to stop the crisis, not only the could the United Nations reclaim some of its stature of the
World's organization to which nations look for leadership, but also, it would also return to its
16

7 Officially called, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948,
,,~u.N ..r.s. 277, Can. r.S. 1949 No. 27 (entered into force January 12, 1951) hereinafter referred to as the
enoc1de Convention.".
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raison d'etre, that is, "to rid the world of the scourge of war," and to meaningfully promote the
protection of human rights.

It has been nearly six years since the brutal attacks began that has resulted in the deaths
of hundreds of thousands civilians, and the displacement of over two and a half million more.
Yet, the failure of the UN and the rest of the world to respond in that time raises both a moral
and legal question: if the systematic and calculated murder of unarmed men and boys, the
abduction and rape of women and girls, the destruction of villages as well as the destruction of
food and water supplies, is not enough to warrant military and/or diplomatic intervention - what
in the world will?

17'~---------------------------------------------------------------------

It should be noted that although the United States has utilized the term "genocide" to describe the crisis, and
thereby giving rise to the obligations under the Genocide Convention, it too has failed to take any substantial action
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II.

A Brief History of the Internal Strife That Has Led to the Coordinated and Systematic
Attacks Upon Civilians in the Darfur Region

A.

Diverse Regions of Sudan

Sudan, the largest nation in Africa, has been mired in civil war since it won its
independence from Great Britain in 1956. 18 The Darfur region is Sudan's largest region, located
in the western part of the country. Darfur was an independent sultanate until 1917, when it was
the last region to be incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Since 1994, Darfur has been
divided into South, West and North regions. Much of the current crisis has taken place in West
Darfur, an ethnically mixed region of Africans and Arabs, though African groups predominate. 19
Since the 1980's, drought has forced the nomadic tribes of Arab cattle herders from the North to
systematically attempt to seize and permanently occupy the land in the central (western) part of
the Darfur region, in order to water and graze cattle. Because attempts by these nomadic tribes
to relocate to more fertile lands have been met with resistance by the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa
tribes, the predominant black ethnic groups of West Darfur, they have since been subject to
hostilities by the government. 20
The central conflict in the ongoing war has been between the Muslim government forces
in the North, and rebels in the South, which began in 1955, declined in 1972, and resumed in
1983. Over the course oftime, some two million people died as a result of the conflict, most of
them Christians.

~~ abate or resolve the crisis.
19 THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (6th Ed. 2001-2004), www.bartelby.com!br/65Ihtml (last visited April 28, 2006).
V Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing By Government and Militia Force in Western Sudan,
20 0 1. 16, No. 6(A), (May 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/0504simple.pdf.

ld.
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Because much of the current crisis has taken place in West Darfur,21 the Masalit, Fur m~d
Zaghawa communities are some of the most predominant ethnic groups of West Darfur, and as
such, have also been the principal victims of the government's military campaign. 22 All of these
tribes are largely peasant farmers, but also engage in cattle raising. Both the Masalit and Fur
have united in marriage with Arabs and other Africans?3
The conflicts in the Darfur region have continued since the early 1980's. Because Darfur
is geographically isolated, it has been neglected by the central government in Khartoum. Much
ofthe peace between the region's ethnic groups have been destroyed due to environmental
degradation from the spread of the Sahara desert as a result of ongoing drought, coupled with
"divide and rule" tactics of the central government and the influx of modem weaponry. 24
Early conflicts were predominantly clashes between nomadic groups within these
farming communities, over access to pasture and water for cattle, or outright theft of animals.
Since the 1980's, drought has driven these nomadic tribes to systematically attempt to
permanently occupy the land in the central part ofthe Darfur region, known as Jebel Marra
Massif. At one point, the conflict rose to the level of a civil war, with entire villages destroyed
and thousands of lives lost on both sides. Despite attempts by these nomadic groups to survive
as livestock herders by seizing land in the fertile central zone, the Fur, the predominant
occupants, have fought back to retain what they have long-viewed as "their land.,,25 This
resulted in the start of government-initiated hostilities against the Fur for resisting the nomads'
intrusion rather than seeking accommodation of them.
21

Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing By Government and Militia Force in Western Sudan,

supra note 19 •

22

ldat6 •
ld
at6 .
24
23

v. ~udan Update, Reports: Peoples, Darfur, www.sudanupdate.orgfREPORTS/PEOPLES/Darf.htm. undated, (last
2s'~~d Feb. 14,2009).

15

The Zaghawa were also among the people attempting to resettle in the central and
encountered hostility from the Fur farmers. Eventually, they too would become a target of
government, pro-Arab hostilities against the "zurga" (a derogatory term for "black") and nonArab groups of Darfur, which would eventually prompt the Fur to form their own militias.
Initially these militias were utilized for self-defense, but were later folded into the Sudanese
Liberation Army/Movement ("SLAIM"), that sought equality for all Sudanese. Between 1987
and 1989, the conflicts between Fur farmers and Arabs intensified so much that thousands of Fur
were killed, tens of thousands more were displaced, and over 40,000 homes were destroyed. 26
Instead of intervening in the conflicts to defuse tensions, Khartoum ignored them, leaving them
to explode some fourteen years later.
In the 1990's, hostilities resumed in West Darfur (among other places), particularly in
1998, when Arab nomads prematurely moved their flocks into land predominantly populated by
Masalit farmers. During the 1998 conflict, more than sixty Masalit villages were destroyed, an
Arab village was burned, both Masalit and Arabs were killed and more than five thousand
Masalit were displaced. 27 Despite a resolution of the conflict being reached, hostilities again
broke out in 1999, with more than 125 Masalit villages partially or totally destroyed and
hundreds killed, including local Arab tribal chiefs. 28 The government brought in military forces
to stop the violence. Though an accord was reached at a reconciliation conference in that year,
nevertheless many Masalit intellectuals and notables were arrested, imprisoned and tortured in
towns where government-supported Arab militias were attacking Masalit villages and unarmed
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Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,
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civilians. The violence that ensued from these attacks further polarized the pro-Arab government
away from its black citizens.
B.

Genesis of the Current Humanitarian Crisis

The current humanitarian crisis essentially began early in the morning on April 25, 2003,
when a blast followed by six rapid detonations shook a tiny one-runway airport in EI Fasher,
where Sudanese soldiers were stationed. The blasts roused the sleeping soldiers out of their
barracks then to be ambushed by machine-gun fire from the rebel Sudanese Liberation
ArmylMovement (SLAlM). The SLAIM formed as a result of the Khartoum government's
disregard for the Darfur region, whereby the government refused to maintain infrastructure such
as roads and other public services, and engaged in a policy of marginalizing blacks politically by
awarding top government positions to local Arabs. Frustrated with being politically and
economically isolated, the SLAIM sought to strike back against the government and while
drawing the world's attention to their political plight. At first Khartoum did not take the SLAIM
seriously; but after the attack at EI Fasher, the government decided to treat the rebels as a major
threat. 29
During conflicts with rebels in South of the country, the Sudanese military perfected a
strategy to combat insurgents: air forces would attack from the sky while Arab tribesmen, armed
by the government, would concurrently attack from the ground. These Arab militia, or

janjaweed were particularly important in Darfur, since a majority of the Sudanese army who
were from Darfur could not be trusted to take up arms against former neighbors and kin.3o By
july 2003, the government was appealing to Arabs in Darfur to protect their homeland from the
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"rebels." It would be the first step to laying the groundwork for the series of coordinated

attac~~~;

by the Sudanese government and the janjaweed against its unarmed black citizens.
As a result of the history of violence, the Sudanese government, together with the

janjaweed, began targeting the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa through a combination of
indiscriminate, deliberate and coordinated aerial and ground attacks, denial of humanitarian
assistance and a campaign of ten-or that has resulted in the displacement of over a million and a
half civilians. The Sudanese government left almost no stones untumed in attacks upon anyone
"suspected" of having any allegiance to the rebel movement.
Since mid-2003, the coordinated attacks by the Sudanese army and the janjaweed have
resulted in mass killing of mostly unarmed men and boys. In almost all of the reported attacks,
the jatifaweed have the imprimatur ofthe government. Witnesses and victims have described the

janjaweed an-iving and leaving with the government forces, wearing uniforms similar to
government uniforms, utilizing similar arms and equipment as that utilized by government
soldiers, and appearing to coordinate ground attacks with aerial bombardment by government
aircraft. 3l Eyewitnesses also reported that during attacks, thejanjaweedhave made such
statements as "we are the government!,,32 As to the attacks, eyewitnesses describe them as
beginning with government helicopters flying at low levels to engage in reconnaissance of
villages or "stake them out," then, engage in aerial bombardments of explosives and/or other
crude armaments as ban-els of nails, car chassis and old appliances from planes in order to crush
people and property.33
Concurrent with the aerial attacks, government soldiers and/or janjaweed went into the
Villages ensured of a lack of security from rebel forces, and engaged in a campaign of looting,

---------------------ld
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32 ld.
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abductions, grisly murders

34

,

beatings, ethnic humiliation, destruction of property and basic

necessities such as food storage units and water wells. 35 Fleeing villagers were also targets in
aerial bombings and shootings. 36 More often than not, these assaults were commenced in the
middle of the night while villagers slept, or while villagers were worshipping at mosques or
places of prayer. Ground assaults were often accompanied by attackers shouting racially
derogatory terms and epithets as bullets sprayed their victims. 37 In addition, both government
soldiers and janjaweed have abducted women and girls who were not killed in the assault, took
them to nearby fields where they were repeatedly raped.

38

Often, a few days after a village has been attacked, government helicopters would return
to "scoped out" villages to ensure that in fact, the villages were empty and had not been
reoccupied. 39 If any villagers had returned, government soldiers and janjaweed would return to
further attack the village and those who may have come back, killing and burning who and what
was left, in order to ensure that a village was not reoccupied by its former inhabitants. 4o Since
the coordinated attacks began, many of the destroyed villages have been reoccupied by the
janjaweed and their families, while nearly two million black Sudanese have been displaced from

their homes.
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C.

The Current Situation - A Large-Scale Humanitarian Crisis With Mostly WO:Ti.en
and Children as Victims

Currently, more than 250,000 displaced Darfur refugees are estimated to have resettled in
makeshift tents in refugee camps just across the Chad border.

41

Other refugees, displaced from

their homes and villages, have not been able to cross the Sahara Desert into Chad, and have set
up refugee camps in the western portion of Darfur. There are now approximately two million
internally-displaced refugees in Darfur.

42

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees

(UNHCR) continues to set up camps, opening its twelfth camp in May 2005.

43

Many towns and

villages in the Darfur region of Sudan, once occupied by tens of thousands of Darfurians are now
essentially ghost towns numbering in the hundreds at best.
In any event, both western Darfur and eastern Chad are desolate landscapes upon which
anyone can hope to survive. The land is dry and the landscape is intensely hot. Refugees have
nothing more than tents to protect them from the sun and harsh elements of the ChadlDarfur
landscape -- hard, arid, barren desert land subject to unrelenting heat and constant sandstorms.
Food is scarce, and wood for fire in the immediate surroundings of refugee camps is even
scarcer. Furthermore, the current situation has demonstrated that refugees are not out of
immediate danger of further attacks, nor are they completely out of harm's way within the
camps, as nearly 80% of the refugees that have fled to Chad are women and children. 44 As such,
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. Id The most recent estimates as of February 2008 put the number of Darfur refugees in Chad at 250,000, which
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the refugees in these camps are susceptible to continuing attacks, and the women are vulnerable
to being raped by thejanjaweed as they gather firewood.
In addition, many of the UN camps are grossly overcrowded, with camps designed for
6,000, actually holding three times that number.

45

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) initially severely underestimated the scope of the tragedy in the Sudan, and thus the
total number of refugees requiring assistance. Many ofthe camps lack clean water, sanitation,
and food, though UN relief workers have been present for months. Infants and children are
particularly at risk as they become severely malnourished and susceptible to disease from
drinking water utilized by animals. The World Health Organization has reported that due to such
unsanitary conditions, as of September 2004, between 6,000 and 10,000 people in camps in
Darfur die every month due to unsafe water and living in unsanitary conditions; many of them
are aged 5 and under. 46
In addition to the unsanitary conditions of the camps, the refugees have literally no
protection from the harsh elements of the Chad/Darfur border landscape - hard, arid, barren
desert land subject to unrelenting heat and constant sandstorms. In many of the camps in Chad,
four sticks in the ground constituted "home. ,,47 Some make roofs or a shelter by draping or
affixing a cloth to the sticks. On sunny days with no wind, such a makeshift shelter provides
some respite from the heat; however, on days with wind and sandstorms, "home" may blow
across the desert.
The UNHCR mobile monitoring teams have also monitored security in West Darfur and
near the Chad border. As a result of attacks in some of the camps, as of late July 2004, the
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UNHCR has had to move over 140,000 refugees to safer camps deeper inside Chad,48 and
another 65,000 as of early October 2004.

49

The UNHCR teams also monitor movements of

people and have found that as the violence continues in Darfur, so have the numbers of refugees
fleeing towards the border. 50
The situation with the explosion of refugees in Chad has become so dire that in early
2006, Chadian President Idriss Deby stated that his country would no longer be able to shelter
refugees after June 2006 nor guarantee the security of the refugees, and hoped that the Darfur
conflict would end at that time.

51

The Chadian government even accused the government of

Sudan of financing and arming anti-Deby rebels from Darfur, who attacked Chad's capital,
N'Djamena, only days before. 52 Despite Sudan's denials, Chad broke diplomatic relations,
which were eventually renewed. 53 In September 2006, a little attention was garnered to the
plight of refugees when then-Senator Barack Obama visited one of the camps in Eastern Chad,
and called for the United Nations to send in a UN protective force. 54
Then-Senator Obama's calls for a UN protective force were quite prescient, as the
violence against Darfur refugees in Chad continued to escalate. In February 2008, aerial
bombing continued over the Chad/Sudan border, and armed men blocked UNHCR trucks from
moving newly arrived refugees further into Chad, away from the border. 55 This prompted the
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Chadian Prime Minister Nouradine Delwa Kassire Coumakoye to declare that the Chadian
government would be refusing to admit new refugees. 56
1.

How the Sudanese Government Continues To Perpetuate and Exacerbate
the Crisis

Despite the fact that over a two and a half million people have been displaced as a result
of the systematic attacks upon unarmed civilians, the Sudanese government is doing little to offer
anything in the way of aid to refugees. As previously noted, sanitation in the camps is poor,
raising worries among those providing humanitarian assistance of the possibility of an outbreak
or cholera or measles. Some observers indicate that these may be the precise conditions that the
i

Sudanese government wanted, in order to eliminate displaced civilians naturally. As if the very
real threat of disease was not enough, refugees living in the camps live under the continuing
threat of attacks from the janjaweed.
The UN reports that despite the numbers that have already fled, the attacks continue. 57
Those who have been displaced have no real prospect of returning home to escape the threat, as
the janjaweed continue their assault on African villages. With the crisis since garnering more
prominence in the world's eyes, the government has felt pressure to alleviate the crisis, though
not in a way one would expect. In August 2004, there were reports of incidents in which masked
gunmen swept into camps in the middle of the night, abducting village leaders. The leaders
would return the next day, apparently injured, reporting that their assailants threatened to kill
them if they did not take their people home. 58 As recently as February 2008, when refugees
attempted to return to their villages in Darfur, they were told by the army to go back to Chad.
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There have been some signs of hope in the crisis, however short-lived. In April 200(,
SLAIM and the Sudanese government signed a temporary cease-fire, and the African Union
(A.U.) agreed to send a hundred and twenty unarmed monitors to Darfur.

60

These monitors were

limited to investigating violations of the cease-fire and were not supposed to combat the biggest
threat, namely, the continued attacks on Darfur civilians by the janjaweed and the military.6l In
late July 2004, the UN Security Council passed a resolution imposing an arms embargo on the
janjaweed and the SLAIM rebels, and threatening the Sudanese government with "further

action," such as an asset freeze or travel ban, if it did not show substantial progress within thirty
days in disarming thejanjaweed and bringing war criminals to justice.

62

But the Sudanese

government made it clear that it had no intention of disarming Arab triballeaders.

63

However, as indicated above, the violence continues. There are also reports that the
Sudanese government continues to arm the janjaweed militias, and it continues to bomb and
attack civilians. 64 Many of the refugees in Chad still face cross-border raids by the janjaweed,
and dangerous isolation during the rainy season, when aid deliveries are almost impossible.

6s

Women are under a constant threat of being raped while gathering wood for fire if forced to look
for wood too far from the camps.66
What is needed now in Darfur and along the Chad border, is an effective, international
peacekeeping and protection presence, precisely what the Sudanese government wants to avoid
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rnost. 67 Only very recently has the UN announced that a peacekeeping force will be deployed to
Darfur to monitor the situation, but full deployment has been constantly delayed. It is sorely
needed, as there have been numerous reports of the Sudanese government threatening to force
refugees to go home, but refugees refuse, knowing full well that they face the threat of further
attacks. 68 Most refuse to return home until they know that it is safe to do so, that is, when the
government rids the country of the janjaweed. 69
III.

The Sudan Genocide - Violation of Numerous Human Rights Treaties
The genocide in the Sudan violates a number of enumerated human rights as contained in

a number of human rights treaties, which creates an obligation under customary international law
to abate and/or bring to an end. Two of the most important treaties being violated, namely the
Genocide Convention and the International Bill of Rights, justifies immediate action by the
Security Council to utilize the threat of armed intervention to put an end to the crisis. 7o
A.

The Genocide Convention

The Genocide Convention came about largely through the efforts of one man, Ralph
Lemkin, a Polish Jew who first began to warn the world about Adolf Hitler's plan to attack Jews
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in Europe as early as 1933. Lemkin was inspired by a speech by British Prime Minister Wins
Churchill that had described what Germany was doing as "a crime without a name.,,7l
In 1944, Lemkin published a long, scholarly account of the Holocaust that included
copies of Hitler's anti-Jewish decrees in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. 72 In Axis Rule,
Lemkin coined a new phrase, "genocide," to describe the crime that went beyond murder to the
annihilation of a people. Within a week of its publication, the Roosevelt administration seized
upon the term to describe what was happening in Europe. Not long after that, "genocide" gained
widespread usage when the media began using the word in its news coverage. 73
In the years after World War II, the newly created United Nations declared the Nazi
atrocities as "crimes against humanity", and set out to create new standards on the laws and
customs of war. 74 After the Nuremberg judgment, the UN General Assembly declared genocide
an international crime. 75 Through the intense lobbying efforts of Ralph Lemkin, in 1948 the UN
General Assembly drafted and unanimously adopted the convention aimed at the prevention and
punishment of genocide, which was ratified on January 12, 1951. 76
For over forty years after World War II, the Genocide Convention was relegated to
obscurity as human rights focused on more modern violations such as apartheid, torture and
disappearances. 77 With the events in Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda, the Convention was brought
back into the limelight once more. The humanitarian crisis in Darfur should be added to the list
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of events of worldwide significance demanding immediate interpretation and application of ~.he
Genocide Convention, and all the acts that fall under its jurisdiction.
1. The Elements of Genocide
Because genocide is a crime of intent, the crucial question is the purpose of the offender,
not the result. 78 Even if the numbers of those killed are relatively low, the crime can be
considered genocide if the intent is to destroy a group "in whole or in part.',79 Whereas there are
large numbers of victims, the intent is relatively easy to prove, and can be easily deduced from
the given facts. 80
In the case of the crisis in Darfur, there is little question that what occurred was genocide.
Large numbers of victims, estimated in the tens of thousands, have been subject to a pattern of
coordinated atrocities: killings, rapes and destruction of property, all due to their ethnicity. The
facts indicate that the predominantly Arab government and its militias committed genocide by
targeting non-Arabs 81 in its campaign of mass murder of national, ethnic and tribal groups, and
in forcing those groups into such adverse conditions so as to bring about their destruction
naturally.
However, quite surprisingly, there has been much debate as to whether what Khartoum
had in mind was in fact genocide, giving rise to the reluctance of the world and the UN to refer
to the crisis in Darfur as such. In July 2004, both houses of Congress unanimously passed
concurrent resolutions calling the crisis genocide. 82 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell
testified before the Senate foreign relations committee that the pattern of atrocities and
78
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displacement of people in Darfur lead to the conclusion that genocide had in fact occurred. 83
Nevertheless, despite the previous Bush administration's conclusion that the crisis is in fact
genocide, no intervention has been offered by the United States.
a.

Appointment of the ICID

On September 18, 2004, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, appointed a commission of inquiry, "to investigate reports of violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law regarding the situation in Darfur, and to determine
whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations
with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.,,84 Unfortunately, as
promising as this seemed, the five-person International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
("ICID,,)85 concluded that in its report that while the Sudanese government and the janjaweed
militia are in fact responsible for the indiscriminate attacks on unarmed civilians that constitute
war crimes, nevertheless, the commission found that the Government did not pursue a policy of
genocide.
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The Commission concluded that two elements of genocide may be deduced from the

gross violations of human rights by the Government and the janjaweed militia.
First, the actus reus, consisting of the killing, or the act of causing serious bodily or
mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life most likely to bring about the
destruction of a group of people. Second, there is the existence of a protected group being
targeted for the criminal conduct. Unfortunately, the Commission further concluded that the
;-~--------------
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essential element of genocide, the intent to commit genocide, was missing, as it appeared that
intent of the government and the janjaweed militia on perpetrating attacks upon unarmed
civilians and villages was primarily for the purposes of counter-insurgency warfare. 87
This is a tragically erroneous conclusion. The overwhelming evidence indicates that the
calculated and coordinated attacks were primarily targeted against unarmed civilians.
addition, the manner in which attacks were carried out strongly suggests otherwise.
attacks focused on food, water supplies and shelters, not armory sites.

9o
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In

The aerial

Ground attacks were

indiscriminate and did not appear to seek out rebel insurgents, or those that were armed. 91
Victims and witnesses alike assert that the Government and thejanjaweed acted in concert to
randomly kill, rape, attack and maim, without any evidence of the presence ofinsurgents,92 and
with the stated intent to kill black Sudanese. 93 In addition, the continued attacks upon civilians
while seeking refuge in camps in and outside of Darfur (over the Chad border), is also
compelling evidence of the intent to commit genocide.
In addition, by not labeling the Darfur crisis for what it is - a genocide, ICID has
effectively avoided having the obligations entailed under the Genocide Convention to be
triggered, which would have obligated the international community - including the United
Nations - to prevent, suppress and punish genocide. 94 Furthermore, the facts of the Darfur crisis
are Virtually identical to those presented in the Kosovo conflict, where there was international

intervention. Neither the UN or the United States had any trouble whatsoever in referring to
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Slobodan Milosevic' s campaign of murder, rape, beatings, burning of villages and

intention~ll

displacement of ethnic Albanians as "ethnic cleansing," and therefore enough to warrant
intervention.
While the two terms "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide" are not entirely synonymous,95
they seek similar ends: to rid a territory of a population. While the Commission may have
erroneously concluded that the Sudanese government and its militias merely intended to rid
Darfur of tribes inhabiting the area, numerous victims and witnesses to the attacks have attested
that the attackers themselves intended to kill the blacks in Darfur. 96 Furthermore, follow-up
attacks of villages after initial air and ground assaults, attacks upon villagers who return to
villages, attacks upon refugees in camps in both Darfur and Chad, as well as the intended
disruption of relief operations, all evidence the intent to not just displace a people, but to
completely annihilate it. 97 The only good news from ICID's investigations was that it did
conclude that crimes against humanity were committed in Darfur thereby justifying prosecution

by the International Criminal Court (ICC), on which the Security Council did follow through.98
2.

Rape

As stated above, reports of the crisis in Darfur include rape of women and girls that were
not killed during an initial assault, as well as the rape of women and girls in the refugee camps in
both Chad and Darfur. 99
The law of war has prohibited rape by soldiers for centuries. 100 During armed conflict,
the role of rape has been utilized as both an attack on the individual victim and as a method of
95
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• ethnic cleansing, intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify an ethnic group. 101 In Wor~d

War II, rape was treated as an instrument of policy; the Nazi and Japanese practices of forced
prostitution and rape on a large scale is an egregious example of such policies. 102
Although rape is specifically prohibited in the fourth Geneva Convention 103 and the
Additional ProtocolS,104 these instruments do not treat rape as a grave breach subject to universal
jurisdiction.
I

l05

Both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals largely ignored gender-based

crimes. 106 It was only in recent years that the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, in
its indictment of Bosnian Serb military and police officers in connection with rapes of Muslim
women in the Bosnian war, declared that rape is a war crime. 107 More recently, both the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have overcome reluctance by those governments and other
obstacles to address and prosecute individuals committing this crime. 108
Furthermore, Pierre-Richard Prosper, former U.S. ambassador-at-Iarge for war crimes,
helped to expand the definition of genocide to include organized violence against women as
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UN News Centre, Darfur's Displaced Remain Traumatized and at Risk of Rape, Harassment, (Aug. 30, 2004),
WWW.un.org/apps/news/stOly.asp?NewsID=11777&Cr=sudan&Crl , (last visited Feb. 13,2009); see also, footnotes
35-37,
supra•
100
Theodore Meron, Rape As A Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. 1. INT'L. L. 424, 430 (Jul.
1993).
1011d.
102

ld
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, (Aug. 12, 1949),6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
hl4N.T.S. 287 [Geneva Convention No. IV].
I Prot?col Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
ttematIonal Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, Arts. 76(1) and 85,1125 U.N.T.S. 3,16 I.L.M.
~91 (~977) [Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
u~ectlOn of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, Art. 4(2)(e), 1125
lOS .T.S.609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [Protocol II].
106 Meron, Rape As A Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, supra note 100 at 430.
St I<. D. Askin, Sexual Violence In Decisions And Indictments Of The Yugoslav And Rwandan Tribunals: Current
¥~tus, 93 AM. 1. INT'L. L. 97, (Jan. 1999); Marlise Simons, For First Time, Court Defines Rape as War Crime, NEW
TIMES, (Jun. 28, 1996), see www.nytimes.com/specials/bosnia/contextl0628warcrimes-tribunal.html.
bqiA Ill?ns, For First Time, Court Defines Rape as War Crime, supra note 106.
"" skm, Sexual Violence In Decisions And Indictments Of The Yugoslav And Rwandan Tribunals, supra note 106
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rape. After spending significant time as a prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal.rci
Rwanda (ICTR), Ambassador Prosper concluded that rape and mutilation had to be considered
crimes so traumatizing to its victims that it made them, for all practical purposes, no longer able
to contribute to humanity.109 While in Arusha, Tanzania, Ambassador Prosper looked at the
Genocide Convention and argued to the court that the Convention envisioned acts which fall
short of death, but also caused "serious bodily harm." Ambassador Prosper further argued that
the systematic rape of Tutsi women fell into that category. In the end, the court found that rape
was a part of the act of genocide. 11 0
There is no question that systematic rapes of women and girls occurred during the initial
attacks in Darfur, and continue to occur against women and girls in refugee camps in and outside
of Darfur. In the totality of the circumstances, it appears that rape, which was sometimes
accompanied by murder, was intended to destroy the ethnic tribes that inhabited Darfur. This is
only further evidence that genocide in fact occurred in Darfur, and that the UN Commission was
incorrect in its assessment as to the intent of the Sudanese government and its militia. As the
crisis in Darfur in fact amounts to genocide, it is now time for the UN to mete out punishment for
these blatant criminal acts.

It is obvious that the actions of the Sudanese government violate the Genocide
Convention. III The Genocide Convention defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to

~~-------------------

U .. S. Dept. of State, Genocide Convention Now Extends to Systematic Rape, press release of the Embassy of the
Il~~:'d States for Japan, undated.
III

Al~lso known a~ the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N .T.S. 277.
w ough Sudan IS not a signatory to this convention, given that the UN was founded out of principles to prevent
n: an~ other atrocities that occurred during World War II, arguably, Sudan has little standing to state that since it is
the; Signatory to the Genocide Convention, it is not beholden to its proscriptions, given that these principles have
orce of customary law.
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destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" by various means,
that seek as its end, the annihilation of a people. The Genocide Convention states that not only is
the act of genocide a punishable act, but it also includes as punishable offense conspiracy to
commit genocide, incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide as well as
complicity in genocide. I \3 The Convention further provides that punishment for the crime of
genocide not only applies to government rulers and officials, but also to private individuals. I 14
The atrocities that have occurred include executions, rapes, destruction of property, food and
water supplies, all due to the ethnicity of the people to whom these crimes are directed towards.
In addition, there is continued violence by the janjaweed against refugees in camps, mostly
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women and children, arguably to the end of destroying the population.
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The International Bill of Rights
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The three principle instruments of human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human

~

~"

Rights ("UDHR"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the

~

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") have collectively,
acquired the designation "the International Bill of Rights. ,,115 Since its adoption in 1948, no state
or government that has come into existence has questioned or expressed reservation to the
Universal Declaration, and it continues to be cited with unanimous approval in resolutions of

1\2

th The ful.1 text of Article II of the Convention reads as follows: "In the present Convention, genocide means any of
e following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group
~ ~~ch: (a) ~illing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
e Iberately mflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
~art; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the
fl30 uP to another group."
G Th~ full text of Article III of the Convention reads as follows: "The following acts shall be punishable: (a)
coenoc.lde; (b) ~onspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to
1t4~lt genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide."
acts e full text of Article IV of the Convention reads as follows: "Persons committing genocide or any of the other
or p ~num~rat~d in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials
Its f1vate individuals."
See note 70, supra.
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international bodies, 116 leading many experts and scholars to argue that the provisions of the
Universal Declaration in fact, have the force of customary law.

II7

Some applicable rights

included are rights to life, liberty, security of person, entitlement to rights without discrimination,
right to nationality, and freedom from arbitrary deprivation of property.II8
The international law of human rights includes numerous international agreements and
other instruments, as well as an extensive body of principles of customary law that seeks to
establish minimum international standards for national human rights as international norms that
states are required to respect and ensure. II9 Of course, the international law of human rights
begins with the United Nations Charter, which has at its core the recognition of and respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 120 The three principle
instruments of human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (lCESCR) have collectively, acquired the designation "the
International Bill of Rights."l2l
The Universal Declaration was adopted on December 10, 1948. Like the United Nations
itself, it was drafted as a result of Hitler and other atrocities that occurred during World War II.
Since its adoption, no state or government that has come into existence has questioned or

116 1d.

117 Id.
118

'

1\9 Untversal

Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 1,2,3,5,7,12,13,14,17.
Damrosch, et aI., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 675-676, (4 th ed. 2001).
dArtlcle 55 of the United Nations Charter reads as follows: "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability
an. ~el1-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
f.~cIPle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of
~~mg, ~11 employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of
an;matl~nal economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation;
to c. Untversal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
fakra~e: sex, language, or religion." Article 56 of the Charter reads as follows: "All Members pledge themselves to
Jlomt and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
120 Lor!

,A.!

:G:"C e 55."

',Dam
".
rOSch, et aI., supra note 119 at 591. See also note 70, supra.
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expressed reservations to the Universal Declaration, and it continues to be cited with unanimy:s
approval or acquiescence in resolutions of international bodies.

122

Though the Universal

Declaration was not originally intended to be law, there has been an increased propensity to
attribute a legal character to many of its provisions, given its universal acceptance.

123

This has

led many experts and scholars to argue that the provisions of the Universal Declaration in fact,
have the force of customary Iaw.
1.

124

The ICCPR and the ICESCR

In 1966, the Universal Declaration was bifurcated into the two distinct covenants, the
ICCPR and the ICESCR. Both covenants begin with the recognition of the inherent dignity of
the human person, and that all members of the human family are entitled to the equal and
inalienable rights of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 125 But the two covenants then
diverge. The ICCPR obligates states to respect and ensure the rights recognized by the Covenant
for all persons subject to their jurisdiction, and to enact laws and adopt any other measures
necessary to that end. 126 The ICESCR obligates states to recognize and achieve progressively a
number of rights, 127 most notably, the right to adequate food, clothing and housing (Article 11),

the right to protection and assistance to the family, mothers and children (Article 10).
However, as worldwide events indicate, many nations have not strictly and faithfully
adhered to the principles of the International Bill of Rights. Unlike the Universal Declaration,

122
123 ld.
124 ld

125

ld

at 593 .
at 594.

126~ Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, www.unhchr.ch.
127

amro~ch, et aI., supra note 119 at 595-97.

soc~er n~ts include the right to work (Article 6); the right to just and favorable working conditions (Article 7); to
(~Clsecur~ty (Article 91; to the high~st attainabl~ standar~ of physical and me~tal.health (Article l~); to e~uc~tion
A·

,

to ~ 13), and to the right take part In cultural lIfe, to enJoy the benefits of sCientific progress and Its applIcatIOn,

enefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
of which a person is the author (Article 15). See, UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human
wWw.unhchr.ch.
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both of the Covenants were designed to transform the provisions of the Universal Declaration
into binding treaties, both Covenants have measures of enforcement by the establishment of
Committees,128 which required states to periodically report to the Committees on measures they
have taken to adhere to the Covenants. In addition, member states may submit complaints
lodged against them by or on behalf of private individuals claiming to be victims of violation. 129
Sudan is a member state to both Covenants, and the Universal Declaration. As well
documented herein, the Sudanese government has committed innumerable gross violations of
human rights. Under the enforcement mechanisms of both Covenants, the government of Sudan
could be held accountable for its violations, and subject to the obligations of adherence of the
Covenants if either individuals or other states file complaints. However, because the number of
complaints against the Sudanese government for violations of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR
(and other human rights conventions) could number well into the thousands, the most practical
vehicle for handling such claims of violations could be the referral of the crisis in Darfur to the
International Criminal Court, as discussed herein.

c.

Other Relevant (and Applicable) Human Rights Treaties

While the Genocide Convention and the International Bill of Rights are two of the most
important treaties that are being violated, nevertheless, a number of other less prominent but
equally important treaties are also being violated which should give rise to United Nations action

to abate or end the Darfur humanitarian crisis. And, while the following conventions do not have
:,same enforcement requirements as the Genocide Convention, nevertheless, these conventions
.... important instruments in the international law of human rights. These documents also lend
to the argument that the situation in Darfur has given rise to a number of human rights

ICCPR has a Human Rights Committee, and the ICESCR has a Committee on Economic, Cultural and
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violations, and that intervention is required to stop the killings, rapes and displacements, as v.t ..•

as to prevent further human rights violations.
1.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
("CERD") was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1965. Its basic tenet is that
all UN members should take steps to promote and encourage universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.

130

It further recognizes that every nation shall fully and faithfully observe

the provisions of the UDHR.

131

Despite these provisions, numerous human rights violations

based on race, sex, language and religion by signatory states have occurred since the
Convention's entry into force. Numerous human rights violations based on race, sex, language
and religion have occurred since the Convention's entry into force in 1969: the Vietnam war,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, the apartheid in South Africa, torture and kidnappings in South
America, and now the Darfur humanitarian crisis. The actions of the Sudanese government, a
signatory to CERD, and the government-sponsored militia against its black minority population,
are in direct violation of the Convention.
2.

The Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

The Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("Women's
Convention") is a special treaty dealing specifically with gender-based discrimination. It was
adopted in 1979, and entered into force two years later. The aim of the Convention is to
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, which Article 1 of the Convention defines
~---------------------------------------------------------------------130 UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, www.unhchr.ch.
131 UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, www.unhchr.ch.
Damrosch, et a1., supra note 119 at 593.
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as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex.,,132 Unfortunately, the
convention is textually silent about violence against women, except as to trafficking of women.
To remedy this, in 1992, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDA W) adopted General Recommendation No. 19, on violence against
women, which applies to violence against women perpetrated by public officials, although
discrimination is not limited to acts by or on behalf of governments. 133
Though there have been numerous reports of mass rape and other crimes committed
against women in Darfur, it is unlikely the Sudanese government will be brought to justice for
violations of this Convention. As of 2000, only 165 nations have fully ratified the Women's
Convention, and Sudan is not one of them. The grisly accounts of mass rape and mutilation of
women in war and conflicts such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda and now Darfur cry out for a
universal ratification and adoption of the Women's Convention. However, having attracted the
greatest number of reservations with the potential to exclude most, if not all the terms of the
treaty,134 the Convention has almost no power to prevent such atrocities from continuing in the
future. And given the number of reservations, it is not likely to be applied seriously any time
soon.

3.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child

The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted in November 1989 and entered
into force in 1990. The Convention recognizes that in order to achieve a full and harmonious
development of a child, it is in the best interests of children to grow up in a family environment.
~-------------------The fuH text of Article I of the Convention reads as follows: "For the purposes of the present Convention, the
te"? 'discrimination against women' shaH mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction mad on the basis of sex
~hlch has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
~espective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
13;edoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field."
Damrosch, et al., supra note 119 at 675-677.
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It also recognizes that in order for the child to be fully prepared to live an individual life in
society, a child should be brought up within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any
as to the child or his or her parent or legal guardian on the basis of race, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status.
Like many other human rights conventions drafted in the spirit of the International Bill of
Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been egregiously violated over time. As
with other conventions and the International Bill of Rights discussed herein, the government of
Sudan, a signatory, is in gross violation in of this Convention by creating the crisis in Darfur, and
in continuing to perpetuate the crisis by forcing thousands of displaced women and children to
live in fear for their safety in deplorable conditions in refugee camps, as well as conscripting
children into the Sudanese army.
4.

The Convention on Refugees and Stateless Persons

The Convention on Refugees was adopted 1951, in response to the large number of
Jewish people who had to leave Germany during World War II. This Convention defines
"refugee" as a person who has crossed an international border due to a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. So far, it is the only international agreement to specifically guarantee
protection to refugees. Sudan is a signatory to this Convention, as is Chad.
As noted above, the continued attacks against displaced Sudanese refugees in Chad is in
clear violation of the Convention. By the fact that displaced persons are now in a protected
status, the Sudanese government, along with the Chad government, is under an obligation to
~-------------------------------------------------------------------

A 1. Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85

.1.I.L. 281, 317 (1991).
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protect refugees. While those displaced persons still trapped in Darfur do not technically meet
the definition of "refugee," nevertheless, it is arguable that spirit of the Convention would create
an obligation for the Sudan government not to engage in acts that purposefully causes harm or
alloWS harm to come to such displaced persons.
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CHAPTER TWO:

THE CRISIS IN DARFUR:
A "CIVIL WAR" UPON WHICH HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION WOULD INTERFERE IN STATE SOVEREIGNTY?

41

-"If the collective conscience of humanity ... cannot find in the United Nations its
greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and
justice."
-- Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan
1.

Introduction
The Sudanese government has continually justified its armed attacks upon innocent

unarmed civilians as the legitimate use of the police power by a sovereign state in a purely
domestic matter, characterizing such actions as "attacks against rebel groups." 135 Others, such as
the United Nations, consider the plight of the inhabitants of the Darfur region to be an issue of
customary humanitarian law, as well in violation of a number of treaties.
While the Sudanese government would have the world believe that the grossly
exaggerated number of deaths and/or refugees are the result of a civil war against "armed
rebels," to all the rest of the world, it is clear that these senseless atrocities that have been
committed on a large scale are the result of a pro-Arab government seeking to eradicate its Black
population.
II.

International Law and Policy on Armed Conflicts - Humanitarian Considerations
A.

Is the Darfur Crisis an Armed Conflict?
1.

Overview

What is occurring today is a full-scale attack on unarmed civilians, creating over two
million refugees, mostly due to an armed militia backed by the Sudanese government, and we
must now ask: Is this really an armed conflict? And what type of conflict is it exactly?
Under international law, an armed conflict is (normally) defined as the "resort to the use
of force to resolve a political issue where diplomatic solutions have failed." 136 Green in his text

----------------------Id
135

136

.

U ~s noted by Warren E. Small, Adjunct Professor, Lecture, "Law of International Armed Conflict," Golden Gate
nlVersity, (Jan. 22, 2007).

42

c

notes, citing Grotius who, in his De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 137states that war is the "state or situat:,
ofthose who dispute by force of arms," 138 usually requiring two or more parties to a dispute.
While the situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan represents many of the elements articulated

in this definition, is appears that it is enough to classify this scenario as an armed conflict.
There is clearly a use of force - the Sudanese military with the assistance of the

janjaw eed utilize arms and other crude weapons to attack villages and farmers in the Darfur
region to either drive out villagers and take over the land, or kill villagers outright. Clearly there
is a history of a dispute, or the basis of a dispute, though it is rather questionable whether the
original dispute between the Sudanese goverrunent and the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
("SLAlM"), one of the so-called "rebel forces," really has anything to do with the Darfur region

of Sudan. The government has repeatedly utilized the "presence" of the SLAIM and other
"rebel" groups in the region as a pretext for its attacks on villages and unarmed civilians, despite
the fact that much of the armed strife between the SLAIM and the government has taken place in
the southern region of Sudano

20

Systematic Attacks on Civilians by the Jan;aweed - Do They Make the
Situation an Armed Conflict?

As stated above, the problem created by the presence of the janjaweed is not only the
attacks upon unarmed civilians with little or no security to protect them, but also the fact that the

janjaweed has acted in the past, and continues to act, with the full assistance, financing and
Imprimatur of the Sudanese goverrunent. Given these facts, it would be fair to say that attacks
by the janjaweed do indeed allow the characterization of the Darfur situation as an armed

~------------------P LoCo Green, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, pg. 1, (1993), citing Grotius, DE JURE BELLI AC
13~CIS, (published 1625.)

Id.
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conflict. As many reports indicate it is the janjaweed that are primarily responsible for the
ongoing attacks of villages and refugees in camps, a closer look at the janjaweed is warranted.
a. Who are the Jan;aweed and What is their Status?
Janjaweed militiamen are primarily members of nomadic Darfurian and Chadian Arab-

speaking tribes who have long been at odds with the Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa farming
communities, over access to pasture and water for cattle, or outright theft of animals. The
janjaweed first emerged in 1988 after then-Chadian President Hissene Habre defeated the Libyan

government's territorial designs on Chad. Libya's Chadian protege, Acheickh Ibn Orner Saeed
retreated with his Arab militia forces to Darfur, where they were hosted by the newly-elevated
chief of the Mahamid Rizeigat Arabs of north Darfur, who had earlier smuggled weapons to Ibn
Omer's forces. Ibn Orner had also brought with him to Darfur an Arab supremacist ideology.
As a result, in the early 1990's, the janjaweed became the combination of Chadian and
Darfurian forces, tolerated by the Sudanese government, who became notorious for racist
rhetoric, massacre, rape and forced displacement. 139 The conflicts between the then-insurgents
and the janjaweed were primarily over the increasingly scarce water and land resources in
Darfur, given the problem of increasing desertification of arable lands, due to ongoing
drought.

140

Such scarcity resulted injanjaweed resorting to such tactics as "swooping in" on

non-Arab farms to steal cattle or force farmers off their land altogether. 141
In 1999-2000, faced with threats of insurgencies in Western and Northern Darfur,
Khartoum armed the janjaweed. The janjaweed became much more aggressive in 2003 after two
non-Arab groups, the SLAIM and the Justice and Equality Movement (hereinafter, "JEM") took

---------------------139
Id
140

.

B. Koerner, Who Are the Janjaweed? A Guide to the Sudanese Militiamen, Slate Magazine, (Jul. 19,2005),
~ate.com/toolbar.aspxlactio=print&id=21 0421 0, (last visited April 15,2007).

Id
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up anTIS against the Sudanese government alleging mistreatment of non-Arab Sudanese by tL
predominantly Arab government in Khartoum. In response to the uprising, the janjaweed be?";
pillaging towns and villages inhabited by members of the Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa tribes from whom many members of the SLNM and JEM drew their forces. 142
Since 2003, thejanjaweed, with the assistance and backing of the government, are no
longer the "scrappy" militias of yesterday, but are now instead well-equipped fighting forces that
receive and enjoy the covert assistance of the Sudanese government. 143 It has been reported by
field observers from Human Rights Watch that the Sudanese government openly recruited horseowning Arab men, promising them a gun and a monthly salary in exchange for their services
with thejanjaweed 144 Another group, International Crisis Group indicated that the money paid
to thejanjaweed is derived directly from the booty captured in raids on towns and villages,
giving them an additional financial incentive to act with extreme brutality.
b.

Should the Jan;aweed Be Entitled to the Protected Status Given to
Members of the Armed Forces?

Mercenaries have long been viewed as non-combatants outside of the protection of the
Geneva Conventions afforded to members of the armed forces (combatants), and are not entitled
to be treated as prisoners of war. As a matter of fact, it has only been since World War II that
mercenaries have been condemned, with the UN concluding that the use of mercenaries in
national liberation movements is a criminal act.

Both the Security Council and the General

Assembly have passed a number of resolutions (though, General Assembly resolutions are nonbinding), indicating that the recruitment and use of mercenaries against national liberation

~-----------------Id. It should also be stated that the conflict in Darfur is entirely separate from the 22-year civil war in the
~uthern region of Sudan that has continued between the Muslim government and Christian and animist rebels.
14~azingly, the janjaweed have nothing to do with that war. Id
I Id
44/d
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movements constitutes a criminal act. 145 Given all that is known about the janjaweed thu5 :can be said that the janjaweed may fall under the definition of a mercenary.
In 1977, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions was adopted,146 and entered into force on
December 7, 1978. Under Article 47 of Protocol I, a mercenary is defined as any person who:
(a) is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does, in
fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially
by the desire for private gain and in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of party to a conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar
ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party; (d) is neither a national of a party to the
conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the
armed forces of a party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a party to
the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 147
Interestingly, although under Protocol I, although a mercenary would not have the right
of a combatant or a prisoner of war, nevertheless, he or she would not be devoid of all protection.
Presumably since he or she is not deemed a combatant, he or she is presumably a civilian and
would be treated as such under the Civilians Convention (the Fourth Geneva Convention.)
Under Protocol I, a mercenary would be entitled to such minimum prerequisites such as a fair
148
.
tnal, as well as the fundamental guarantees under Article 75 of Protocol 1.

It appears that the janjaweed falls under all categories indicated above, and may be
deemed mercenaries. It also appears that the janjaweed have been recruited as mercenaries by

~------------------

Green, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 131 at pg. 112; see also note 31, supra.
See note 43, supra.
See, Article 47, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,1125 U.N.T.S. 3, adopted June 8,
!4~77, at Geneva, Switzerland.
See note 38, supra.
146
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the Sudanese government to oppose any force real or perceived, that is actively seeking tc
the government from further marginalizing Black Sudanese in the Darfur region.
c.

The Problem of Mercenary Status - The Imprimatur of the
Sudanese Government

Members of the janjaweed militia have also been reported to have the imprimatur of the
government. Numerous witnesses and victims have described the janjaweed arriving at the same
time as and leaving with the government forces, wearing uniforms similar to government
uniforms, utilizing similar arms and equipment as that utilized by government soldiers, and
seeming to coordinate ground attacks with aerial bombardment by government aircraft. [49
Members of the janjaweed even reside in government garrison towns. [50 It has also been
reported that during attacks, the janjaweed have made such statements as "we are the
government!" leaving no doubt as to the relationship between the government and the

janjaweed. [5 [
Despite the rather obvious imprimatur of the government, nevertheless, it cannot be said
that the janjaweed is in fact a part of the armed forces of the government of Sudan. Numerous
reports of the ongoing violence in the Darfur region refer to the janjaweed as militiamen, acting
in concert with, (though outside of) the government. The Khartoum government itself has
offered various conflicting reports of its logistical and financial support of the janjaweed,
denying any involvement with thejanjaweed coupled with claims ofthejanjaweed acting
alone, [52 then flatly refusing calls from the international community for the government to

~-------------------Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,
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disarm them. 153 Nevertheless, it is likely that despite reported ties to the government, the

janjaweed should be considered as having a "mercenary" -type status.
3.

The Activities of the SLAIM and the JEM - Do They Make it
an Anned Conflict?
a.

The Beginning of the Sudanese Liberation Anny/Movement

The SLAIM was originally made up of an armed self-defense militia formed by western
Sudanese tribesmen - primarily the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes who utilized the land for
farming, as a defense to those Arab tribesmen who wish to utilize the same land for grazing their
cattle. 154 Currently, many of those in the SLAIM are non-Muslim Black Sudanese who have
survived the attacks of the janjaweed who have taken up anns to stop the marginalization of
Black Sudanese by the pro-Arab government.

155

Formerly known as the Darfur Liberation Front, the SLAIM issued a political declaration
on March 14, 2003, stating that it had taken up arms against the Khartoum government to change
the political system in Sudan. The SLAIM demanded, among other things for Black Sudanese,
equality, the separation of religion and the state, complete restructuring and redistribution of
political power, equitable development as well as cultural and political pluralism. 156
b.

The Beginning of the Justice and Equality Movement

The JEM began as a result of a 1989 coup by the National Islamic Front leader Hassan alTurabi who overthrew former President Sadeq al-Mahdi, clearing the way for Omar Hassan alBashir to take the presidency. 157 AI-Turabi then incorporated non-Arab African Muslims into
the political system of Sudan. Al-Bashir saw this incorporation as an attempt to reduce his
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power, dissolved the government and purged it of the non-Arab Muslims who went on to
the JEM.

158

The pro-Arab, Muslim government is accused by the JEM of being discriminatory and
oppressive to non-Arabs, accusing the government of such offenses as taking lands from African
tribes, systematic rapes, destruction of basic infrastructure such as water and electrical systems,
bombing of civilians. 159 The JEM along with the SLAIM has also accused the government of
attacks on camps of internally displaced persons, mostly non-Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim
Africans. It is in defending these camps that both rebel groups have encountered the janjaweed,
who have sometimes plundered the camps taking livestock, water and other resources, and

.
. the camps. 160
sometimes
women III
c.

Joining of Forces of the Two Rebel Groups

In January 2006, the SLAIM and the JEM issued a joint statement, indicating that they
agreed to join in all political, military and social forces, their international relations and to double
their combat capacity in a collective body under the name Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of
West Sudan. This statement presumably means that the two groups are operating under a joint
command. Even though the groups have acted jointly since the statement was issued, recent
events have suggested that there may be somewhat of a splinter between the two groups. For
example, some factions of the SLAIM still loyal to a SLAIM former leader Abdul Wahed
Mohammed el Nur, may not be party to peace agreements signed by the current leaders of the
joint forces, namely Minni Arcua Minnawi (SLAIM) and Ibrahim Khalil Mohammed (JEM).

---------------------Id
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B.

The Conflict in Southern Sudan

Southern Sudan has been beset more than one civil war. The first civil war between
Northern and Southern Sudan began in 1955, one year before Sudan was declared an
independent nation. It essentially sought to limit the movement of Southern Sudanese in order to
prevent the spread of malaria and other tropical diseases to British troops that previously
occupied Sudan. 161 The conflict lasted from 1955 to 1972, when a cessation of the north-south
conflict was terminated under the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted
autonomy to Southern Sudan. 162
The Second Sudanese Civil War began in 1983, after a ten-year hiatus of conflict, when
President Gaafar Nimery decided to abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement by creating a
Federated Sudan which included states in Southern Sudan, previously declared autonomous. 163
President Nimeiry also imposed Islamic law on the southern states. 164

The Sudan People's

Liberation Army (SPLA) was formed as a result. 165 The war continued after Nimeiry was ousted
and a democratic government was elected, although the Umma party (an Islamic party) had a
majority in Parliament.
The leader of the SPLA, John Garang, refused to recogmze the Umma party as the
government but agreed to negotiate as a representative of their parties.

A bloodless coup

installed current President Omar al-Bashir and Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi, and a
government of Islamic orientation that began to use religious propaganda to recruit people for the
regular army. This caused the conflict with SPLA to intensify, as many people in the south were
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Christian. 166 The SPLA sought the support of the West (after previously having the support of
the Soviet Union and Ethiopia) to portray the war as campaign of the Arab Islamic government
to impose Islam and the Arabic language on the Christian south. 167
The second civil war went on for twenty years, which left a devastating effect on villages
and tribal rebels alike.

It also bitterly divided the country on racial, religious and regional

grounds, displaced more than four million people, and resulted in the death of two million more.
It also severely damaged the Sudan economy, resulting in starvation of many people, as well as a

demise of infrastructure and funding for basic health services, education and jobs. In 2003,
significant progress towards a peace agreement was made, and a Comprehensive Peace
Agreement was reached on January 9,2005, granting Southern Sudan autonomy for six years, to
be followed by a referendum on independence. It also created a co-vice president position and
allowed the north and south to split oil (and their proceeds) equally, but left both the North and
South's armies in place.
The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established under UN Security
Council Resolution 1590 of March 24, 2005, whose mandate was to support implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to perform functions related to humanitarian
assistance, as well as to promote the protection of human rights. 168 UNMIS' mandate was
quickly tested when John Garang, the south's elected co-vice president died in a helicopter crash
on August 1, 2005, three weeks after he was sworn into office.

This resulted in riots, but

eventually, peace was restored to the region. 169
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Despite the 2005 Peace Agreement, southern Sudan still faces a number of probl,,:" ...
Widespread sexual violence against children continues, as well as a lack of adequate
infrastructure designed to bring adequate healthcare, education and jobs is still prevalent. 170 The
imposition of Sharia (Islamic) law makes it difficult to prosecute many sexual assault cases, and

in addition, the lack of attention of the pro-Arab Islamic government has allowed thousands to
continue to face the on-going threat of sexual abuse, armed attacks, abductions, torture and

· Iacement. 171
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C.

Is the Darfur Conflict a Fight for Self-Determination?

The attack at EI Fasher in 2003 that triggered the current crisis was borne out of a long
struggle of Black Darfurians for equality and political equality in the Darfur region. As indicated
above, the pro-Arab government has over time engaged in the systematic political and economic
marginalization of Blacks, while favoring Arabs. It has been reported that both the SLNM and
the JEM have taken up arms to oppose such marginalization of Blacks, to seek infrastructure,
jobs, political equality in the Darfur region. As indicated in Chapter II (A) (2), it appears that
under the current facts, the conflict in Darfur can be characterized as a conflict for selfdetennination, which is not clearly defined under Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
discussed below.
1.

The Activities of the Sudanese Army - Do They Make it an Armed
Conflict?

Although many reports indicate it is the janjaweed that are primarily responsible for the
ongoing attacks of villages and refugees in camps, it should be remembered that the janjaweed

has acted and continues to act with the full assistance, logistical support and financing of the
~---------------.
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Sudan government. Furthermore, it should be noted the janjaweed has not acted alone in its
attacks on villages. As reported by Human Rights Watch, many of the aerial bombardments,
surveillance, heavy equipment and reconnaissance of villages before, during and after attacks
have been committed by the Sudanese Army and government planes and helicopters. 172
During conflicts with rebels in South of the country, the Sudanese military perfected a
strategy to combat insurgents: air forces would attack from the sky while Arab tribesmen, armed
by the government, would concurrently attack from the ground. 173 These Arab militia, or

janjaweed became particularly important in Darfur, since a majority of the Sudanese army who
were from Darfur could not be trusted to take up arms against former neighbors and kin. 174
Nevertheless, although it can be said that thejanjaweed is responsible for much of the killing, in
all these attacks, government forces have played a more than a supporting role to the janjaweed "softening up" villages with heavier weapons than those carried by the janjaweed, providing
logistical support, or giving the janjaweed protection as they leave. 175
As previously noted above eyewitnesses report that attacks were coordinated and brutal,
starting with government helicopters, flying at low levels to engage in reconnaissance of villages
prior to a full-scale attack. Then, aerial bombardments consisting of hurling explosives and/or
other crude armaments ensued. 176 Fleeing villagers were targeted in aerial bombings and
shootings. l77 Both the government soldiers and janjaweed abducted women and girls who were
not killed in the assaults, took them to nearby fields where they were repeatedly raped. 178 A few

.
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days after a village has been attacked, government helicopters would return to "scope out"
villages to ensure that the previously attacked villages were empty and had not been reoccu( i
e

If any villagers had returned, government soldiers and janjaweed would return to further attack
the village, killing and burning who and what was left to ensure that a village was not
. d 179
reocCuple .
a.

Was there a "Declaration of War"?

Although it can be said that ongoing political strife is primarily responsible for the fullscale crisis/conflict that is taking place today, it would be accurate to say that no official
declaration of war has been made by either the Sudanese government or the "rebel" forces
seeking political and socio-economical equality. Nevertheless, the attack at El Fasher on
government soldiers by the SLAIM in 2003 can be said to have been interpreted by the Sudanese
government as a "declaration of war" by rebel forces against the Sudanese government's proArab rule, since it is after this point that the attacks against civilians, villages and internally and
externally displaced refugees began.
b.

Are Combatants an Instrument of the Government?

The simple answer to this question is yes and no. As indicated above, although it is the

janjaweed that has been primarily responsible for much of the killing on the ground,
nevertheless, government army soldiers have played a role in the destruction of villages, the
killing, rape, torture and displacement of civilians. Certainly Sudanese government soldiers may
be deemed as lawful combatants. Combatants are defined under the Oxford Manual on the Laws
of War as members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, actively engaged in conflict,

protected or bound by the laws and customs of war, 180 and includes,
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"the army, properly so called, including the militia ... and other bodies whic '
fulfil [sic] the three following conditions: (a) That they are under the direction
a responsible chief; (b) That they must have a uniform, or a fixed distinctive
emblem recognizable at a distance, and worn by individuals composing such
corps; (c) that they carry their arms openly.,,181

,! .

It appears that members of the Sudanese army meet all three criteria. Although much that
is written about the Darfur conflict mostly describes the actions of the janjaweed, many
eyewitness reports of attacks on villages compare the janjaweed to government soldiers, as
wearing similar uniforms as the soldiers, under the direction of a responsible authority and
carrying arms openly, much like government soldiers, having the imprimatur of the government.
As soldiers are in fact instruments of the government, acting on behalf of the government, and
carrying out the government's policies, it can be said they are lawful combatants in the conflict.
As to the janjaweed however, the answer is not so clear. They too appear to act at the behest of
the government, are under the direction of the Sudanese military, and carry weapons openly.
Nevertheless, for the reasons stated above and below, the janjaweed cannot be said to be lawful
combatants that are instruments of the government of Sudan.
c.

Is there a "Belligerent" or Adverse Party?

Those who would be considered "belligerents" are in fact the rebel forces, namely the

SLAIM and the JEM, who are seeking socioeconomic and political equality in the Khartoum
government. Although the reported attacks in the conflict are against civilians, nevertheless,
under the laws of armed conflict, unarmed civilians who have not taken up arms in the fight (as
many ofthose killed, injured or displaced are) not considered a party to the conflict.

~-----------------
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d.

Are Members of the Sudanese Army Subject to the
Laws of Armed Conflict?

As members of the Sudanese army are considered members of the armed forces of a purl.'
to a conflict, that being the Sudanese government, and are considered bound by the laws of war,
indeed, members of the Sudanese Army are, deemed to be "combatants" and are as such, subject

tojus in bello, or the laws of armed conflict. 182
D.

An Armed Conflict

Given all that is known about the situation in Darfur, it can be concluded that what is
going on is in fact, an armed conflict. Clearly, the Government is utilizing its armed forces to
resolve what it sees as a political dispute - "rebel" forces that seek political and socioeconomical equality for non-Arab Sudanese, and evacuation of those non-Arabs that stand in the
way of a pro-Arab mandate, and the "rebel" forces have resorted to armed warfare in achieving
their ends. Although the status of some of the participants remains questionable, namely that of
the janjaweed, there is little doubt that the situation would qualify as an armed conflict.
There are combatants, the Sudanese army, there are "belligerents", namely the SLNM
and the JEM (as well as other off-shoot organizations, not discussed here), and there is armed
warfare - attacks against both the government troops and the rebel factions, although no "war"
was officially "declared." The next question that needs to be addressed is what type of conflict is
the Darfur conflict, and what law applies?

~-----------------
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III.

Does the Darfur Crisis Meet the Definition of International Conflict?
A.

What Law Applies?
1.

Origins of an International Armed Conflict

Normally, an international armed conflict is defined as the resort to the use of force by
two or more states to resolve a political issue where diplomatic solutions have failed. 183 In the
case of the conflict in Darfur, it is clear that the origin of the conflict is not a "state vs. state" type
of conflict. While it may yet morph into a full-scale international conflict, as there have been
reports in recent years of armed conflict with between Sudan and its neighboring states, Chad
and the Central African Republic, nevertheless, all of the evidence presented indicates that the
current crisis is borne out of a historical struggle in a country plagued by internal conflicts.
2.

Acts Suggesting that the Armed Conflict May Be Deemed as an
International Armed Conflict

There is no question that the conflict in Darfur has spread to eastern Chad, just across the
Sudan border. Recently, reports have estimated that over 250,000 displaced Darfur refugees
have resettled in makeshift tents in refugee camps just across the Chad border. 184 In addition,
several thousand people have been killed, thousands of women and girls have been raped, entire
villages pillaged and destroyed, causing the mass exodus of villagers to eastern Chad and away
from their homes. 18S It is currently estimated that there are approximately 2.5 million displaced
people within Darfur and Chad. 186 Another 46,000 refugees from the Central African Republic
have also fled to Chad. 187

~----------------184 See

note 130, supra.
Amnesty International, Chad: Civilians Under Attack Darfur Conflict Spreads to Eastern Chad, (Mar. I, 2007),
~esty.org/enllibrary/info/AFR20/005/2007.html, (last visited Feb. 14,2009).
18 Id.
6 Id.
187 •

Id.

57

•

The janjaweed militia from both Sudan and Chad has been deemed primarily respons::~· ••
for many of these attacks against Chad civilians, as well Chadian armed groupS.188 There are
also reports that the Sudanese government continues to arm thejanjaweed militias, and it
continues to bomb and attack civilians. Many of the refugees in Chad still face cross-border
raids by the janjaweed, and dangerous isolation during the rainy season, when aid deliveries are
almost impossible. Women are under a constant threat of being raped while gathering wood for
fire ifforced to look for wood too far from the camps. 189
Ironically, these attacks on unarmed civilians have prompted both the Sudan and Chad
governments to accuse each other of "sponsoring, harboring and arming opposition armed

{.

groupS.,,190 As a result, such mutual accusations have resulted in the relations between the two
governments to deteriorate to the point where, in November 2006, the government of Chad
declared that it was "in a state of war" with Sudan. 191 As such, it appears that both international
humanitarian law and international law of armed conflict applies.

B.

Applicability of the Hague Convention

The intention of the twenty-six countries that met at The Hague in 1899, and then in

1907, was to memorialize in writing the agreed upon jus in bello, or the conduct of armed
conflict. The intent of the wording of what is now the preamble to Hague Convention IV, was
"inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit, are
intended to serve as a general rule of conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relation and in
their relation with inhabitants [of enemy territory] 192 (Emphasis added.)
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During that time, it is evident that the Law of the Hague, as well as the resulting
Declarations and Conventions, were intended to pertain to international conflicts, or conflicts
between states only. While the Hague Conventions are one of the cornerstones of international
humanitarian law with regard to armed conflict, nevertheless, it is the intent of the Hague
Conventions that they apply to inter-state armed conflict, that is, conduct of armed conflict
between states.
While it may be said that the conflict in Darfur has recently taken on an international
dimension with the "declaration of war" by Chad against Sudan,193 the Hague Convention would
only apply to any conflict between Sudan and Chad or any other state, and would not apply to
the internal conflict that has taken place between government forces, the janjaweed and the
"rebel" SLAIM and JEM since 2003.
C.

Applicability of Geneva Conventions I-IV

Like the Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions is also a cornerstone of
international humanitarian law and is also international law on the conduct of armed conflict.
However, the Conventions I through IV do not apply to non-international conflict, although it
stated that Common Article 3 sought to impose some minimal humanitarian considerations in
non-international conflicts. 194 Like the Hague Conventions, applicability of the Geneva
Conventions would only occur in the case of any conflict taking place between Sudan and
another state; it would not apply to events already having taken place intrastate since 2003. It
appears that since neither the Hague Conventions or Geneva Conventions would apply to the
internal conflict, a review of the law of armed conflict as applied to internal conflicts is in order.
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1.

Is the Conflict an Internal Conflict - Origins?

Prior to 1977, much of the international law of armed conflict did not apply to noninternational conflicts, except for Common Article 3 of all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Common Article 3 sought to impose minimal humanitarian considerations even to noninternational conflicts. However, Common Article 3 has some drawbacks in terms of the Darfur
conflict in that it does not go far enough to protect those who have been affected by or killed in
the crisis, as discussed below. Thus, a review of other (possible) applicable treaties is warranted.
a.

Applicability of Protocol I - Self Determination

In 1977, Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of Warfare was
adopted. Protocol I pertains to internal conflicts directed towards the achievement of selfdetermination and national liberation, and views these conflicts as international conflicts, 195
despite their purely intrastate nature. Article 1, paragraph 4 provides that "international armed
conflicts" shall include:
"armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of selfdetermination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.,,196
Protocol I however has some drawbacks. It does not make any determination within its
tenns as to when a movement is seeking self-determination, or what is in fact a national
movement for liberation,197 nor are the terms "self-determination" and/or "national movement"
defined any better in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. 198 The decision as to whether the

<•
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conditions specified in Article 1 (4) of Protocol 1 are purely subjective, and depends upon tIE
· 199
facts of each confl ICt.
For those states that have ratified Protocol

1,200

including Sudan, the decision to recognize

a national movement's campaign for self-determination brings that conflict under the auspices of

an international armed conflict. Protocol 1 provides that members of the national liberation
movement concerned become entitled to all of the privileges of a legally recognized
combatant.

201

Members of national liberation movements are also endowed with a number of privileges
that are normally not afforded to other regular forces engaged in an international conflict. For
example, members are not permitted to wear uniforms, do not have to carry their arms openly at
all times, do not have to wear marks identifiable at a distance, unlike other requirements for
lawful combatants. 202 Also, and most notably, under Article 1 (4), the members of the national
liberation movement involved acquire the status of combatants and cannot be regarded as
committing any criminal offense against the entity against which they are conducting their
operations. Also of interest is that under Protocol I, mercenaries, which appear to be the
classification ofjanjaweed militia, are not protected as combatants and may be tried for criminal
conduct for actions committed during the conflict. 203
One more interesting aspect regarding Protocol I should be noted. While Protocol I does
not replace the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it seeks to reaffirm and develop them. For
example, where Protocol I merely restates or rephrases the obligations enumerated in the Geneva
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Conventions, it would be binding on a state even if it had not ratified or acceded to Protocc!.r.~
but which is a party to the four Geneva Conventions.

204

As to the Darfur conflict, Sudan, whi-::;h

is a party to all four Geneva Conventions, would have been bound by those terms of Protocol I
that restate or rephrase the terms of the four Conventions. Fortunately, as of March 7, 2006,
Sudan acceded to Additional Protocol I, and on July 13,2006, acceded to Additional Protocol II.
Both instruments came into force six months after Sudan's accession.
As indicated above, there is ample evidence that what is going on in Darfur would
accurately be characterized as a struggle for self-determination. In taking up arms against the
government, the SLAIM and the JEM are seeking to achieve political and socio-economic
equality systematically denied to non-Arab Sudanese since the pro-Arab movement took over the
Khartoum government. Since neither "self-determination" nor "national movement for
,"..

liberation," are precisely defined under either Protocol I or the Declaration for Friendly
Relations, it appears that the efforts of both the SLAIM and the JEM may fall under the
definition of self-determination, and as such, should be deemed an international conflict under
Protocol I.
b.

Applicability of Protocol II

Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, also adopted in 1977, is the first and only
international agreement exclusively regulating the conduct of parties to a non-international
conflict.

--~U

20S

Non-international conflicts are defined in Article I of Protocol II as:
"all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article I of Protocol I and which
take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organised [sic] armed groups, which [1] [are]
under responsible command, [2] exercise control over part of its territory as to
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enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and [3 j ; c.l'
able] to implement this Protocol. ,,206
Protocol II is a difficult threshold to meet, as it requires that all three elements be met before

c1

conflict can be deemed to be a conflict falling under Protocol II. As a matter of fact, with the
provision that a dissident movement be in control of part of the national territory, almost no
national liberation movement has met this requirement, as almost no national liberation
movement has been in such control of any part of the national territory.207
As to the conflict in Darfur, the national liberation movement, namely, the SLAJM and
the JEM, is not in control of any part of the national territory in Sudan enough to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations. As many of the reports indicate, most of the attacks
are against unarmed civilian in villages scattered throughout Darfur, which it is reported, the
government claims may contain the "rebel forces. ,,208 This does not suggest that the rebel forces
control any part of the Darfur territory, if in fact the government attacks villages where they
"suspect" the rebels may be. As a matter of fact the evidence suggests quite the opposite - the
attacks have been effective to drive out and displace over two and a half million people from
their homes and villages in Darfur.
Furthermore, it is also arguable that the SLAJM and the JEM are not under a central
command, or able to accede to Protocol II. As indicated above, although the two groups made a
statement regarding the combination of forces and resources, however, recent reports have
suggested a philosophical "split" between the SLAJM and the JEM.

209

Despite the

announcement in January 2006 of the two groups forming a joint group, the Alliance of
Revolutionary Forces of West Sudan, there is little evidence to suggest that there is an organized,
~----------------207 M at pg. 63; see also 16 LL. M. 1442 (1977).
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centralized military command. As a matter of fact, recent reports seem to indicate that aWL.
the "rebel groups" against government forces are anything but organized, but are in fact ranc1r:r".
and sporadic. Furthermore, if indeed philosophical differences may exist among some former
members of the SLAIM and the JEM under the joint Alliance, this would seem to undermine any
ability of the Alliance to accede to Protocol II. As such, it appears that Protocol II would not be
applicable to the Darfur conflict.
D.

Applicability of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions

Assuming that neither Protocol I nor Protocol II apply to the Darfur conflict, and the
conflict can be deemed a truly internal conflict not entitled to the application of international law,
common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949 would apply. 21 0 Common Article 3 to
the Conventions was the first attempt to extend international recognition to non-international
conflicts in order to impose obligations upon the parties thereto to observe legal regulations
during the conflict. 2ll
Under common Article 3, protection is stipulated on a basis of complete nondiscrimination for all persons including hors de combat, civilian and non-combatants in a noninternational conflict located in a territory of a party to the four Conventions. 212 The purpose of
common Article 3 is to ensure that such persons are treated humanely, and forbids such acts as
cruelty, murder, torture, unfair trial, etc. 213 The provisions of common Article 3 bind each party
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Article 3 does not affect the legal status of any party,z15
However, one problem of Article 3 common is that it entitles only the national
government of the territory in which a non-international conflict is located to retain power to try
insurgents for treason or administer justice under the national criminal law after the conflict has
ceased. 216 Such a rule would be wholly inappropriate in a state such as Sudan. As reports
indicate, the Khartoum government cannot be trusted to carry out justice after the conflict is
over, given that it has denied the numbers of people killed by its own troops, despite conflicting
reports to the contrary by respected human rights organizations such as the United Nations or

Human Rights Watch.
Furthermore, it is a long held maxim in international law that where a government is
unable or unwilling to try those parties that commit atrocities during an armed conflict, such war
criminals should be brought to justice in an international tribunal. Given everything that is
known about the Darfur conflict, it appears that the Khartoum government would be more than
unwilling to try those members of its own forces or member of the janjaweed militia that have
committed inhumane acts and/or war crimes against civilians and other non-combatants to the
conflict, since it has voluntarily recruited, financed, supported and rewarded those individuals
that served the government to clear the Darfur region of non-Arab settlers, and has continued to
provide no protection whatsoever to those civilians and non-combatants who have survived
attacks during the conflict.

--~14
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IV.

Conclusion
The purpose of armed conflict is "to defeat the adverse party.,,217 The law of armed

conflict only permits such actions that are necessary for this purpose, and forbids acts which go
beyond this and cause injury to persons or damage to property not essential to achieving this
end. 2i8 One of the most basic rules of the law of armed conflict is that civilians and civilian
objects must not be made the object of direct attack.

219

Yet, as we have seen almost everyday for

the past six years, this is exactly what is happening in the conflict taking place in the Darfur
region of Sudan. Most of the armed attacks of villages have been directed towards the very
citizens that the Khartoum government has marginalized, systematically denied equal political,
socio-economic and infrastructure rights to, and isolated. The struggle by the two main rebel
forces with the Khartoum government for self-determination, or achievement of equal rights in a
pro-Arab government for non-Arab citizens, has lead to the deaths of over 300,000 people and
the displacement of another two and a half million people.
It is not enough to recognize that a great atrocity of genocide is occurring in the Darfur
region; at the root of it all is an internal armed conflict, subject to the laws of international armed
Id. at 58.
Green, THE CONTEMPORAR Y LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 13 I at pg. 118.
Id.
219
Id. at 120.
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conflict taking place, to which the parties to the conflict must abide, which has now spilled
into a neighboring country making it, in effect, a conflict between two states. Unfortunately, the
main parties to the conflict, the Sudanese army and its armed militia the janjaweed, are not
abiding by these laws of armed conflict. The international community has called for resolution
and amelioration of the effects of the conflict under the terms of international treaties pertaining
to human rights. However, there is ample opportunity to also bring those who violate the laws of
armed conflict to justice based upon the various conventions that govern it.
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CHAPTER THREE:
LAW AND POLICY ON
ARMED INTERVENTION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS
AND THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR
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" ... [I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common
humanity?"
-- Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan
I.

International Intervention - A Very Unsettled Proposition

A.

The Power of the U.N. to Engage in/Authorize Intervention

The U.N. Charter is the legal authority that allows the United Nations to engage in
intervention. 22o Article 2(4) of the UN Charter expressly prohibits one member nation from
using military force against another.

221

This is so because the U.N. Security Council is primarily

responsible for maintaining international peace and security, with its primary powers as set forth
in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the U.N. Charter.

222

Chapters VI and VII authorize the

Security Council to utilize various methods to maintain international peace and security.223 The
following indicates that while the Security Council may be, and has been, unwilling to do much
to put an end to the crisis in Darfur, nevertheless, it is vested with great power to do so.
1.

Peaceful Measures Under Chapter VI

Chapter VI of the Charter authorizes the Security Council to investigate disputes that may
disrupt or even threaten international peace and security, and to recommend appropriate
procedures to mitigate or resolve them. 224 Such procedures usually involve formulating
diplomacy strategies such as hortatory actions, negotiation and peace agreements as incentives to
settle disputes peacefully. 225 Hortatory actions may include declarations issued through
resolutions, and/or presidential statements; negotiations involve engaging conflicting parties in
~-----------------I DaVid J. Scheffer, U.N. Engagements in Ethnic Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 147,
7 (David Wippman ed., 1998), as cited by Nadia Deans, Tragedy of Humanity: The Issue of Intervention in the
22~rfurCrisis, 19 Emol)' Int'l L. Rev. 1653, 1671 (2005).
222 U.N. Charter, Article 2(4).
223 U.N. Charter Art. 24, para. 2.
224 M.
See Scheffer and Deans, supra, note 220.
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discussions in an attempt to address underlying conflicts, which can be an effective means
preventing such conflicts from recurring.

226

However, where a situation has reached the level

where it may be deemed a crisis or even a humanitarian crisis such as that in Darfur, the U.N.
should not rely solely on such peaceful means of conflict resolution to end such a crisis.
2.

227

More Coercive Measures Under Chapter VII

In those cases such as the Darfur humanitarian crisis where peaceful measures are not
feasible, (nor would they necessarily be effective), Chapter VII authorizes the United Nations to
take more coercive measures of intervention.

228

Article 39 authorizes the Security Council to

determine if there is any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" and to
decide if measures to be taken under Articles 41 and 42 are necessary "to maintain or restore
international peace and security.,,229 In other words, the U.N. Charter allows the United Nations
to intervene in those situations constituting a breach of the peace by either imposing sanctions or
by taking military action. Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to engage in military
intervention if nine members of the Security Council vote (with the concurrence of all five
permanent members) to engage in military intervention where measures under Article 41 are
deemed inadequate to address the threat or breach of international peace or an act of
aggression. 23o
a.

Article 41 Sanctions

The types of measures employed under Article 41 are not likely to help ameliorate the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Article 41 allows for such non-military measures to ensure that
States comply with U.N. mandates. These measures may consist of "complete or partial

---
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interruption of economic relations" such as sanctions, or "the severance of diplomatic
relations.,,231 The usual sanction for states involved in ethnic conflict and/or human rights
violations is an arms embargo, since it is easier to impose than other broader sanction regimes,

and usually more effective?32 Economic sanctions are also effective to exert pressure to comply
with intemationallaw, and may function to help establish individual accountability.233
1.

Economic Sanctions

Normally, sanctions can be very effective in coercing the violating state to comply with a
U.N. mandate.

234

However, in situations such as that presented in the crisis in Darfur, where

non-state actors are the violators, there are a number of reasons that it would be difficult indeed
for economic sanctions to induce compliance. 235 First, although numerous reports have

~: .

,,-

"",

described thejanjaweed attacks as acting with the imprimatur of the Sudanese government,236
the government adamantly denies having any ties to the janjaweed, and instead, would have the
international community believe thatthey are "armed bandits, neither organized nor funded.,,237
Second, assuming the government's highly improbable claim that thejanjaweed is not acting

with government authority is true, there appears to be no plausible evidence that such sanctions
would be effective to prevent further attacks on civilians, since an economic sanction would not
reach a non-state actor.

m~--------------------------------------------------------------------------

230 U.N.

Charter Article 39.

Id.

231
232 See
233

Id.

Deans, supra note 220, 1674.

8 A~ example is the Security Council's imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia, Montenegro and the

I OSnIa Serbs, which prompted all parties to cooperate with their ethnic counterparts, and even coerced the Serb
J:ders to Cooperate with the ICTY. See, Deans, supra, note 219, 1675
23/d.

au Id.

In the case of the crisis in Darfur, the non-state actors are the janjaweed. who are alleged to act with the

236thority of the Sudan government.
237 See notes 31-40, supra.

w::.:~_0fl the UN,

The UN Human Rights Council Self-Destructs: Geneva Updates, Dec. 5,2006,

~ontheun.orglgeneva-updates.asp?p=290, (last visited Feb. 1,2009.)
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Third, there is also the problem that the imposition of any sanctions such as an econcr"' -~
sanctions or an arms embargo from the Security Council is not likely to materialize, given that

twO of its permanent members China and Russia have their own economic interests in Sudan (oil
and weapon sales to Sudan). On July 30, 2004, the Security Council passed Resolution 1556
which imposed an arms embargo upon Sudan, prohibiting the sale of weapons and related
material to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in Darfur. Security Council
Resolution 1591 on March 29,2005, expanded the embargo to all parties to the N'Djamena
Cease fire agreement and other belligerents in Darfur. 238 Although the embargo did ultimately
include the Sudanese army with the passage of SC Resolution 1591 (under SC Resolution 1556,
it did not), this did not deter other nations from selling arms to Sudan, which is now awash with
arms.239 Two nations who have continued to sell arms to Sudan are two of the Security
Council's permanent members, China and Russia. 24o Although there is a movement by UN
experts to urge a wider arms embargo to extend to all of Sudan and Chad,241 it is unlikely that
either China or Russia will agree to such an expanded sanction.
2.

Diplomatic Sanctions

The Security Council may also impose diplomatic sanctions as a reprimand to those
parties engaging in conflicts that breach international peace. Articles 4,5 and 6 of the U.N.
Charter give the Security Council the authority to either "deny membership in the United
Nations, for suspending the rights and privileges of membership and for expelling from the

~-----------------. ~uman Rights First, Stop Arms to Sudan, Dec. 2008, http://www.stoparmstosudan.org/pages.asp?id=32, (last
~lSlted Feb. 1,2009.) The ceaseftre agreement, which has since collapsed, was signed on April 8, 2004, by the
I ovenunent of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement! Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, two of the
:glest rebel groups operating in Darfur at the time. Id.
~d
24 Id.
. lId
.' See also Reuters, UN Experts Urge Wider Arms Embargo on Sudan, Chad. Nov. 18,2008,
J/wWw.reuters.comiartic1elhomeaeCrisis/idUSNI8283497.CH .2400, (last visited Feb. 1,2009.)
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organization respectively.,,242 The harshness of severing diplomatic relations is such that it is
considered "a measure [just] short of using force to enforce Security Council decisions.,,243
Diplomatic sanctions under Articles 4,5, and 6 of the Charter may prove somewhat
effective in the case of the crisis in Darfur, may be more effective against the Government than
economic sanctions. One reason is that for many months after the crisis began, the Government
denied that such atrocities as those that have occurred in Darfur have in fact occurred,244 and the
exacerbation of the conflict has precluded any attempts of the United Nations or other nongovernmental organizations to investigate the gravity and extent of the situation with refugees, as
well as to acquire an accurate account of how many civilians have lost their lives. 245 Second,
despite its protestations of non-involvement with the janjaweed or even its more incredible claim
oflack of knowledge of the movements of the janjaweed, the Government of Sudan might
respond to diplomatic sanctions if instituted coercively enough.
The Security Council should take the position that the Government's claims of noninvolvement or even lack of knowledge of the janjaweed are too incredible to be believed, and
force the Government to "crack down" on the janjaweed or face potential diplomatic exile. Why
would this be effective? Because despite media reports of the ongoing crisis in Darfur, which
the Government deems as "exaggerated,,,246 the Government has attempted to present itself in a
POsitive light in the international community and within the United Nations. The Government's

':"'---.
c,U
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.N. Charter arts. 4-6; see also Deans, supra note 220, at 1675.
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membership on the former Human Rights Commission,247 is an example of the Governme!~(c'
brazen attempts to elevate Sudan's profile on the international stage, despite its human rights
record. Such diplomatic sanctions could also keep the Sudanese Government from hiding its
crimes behind the mask of a high international profile.
b.

Article 42 Military Intervention

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, if the State does not comply after Article 41
sanctions are employed, the United Nations may also use military action under Article 42 to
restore international peace and security.248 Where the Security Council determines that a conflict
constitute a threat to or breach of international peace and security, or an act of aggression, then
Chapter VII effectively overrides the sovereignty limitation on armed intervention. 249
There certainly is precedent for the successful employment of UN instituted military
intervention. The 1990 military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait is an example of a Security
Council authorized military intervention under Chapter VII, in which the Security Council
determined that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a breach of international peace and security that
warranted military intervention.

25o

In addition, the UN issued Resolution 688 to justify the 1990

invasion of northern Iraq on the grounds that Iraq's repression of civilian Kurds led to the
displacement of the Kurds and created a refugee crisis in Turkey and Iran. 251 The UN
determined that the refugee crisis was a breach of international peace and security.252
Much in the way that the UN determined a military invasion by Iraq resulting in a large
scale refugee situation was a breach of international peace and security, the Security Council

--~7
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Os BBC News, UN Elects New Human Rights Body, May 9, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hilamericas/4754169.stm,
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should also determine that the situation in Darfur, which has also resulted in a large-scale refL;i):'

C

situation, should also be deemed to be a breach of international peace and security. Although no
other state invaded Darfur, nevertheless, the crisis has not only presented the potential to affect
other states, but the sheer numbers of refugees (over 250,000 since 2004)253 that have flooded
over the border into neighboring Chad to escape the violence in Darfur, could affect the stability
of Chad. As previously indicated, there have been numerous attacks on civilian refugees in
refugee camps by the janjaweed, 254 within the Chad border to the point where a large number of
refugees in camps had to be moved deeper within Chad away from the border. 255
Such attacks as aerial bombings within the Chad border has had a multi-dimensional
effect of (1) endangering refugees and Chadian civilians, (2) angering the Chad government and
thereby raising the potential for relations between Chad and Sudan to further escalate,256 and (3)
endangering efforts of the UNHCR from getting food supplies to camps in order to provide
assistance to tens of thousands of refugees. Such attacks have furthered tensions between Sudan
and Chad, with each government accusing the other of supporting rebel groups hostile to their

253

See, U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet: Sudanese Refugees in Chad, .. Dec. 2004,
;Vw.state.gov/documentiorganizationJ39325.pdf. See also notes 48-49, 51, 54-55, supra.
See Refworld, "Sudan-Chad: Bombing Blocks Access to New Refugees, .. Feb. 20, 2008,
~.unhcr.org/refworldltopic,4565c22511,4565c25fl7f.47bea83alde,O.html, (last visited Feb. 3,2009).
See, UNHCR, UNHCR To Move Refugees Further Away From Chad/Sudan Border, (Mar. 10,2008),
~.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS& id=44117d424, (last visited Feb. 14,2009).
d' See, U.S. Department of State, "Chad", Nov. 2008, www.state.gov/r/paieilbgn/37992.htm.In 2006, a border
~?ute broke out between Chad and Sudan as a result of the massive numbers of refugees that have fled to Chad, in
\V lch both governments accused the other aiding rebel groups in each country in armed conflict with their
~spective governments. The conflict caused such a humanitarian crisis that the UN authorized deployment of an
auropean Union peacekeeping force. In 2008, Chad and Sudan entered a cease-fire agreement at N'Djamena, Chad,
!niter Chadian rebels infIltrated N'Djamena and surrounded the Presidential Palace, which Chad believed Sudan was
~olved with. The two governments signed a peace accord in March 2008 agreeing to stop backing rebels hostile to
e h other. The peace accord quickly deteriorated, resulting in a breakdown in diplomatic relations that were
,ventually restored in October and November 2008.

75

respective governments. 257 This has resulted in a breakdown of diplomatic relations betwe(\;' .,.

twO governments,258 which could destabilize the region.
Because the Darfur crisis has affected Darfurian civilians in Chad, has created a burden
for the Chadian government, and has the potential to affect innocent civilians of Chad, the
Security Council can and should exercise its Chapter VII powers because there is a breach of
international peace and security. The Darfur crisis has caused diplomatic relations to break
down (and revive) between Sudan and Chad, but it is a matter of time before the situation
explodes and causes conditions to deteriorate completely.
B.

Humanitarian Intervention by States

If the Security Council is not willing to intervene, despite the attacks on refugee camps in
Darfur and in Chad, as well as escalating tensions between the two governments, then it should
authorize a multilateral armed intervention and/or peacekeeping forces in the crisis. As to
individual states, the Charter provides two accepted legal bases for the use of force: the right of
individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack, or force authorized by the
UN Security Counci1. 259
However, as the 1999 NATO air strikes in Bosnia demonstrate,260 customary norms have
allowed for a third -- the use of force for humanitarian purposes. Humanitarian intervention is an
armed intervention by a State or group of States, without the consent of the violating country or
the United Nations to handle situations of human rights violations and protect the nationals of
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. In March 1999, NATO forces intervened militarily in Kosovo to stop Slobodan Milosevic's "ethnic cleansing"
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that country.261 Humanitarian intervention is designed to prevent atrocities (or further atroc;: '

by State governments against their own civilians and to preserve regional and global stabilitv. 262
The widely accepted view is that such interventions are intended to be a short-tenn initiative,
aimed at stopping massive and ongoing human rights violations and atrocities, which are no
longer justified once violations cease.

263

Furthennore, the text of the Charter itself, under Article

1(3), arguably is consistent with the purposes of humanitarian intervention, by stating that one of
the main purposes ofthe United Nations is "[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social and cultural or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
. ,,264
WI·thout d"IstmctlOn.

Although humanitarian intervention pre-exists the creation of the UN and the Charter, it
was not until after World War II that humanitarian intervention was actually discussed by
scholars as a legal norm. 265 The International Law Commission (ILe), in commentaries to the
Draft Articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts,266 though not referring to
humanitarian intervention by name, did however note that a "legal regime of serious breaches [of
peremptory norms J is itself in a state of development.,,267
Humanitarian intervention as a concept is dependent upon the existence of the obligations

erga omnes partes, i.e., "the obligations of a state towards the international community as a
26\
262

See, Deans, supra note 220, at 1677.
Id. at 1678 •
1 Petr Valek, Is Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Compatible with the u.N. Charter?, 26 Mich. 1. Int'!. L.
2~23, 1227 (2005).
1 U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 3; see also, J.J. Welling, Non-Governmental Organizations, Prevention, and
26~ervention in Internal Conflict: Through the Lens of Darfur, 14 Ind. 1. Global Legal Stud. 147,167.
266 Valek, supra note 263 at 1226.
S Id. at 1226, citing Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 83, U.N. GAOR, 56 th
26~sS., U.N. Doc. AlRES/56/83 (Dec. 12,2001).
WId., Citing the Int'!. L. Comm'n, Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally
itsro~gful ~cts, 53'd Sess., art. 19 (2001), reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 292, U.N. Doc. A/56110 (2001).
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whole.,,268 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that "such obligations derive ...
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery racial
discrimination. ,,269 One scholar noted that "in the event of material breaches of such obligations,
every other state may lawfully consider itself legally injured and is thus entitled to resort to
countenneasures against the perpetrator. ,,270
Even though the ILC and the IC] have posited general rationale for humanitarian
intervention, the Genocide Convention limits intervention, stating "[a]ny Contracting Party may
call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the
United Nations as they consider appropriate.,,27I Because the Genocide Convention itself does
not give individual states a right to intervene even in the event of genocide, humanitarian
intervention has been hotly debated by international lawyers and scholars, as an assault on
.
272 Wh'l
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humanitarian intervention, the use of force as part of such an intervention has been a dubious
proposition at best.
1.

Humanitarian Intervention as an Assault on State Sovereignty

In the case of civil war, many nations will not intervene, even if a humanitarian crisis is
afoot, for fear that it will infringe upon a state's sovereignty. This raises a question with the
crisis in Darfur, as to whether part of the reluctance on the part of the Security Councilor any
other party to intervene militarily to stop the crisis in Darfur, is because the conflict there is
viewed as a "civil war."
~-----------------

2(/d at 1226.
270 Id, Citing Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 33, PP 33-34 (Feb. 5).
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In other cases, humanitarian intervention has been used as a pretext for political and
military intervention in another nation's sovereign affairs,273 and has even been deemed an
"assault on a state's sovereignty," when the humanitarian intervention occurs without Security
Council VII authorization. In any event, recent history indicates that the criteria for deciding
when an intervention is appropriate has been applied unevenly, such as the intervention in
KosovO and the non-intervention in Rwanda.
Grotius, referred to as the "father of international law," stated that "any ruler or
government loses the protection of international law when he starts to commit serious crimes
against his own people.,,274 Grotius' legacy also includes the theory of ' just war," which is
lawful only when fought for ajust purpose by just means.,,275 The problem with this doctrine is
that it was impossible to determine in any particular case whose case was just and whose case
was not. 276 Over time, the rule of bellum justum which was understood as a legal restraint on
war, turned into the opposite, and the end result is that both domestic and international law were
rebuilt on a basis that left little room for "moral absolutes.,,277
Critics of humanitarian intervention have held onto the traditional view of sovereignty,

and have used Grotius' own words as the basis of their arguments against humanitarian
intervention, and have also had to look no further than Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which
rules out any use of force other than that permitted by way of self defense under Article 51 of the
Charter, or that permitted or required by way of collective action under Chapters VII and VIII.278
The rationale is that force, or the threat of it, other than that used in self-defense, is axiomatically
~--------------------------------------------------------------------173 See,

Deans, supra note 220, at 1677.
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a violation of a state's sovereignty, which in the Westphalian-state model describes as the notic'J
ofterritorial integrity and political independence.

279

The post-Westphalian international system is dominated by the notion of sovereignty as
its defining characteristic.

28o

This unfortunately has created a one-dimensional view of the

global community, that any conflict would only involve the interaction of one sovereign state
with another. 28 I Of course, this does not contemplate a situation of an internal crisis within a
state, with the state itself as the perpetrator of the conflict. This binary, state/non-state view of
global relations is problematic for two reasons: first, activities falling outside of this model are
ignored, and two, it is presumed that any activity occurring entirely within a state borders do not,

and should not, draw international attention. 282 Sovereignty will act to prevent the international
community from prosecuting genocidal atrocities, thus rendering intrastate murders beyond the
scope of international concern. 283
Critics have also argued that humanitarian intervention is in fact, a "pretextual" basis for
starting a war to implement a regime change in an independent, sovereign state. 284 Although the
"pretext" argument is one rationale as to why modem international law precludes unilateral
humanitarian intervention, the real question is, should it, if it is compatible with the purposes of

UN Charter to restore peace and security?285

278 ·
.• NIgel Rodley & Basak Cali, Kosovo Revisited: Humanitarian Intervention on the Fault Lines ofInternational
;~aw. 7 Hum, Rts. L. Rev. 275,279 (2007) .
. . !d. at 279.
Michael Pulos, Hiding Corpses Within Sovereign Borders: Why the World Fails to Prosecute Genocide, I I
J. Int'I L. & Foreign Aff. 16 I, 170 (2006).

Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and the Pretexts for War, 100 Am. J. Int'I L. 107, 108 (2006), which
a number of international scholars who object to legalizing unilateral humanitarian intervention based on the
argument, including Oscar Schachter, Louis Henkin, Ian Browlie, Bruno Simma, Richard Bilder, Thomas
and Jane Stromseth.
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Another argument against humanitarian intervention lies in the notion of state practjcD.

In particular, it has been argued that some of the most "noble" incidents of intervention in the
twentieth-century, could not withstand scrutiny.286 In other words, they were not justifiable, and
therefore could not amount to customary law.

287

Their relevance is disputed because such

interventions were not justified based on a legal right of humanitarian intervention by the
interveners themselves, nor could it be viewed that the interveners were placing humanitarian
needs above their own state interests.

288

However, in recent years, the international community has changed its view on
humanitarian intervention. Many theologians, ethicists, political scientists and international legal
scholars are taking another look at sovereignty, recognizing that sovereignty is in fact a
malleable power that as a principle of international law has never been absolute, but relative in
the sense that the sovereignty of one state found its legal limits in the sovereignty of other
states.289 They are moving toward reviving the "just war" doctrine in that humanitarian
intervention is a "just cause" for war. 290 Some legal scholars have moved back to the Grotian
concept of a universal moral order involving human rights, in that gross violations of human
rights present a prima facie just cause for action. 291

;--------------------See Rodley & Cali, supra note 278 at p. 279.
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Examples of interventions that have been questioned by some scholars who believe humanitarian intervention

~ Illegal, or was a pretext for promotion of the interveners' own state interests include, India's intervention in

. angladesh (1971), Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, France's intervention in Central Africa (1979), Tanzania's
WJervention in Uganda (1979) and the US' interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989-1990) .
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Teson, a proponent of this concept, states:
"Wars should be avoided, even sometimes at a considerable cost. But some wars
are just. The United Nations itself is the child of a victory in a just war. Just wars
are those that are waged in defense of the only currency we all have: our basic
rights and the individual autonomy from which they derive.,,292
The Security Council cannot authorize military intervention under Chapter VII unless
there is a threat of international peace or an act of aggression. 293 In the case of the crisis in
Darfur, surely the Security Council could justify a military intervention because the 1990
invasion of northern Iraq which lead to influx of refugees from northern Iraq into Iran and
Turkey, is strikingly similar to the displacement of Darfur civilians into Chad which has led to a
refugee crisis for Chad. The similar circumstance of refugee displacement could be considered a
breach of international peace and security, which gives the Security Council legal basis to
authorize military intervention under its Chapter VII powers.294 Far from being an action that is
at variance with the purposes of the United Nations, intervention is consistent with a key purpose
of the organization as embodied in the Charter, which is the achievement of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. 295
As Teson describes, an intervention in the Darfur crisis would be, a "just" war. 296 The

erga omnes obligation the United Nations owes to the international community to prevent such
gross violations of human rights vests it with the moral authority to address and (hopefully) abate
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incidents of genocide.

297

Hopefully, starting with the Darfur crisis, it can be applied more

consistently in the future, than it has been applied in the past.
C.

Inconsistencies in the Application of Humanitarian Intervention
1.

The Intervention in Kosovo

When NATO forces intervened militarily in Kosovo to stop Slobodan Milosevic's
"ethnic cleansing" campaign waged against ethnic Albanians, such intervention faced severe
international criticism until NATO's bombing campaign proved successful. NATO's use of
force in Kosovo presented a legal dilemma in that its military action did not fit either of the two
accepted legal bases for using force under the UN Charter. NATO's chief justification for
military intervention was that the Kosovo crisis had implications for stability in the entire
region.298
The killings in Kosovo began in late February/early March 1998, in a small town of
Prekaz, when Serb paramilitary units stormed through ethnic Albanian villages, killing scores of
people. Whole families were burned alive in their homes; women, children and elderly were
among the victims.
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In the months to come, more innocent Albanians would die and more

refugees would flee as a result of the Serb offensives launched against rebellious Kosovar
Albanians.
After the initial February/March attack, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
determined that Slobodan Milosevic had to be stopped immediately before more violence and
deaths ensued.

30o

Unfortunately, it took a year and a half, with numerous conferences and

~egotiations and the eventual NATO air strikes before Russia and China would agree to a
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Security Council resolution that would provide a framework for a military agreement betwc(''':

NATO and Yugoslavia, and allow a peacekeeping force in Kosovo.
On March 23, 1999, NATO initiated air operations. Before the bombing campaign
began, the Serb offensive had already driven 100,000 Kosovars from their homes. Milosevic's
apparent goal, not unlike that of the Sudanese government,301 was to quash the opposition and
reestablish an ethnic balance on a permanent basis.302 Despite the fact there was no agreement
from the Russians for the strikes or a Security Council authorization for NATO's use of force,
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was supportive of the strikes. The Secretary General recalled
the atrocities that had taken place in Bosnia only a couple of years before, stating "[there] are
times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace. ,,303 Moreover, in a speech
in Geneva to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary General also stated that
"'ethnic cleansers' and those guilty of gross and shocking violations of human rights will find no
justification or refuge in the UN Charter. ,,304
a.

Could the Kosovo Intervention Serve as a Roadmap for Humanitarian
Intervention in Darfur?

The NATO air strikes lasted for eleven weeks/OS and during that time, Milosevic
continued his murderous assault against Kosovar Albanians, and sending another million more
fleeing from their homes?06 The strikes inflicted a great deal of damage on the infrastructure of
Milosevic's government and forces. As such, on June 3, Milosevic accepted a deal that even the
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Russians could agree to, which would allow Milosevic to withdraw his troops and end the
conflict.307 Shortly thereafter, a Security Council resolution was drafted that provided the
framework for a military agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia, and determined the timing
of the withdrawal of Serb forces.

308

On June 9, Yugoslav forces began to withdraw. Once

withdrawal was verified, NATO halted its military operations the next day.309 Once NATO
halted its operations, Russia agreed to vote on the Security Council resolution

310

authorizing a

peacekeeping force. Afterward, the peacekeeping forces deployed. Not long after that, refugees
returned to their homes.
While the road to disarmament and peace was long, arduous and by no means perfect,
because of the intervention by NATO forces the numbers of those killed and/or displaced were
greatly reduced. While NATO forces may not have a direct interest in the affairs in African
countries, nevertheless, similar diplomatic negotiation among G8 nations could have taken place
long ago to curb the violence and reduce the sheer numbers of refugees from Darfur. While the
road to peace was difficult, it does highlight two problems with humanitarian intervention: the
political will coupled with the national interests of the individual permanent members of the
Security Council, (i.e., Russia's reluctance to authorize force against a Slavic nation), and the
potentiality that humanitarian intervention may be used by more powerful nations to bring about
regime change. In any event, the process to peace in Kosovo is an admirable effort that could
have been duplicated in achieving peace in the Sudan, to avoid needless deaths and the
displacement of over a million refugees.
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2.

The Lack of Intervention in the Rwandan Crisis

Only five years before the NATO intervention in Kosovo, ethnic Hutus in Rwanda began
murdering the minority Tutsi population (along with moderate Hutus). Not only was
intervention non-existent, but a little more than two weeks after the killings began, the UN
Security Council voted to cut the UN force in Rwanda from 2,500 to 800. 311 Over 800,000
Rwandans were killed in 100 days.312 To add insult to injury, like the current situation in Darfur,
the UN as well as the U.S. administration, were either reluctant or flatly refused to refer to it as a
"genocide. "
a.

The Genesis of the Rwandan Massacre

Rwanda is a small state, roughly half the size of Maryland that was a German colonial
possession from 1899 until 1916. Belgium then became Rwanda's colonial ruler until 1962. 313
Two ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi dominate the population of Rwanda. Hutus make up
a numerically larger group, although European colonialists treated the Tutsis as being more
superior.

314

In the late 1950's, the Belgians realized that Hutus outnumbered Tutsis, and Hutus

would eventually rise to power. As such, Belgium abandoned its affinity for the Tutsis. 315
Civil unrest between the Tutsis and the Hutus ensued over the next forty years. Attacks
against the Tutsis over the years resulted in approximately 200,000 Tutsi refugees fleeing to
Uganda.

316

However, life in Uganda under two successive dictators (Obote and Amin) gave

coming-of-age Tutsis a chance to gain military experience, and a renewed determination to
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return to and liberate Rwanda. 31 ? These same fighters formed the core ofthe Rwandan PatrlJtic
Front (RPF).

318

During this time, the one-party state in Rwanda was becoming increasingly corrupt and
the Hutu government sought to blame the Tutsis for domestic problems in order to deflect blame
from itself. 319 Meanwhile, in the early 1990's the RPF began offensives into Rwanda in order to
achieve political equality for Tutsis. 32o The government seized the opportunity to denounce the
Tutsis and blame them for any and all government setbacks.32\ This resulted in one of the most
virulent, anti-Tutsi hatred campaigns in Rwandan history.
By 1994, tensions between the government and the RPF were at an all-time high.
Violence was continuing to escalate. By late March, there were reports of weapons being
distributed to Hutu civilians. 322 The situation boiled over on April 6, 1994 when Rwandan
President Juvenal Habyarimana's plane was shot down by two surface-to-air missiles. 323
Rwandan authorities seized on the tragedy as an opportunity to immediately blame the RPF. 324
Militia and army units were immediately deployed, and roadblocks were set.

325

For the next 100

days, a genocidal fury ensued that would result in over 800,000 people being hacked,326 shot,
strangled, clubbed and burned to death. A majority of these were unarmed civilians,
predominately Tutsis, though some moderate Hutus also perished. A new civil war, far more
bloodier than those in Rwanda's past had begun.
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b.

The U.S. Failure to Intervene in the Massacre

Despite the extreme circumstances presented in the massacre, the U.S. response was
immediate but eventually, utterly lacking. Though the Clinton administration followed the
situation closely, it failed to use the word "genocide." The Defense Department established a
task force that collected and forwarded information on the situation, including the numbers
killed. Although U.S. Marines were deployed to assist with the evacuation of U.S. citizens, that
was the extent of U.S. military intervention.
Nevertheless, the U.S. did not intervene or engage in peacekeeping in Rwanda. The
question of sending US troops as part of either a unilateral or multilateral force was raised but
there was no call for Congress to send troops, as the tragedy in Somalia was fresh in the minds of
many members of Congress, as well as in the mind of the American pUblic. 327 The Clinton
administration surmised that it was highly unlikely an intervention in another internal crisis in an
African nation would not have the support of the American public. 328 At one point, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) volunteered to contribute forces, but funding for those
forces would have to be provided. No funding was forthcoming, as there was little public
support for involvement in Rwanda. Interestingly, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) did
not call for intervention. Although UN troops were present when the massacre began, eventually
they were withdrawn for safety reasons, and reinforcements were denied. 329
While at the time there was no urgent need to intervene, there has been quite a bit of hand
Wringing since. Almost fifteen years have passed, and Rwanda is still considered one of the
Worst massacres in history. In 1999, President Clinton stopped in Rwanda to apologize for his
~---------------------------------------------------------------------321 The
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"hands-off' policy and pledged that never again should the U.S. fail to act in the face of such
· eVI'dence. 330
compel1mg

Many have criticized the Clinton administration for its failure to act, and rightly so.
While an apology was well-intentioned, nevertheless, it came five years too late, and after almost
one million people perished in one hundred days. The compelling evidence of genocide required
that other nations as well as the UN take action. The former head of the UN peacekeeping
mission in Rwanda, Retired General Romeo Dallaire has written and spoken extensively on the
subject,331 and opines that action was not taken in Rwanda due to the self-interests of nations,
that the gain was not there and the risks were too high.
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c. Racism and Intervention: Are the Standards for Intervention Applied
Consistently?
While the massacres in Kosovo were certainly enough to grab the world's attention, the
number of total deaths is not anywhere near the estimated total of those that have perished in
either Darfur, or in the Rwandan massacre of 1994. Hundreds of thousands have been killed in
Darfur, while it is well known that over 800,000 Rwandans were killed in that governmentorchestrated massacre. As of November 1999, the estimated number of total dead in Kosovo
Was between 10,000 and 20,000. 333 This raises yet another ethical and moral question: whether
intervention in government-sponsored genocide is in fact based on race. In the midst of criticism
. leveled at the lack of intervention in both the crises in Rwanda and Darfur, it is questionable
.What is the difference between the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts in which U.S. and NATO forces
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intervened, and the Rwanda and Darfur crises, where the U.S. and other nations refuse to use~~y
"genocide" label, let alone intervene to stop it.
One point should be noted, is that while the NATO intervention in Bosnia was later
accepted, it was at first blush deemed illegal. NATO forces went in without the approval of the
Security Council (acquired later), and by traditional standards, was in fact an illegal intervention.
Under Article 2(4), NATO did not intervene as a result of an act of aggression that caused it to
act in self-defense under Article 51, nor did it act by way of Chapter VII authority (enforcement
action) or under Chapter VIII (regional action).334 Ironically, one reason the intervention may
have ultimately been "blessed" by the international community is that the NATO intervention is
consistent with the main object and purpose of the Charter that is, the maintenance of

.
. I peace and
' 335
mternatIOna
secunty.
Many critics have placed the difference in opinion on these two interventions squarely
upon the issue of race. The former head of UN security forces for Rwanda attributes the
intervention in Kosovo to the residual influence of the colonial era; Yugoslavia is white, located
in Europe and is closer to home. Whereas in Africa, there is a tendency to trivialize Africans as
always engaging in "tribalism," leaving an impression that some count whereas others do not. 336
Unfortunately, this also raises an ethical and moral dilemma, as genocide is neither race nor
gender specific.
During the Rwandan massacre, the Congressional Black Caucus was surprisingly silent
on Whether the U.S. should intervene to stop the massacre. President Clinton specifically sought
Out the Congressional Black Caucus' level of interest in the issue, but it had not called for
. intervention. Again, it is believed that the political and military dimensions that presented
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themselves in Somalia would not be repeated, thus making even the CBC wary of interventim~ ;
another African civil war. Most interesting is the fact that the CBC has not made any allegations
that the failure to intervene in Rwanda was due to racism. Press conferences that took place at
the time indicate that while the CBC makes only passing references to Rwanda, it never made
any comparisons with response of the U.S. and NATO forces in the massacres in KosovO. 337
On the other hand, as to the crisis in Darfur the Congressional Black Caucus was quite
vocal. In June 2004, ranking members of the CBC took part in a joint press conference in which
they brought attention to the crisis by seeking 10,000 signatures to deliver to then-Secretary of
State Colin Powell, to compel the U.S. to intervene militarily to stop the genocide. 338 Since that
time, members of the CBC had continually called for the Bush administration to take action on
the crisis in Darfur, so as to avoid another crisis as that which occurred in Rwanda. 339 Although
pronouncements were made, no action was ever taken by the Bush administration. It remains to
be seen what actions or policy positions will be taken by the new administration of U.S.
President Barack Obama, or whether Congress will actually have to "pressure" President Obama
to take a position on the Darfur crisis.
Although the Khartoum government has claimed that interfering in the genocide in
Darfur is a matter of interfering in its "sovereign matters" and relies upon Article 2(7) of the
Charter,340 the short answer to such a claim is thus: the United Nations was created out of the
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principle that a state (case in point, Nazi Germany) should not be allowed to kill its own pee
To say that a full-scale genocide is a "sovereign matter" is ludicrous - the Secretary-General
himself has stated that genocide and other crimes against humanity simply do not fall within the
purview of sovereignty, when he noted that world leaders at the 2005 World Summit agreed that
"all states have the 'responsibility to protect' their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.,,341 As discussed further herein, such a pronouncement
turns the traditional Westphalian-state notions of sovereignty on its head: sovereignty is not
absolute (in that a sovereign nation may abrogate international law), and with sovereignty comes
responsibility.
Further, it should also be noted that Article 54 of the Charter circumvents any possibility
that a single-actor nation could use military intervention in another nation's sovereign affairs.
Article 54 requires that the Security Council be kept informed of any regional activities engaged
in for the purpose of the maintenance of international peace and security.342 Thus, the threat that
one nation will "interfere" in another nation's "sovereign affairs" when it offers humanitarian
intervention is reduced to a minimum.
In any event, it is the Security Council that is really charged with the duty to maintain
international peace and security. Genocide is a norm de jus cogens - one of the most widely
accepted fundamental norms of international law that are non-derogable, and constitute the most
despicable crimes against humanity.343 It has been argued that a violation of ajus cogens norm
giVes rise to universal jurisdiction, punishable by any state, because the violator becomes a
~-------------------h K. Annan, Darfur: A Responsibility We All Share, THE GUARDIAN, NIGERIA, (Sept. 29, 2006),
~ww.ngrguardiannews.com/editorial opinion/article03.
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92

hostes humani generis, a common enemy to al1. 344 If the Security Council believes any state
acting under universal jurisdiction to intervene and stop a genocide is an improper use of force,
then it should use its power to create an exception to the prohibition on the use of force namely, to investigate and take military action if necessary to stop genocide and other crimes
against humanity -- before they become large-scale humanitarian crises, which the international
community decided is never an issue of interference in a state's "sovereignty" when it created
the United Nations.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

FROM MERE ASPIRATION TO EMERGING LEGAL PRINCIPLE:

THE BIRTH OF "THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT"
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a

"What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or trampling
over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical protection for
ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable
to protect them."
-- The International Commission on
State Sovereignty
Overview on Humanitarian Intervention

I.

For years while the world watched the atrocities and severe violations of human rights in

such places as Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Rwanda, Darfur and now Zimbabwe, the international community struggled to find a
way to institute mechanisms to prevent, deter and remedy such tragedies of humanity. It was
clear when the United Nations was founded that all peoples, no matter who they were or where
they lived, regardless of race, sex, ethnicity, religion, language, social status or political
preferences and affiliations were entitled to the enjoyment of basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms that are now embodied in such documents as the UN Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Bill of Rights, as well as number of
treaties.

However, the problem has been one of enforcement.

How does the international

community assure the world's peoples who have been stated to be entitled to live free and enjoy
these rights when the traditional notions of sovereignty, and that sovereignty should not be
interfered with, that such rights to human security will be protected?
Many scholars have also struggled with the same question as to how to prevent such
tragedies and get back to the basic reason the UN was founded.

Two such scholars, Sean

MUrphy and Michael Scharf, both struggled to establish overall frameworks for the legality of
:humanitarian intervention in the aftermath of the massacres and subsequent interventions in
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Bosnia and KoSOVO.
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After Bosnia, Professor Murphy attempted to make a case

customary international law that allows for humanitarian intervention in cases of widespre,d
deprivations of human rights.
widely adopted by states.

346

Unfortunately, while this theory was influential, it was not
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The problem was also one of a basic dilemma: humanitarian intervention versus state
sovereignty. The international community was mired in the framework that sovereignty was
paramount to all other considerations, and that no state had a right to interfere in the internal
affairs of another. Such "interference" was an illegal assault upon another state's sovereignty,
even if the intervention was to save a state's people from human rights violations at the hands of
their own government. This conjured up the notion that sovereignty was somehow, "absolute
sovereignty." Not only was it outdated thinking about the notions of sovereignty, it was wholly
incorrect. One needs to look no further than the reasons the United Nations was founded: and
the basic reasons were not to protect "absolute" state sovereignty.
Although the Charter framework does contemplate protection of the sovereignty of the
state, as we have learned from the reasons the United Nations was founded, one reason was not
to protect sovereignty "at all costs." Nazi Germany attempted to "grow" its state not only to
achieve European and eventually world domination, but also to deprive many of its own
"citizens" of their inherent human rights, including the right to live, through genocide and ethnic
cleansing. The successful nations of World War II and the founders of the United Nations had in
mind when they wrote the Charter of the new organization, that a state should not be allowed to

kill its own people. As Grotius even recognized, killing one's own people is not an attribute of,
~-----------------Paul R. Williams and Meghan E. Stewart, Humanitarian Intervention: The New Missing Link in the Fight to
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nor an absolute right of sovereignty.348 Such historic pronouncements and precedent lead to one
simple conclusion: there is no such thing as absolute sovereignty, nor is sovereignty "absolute."

A.

Appeals of the Secretary-General for Consensus on Intervention

In response to the many tragic events that had taken place in the 1990's, then SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan addressed the dilemma of humanitarian intervention in his addresses to the
General Assembly in September 1999, and again in April 2000. The former Secretary-General
had generated a great deal of discussion in response to his remarks, when he called upon member
states to "unite in the pursuit of more effective policies to stop organized mass murder and
egregious violations of human rights.,,349 The former Secretary-General recognized at the time
that in the nearly six decades since the UN was founded, the character of the international system
has changed. No longer were disputes primarily between two or more states; in modem times,
for the most part, disputes were primarily intrastate, mostly civil wars or "uncivil wars" as one
scholar refers to them 350 - that claim mostly innocent civilians as opposed to soldiers or other
military personnel, as its primary victims.
On September 20, 1999, in reflecting upon the prospects for human security and
intervention in the 21st century, the former Secretary-General addressed the General Assembly
of the UN and declared:
"In the case of Kosovo . . . the inability of the international community to
reconcile the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional
organization without a United Nations mandate, and the universally accepted
imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic violations of human rights,
could only be viewed as a tragedy. It had revealed the core challenge to the
Security Council and the United Nations as a whole in the next century: to forge

note 274, supra.
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unity behind the principle that massive, systematic violations of human
wherever they might take place-should not be allowed to stand.,,351

r:::;J ."

Such a declaration challenged on its face, the concept of "absolute" sovereignty (or sovereiglll)'
that was not to be undermined in any manner), that the UN and the international community had
clung to for over five decades.
The former Secretary-General again reissued the challenge and made a compelling appeal
to the international community to find consensus to resolve the dilemma of humanitarian
intervention, when he gave his address in 2000 before the Millennium Summit.

352

In posing one

poignant question to abhorrent critics of humanitarian intervention, the Secretary-General stated:
"[I]f humanitarian intervention is indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty,
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic
violations that offend every precept of our common humanity?,,353
Such a compelling question essentially summed up the core of the debate on humanitarian
intervention since the UN was founded.

Was the UN created to protect sovereignty - or to

protect human rights? If those critics of humanitarian intervention took a closer look at the
reason the UN was founded, they would have realized that the creation of the UN was a
~ctestament to the principle that gross and systematic violations of human rights (i.e. the
~~--
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was not tolerable, and that intervention to stop such violations (i.e., nations becoming

in World War II to stop Hitler's march across Europe, who killed millions of innocents
the way) was entirely permissible.

Press Release, General Assembly, Implications of International Response to Events in Rwanda, Kosovo
by Secretary-General, in Address to General Assembly, U.N. Doc. GA/9595 (Sept. 20, 1999), available at
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B.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and
the 2001 Report

In response to the Secretary-General's challenge, in September 2000, the Government of
Canada, together with a group of major foundations, undertook the call to find consensus on the
question of humanitarian intervention, and announced at the General Assembly the establishment
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ("ICISS").

Although

many governments had attempted to answer the Secretary-General's call,354 the ICISS ultimately
proved to be the most influential in shaping the concept of "the responsibility to protect.,,355
The mandate of the Commission was to build a broader understanding of the problem of
reconciling intervention for humanitarian purposes and sovereignty.356

More specifically, the

mandate was to develop a global political consensus on how best to move from polemics - and
often paralysis-towards action within the international system, particularly through the United
Nations,357 to resolve matters involving mass human rights abuses and/or atrocities.
The Commission met for the first time in November 2000 in Ottowa, Canada, then
proceeded to take its research around the world, where it met with various individuals in the
international community in order to consult with the widest possible range of opinion around the
world. Discussions were conducted in Beijing, Cairo, Geneva, London, Maputo, New Delhi,

New York, Ottowa, Paris, St. Petersburg, Santiago and Washington, D.C. 358 The meetings
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involved representatives from governments, inter-governmental organizations, non-goverrum: ,;.Jl
1

organizations, universities, research institutes, and civil society.359
In 2001 ICISS produced a report, "The Responsibility to Protect," an astounding
breakthrough which finally reconciled the two seemingly opposing goals of the UN Charter,
protection of sovereignty and the promotion of human rights, in that it conceptualized
sovereignty in terms of governmental responsibility.

The Report veered away from the

traditional language of the sovereignty-humanitarian intervention debate,360 which tended to
focus on either the "right of intervention" or "a right to intervene," versus "interference with
sovereignty." The Report instead clarified that "responsibility to protect" focused on, not the
government wanting to intervene or on the government to be intervened in, but instead on those

the concept is seeking to protect - the victims of mass humanitarian crises, the citizens of the
state that has failed to protect them.
1.

Overview of the Report

The Commission essentially divided the Report into eight major parts, with the most
important sections focusing on the meaning of "the responsibility to protect," namely, the three
distinct responsibilities that are: (1) the responsibility to prevent, (2) the responsibility to react

and (3) the responsibility to rebuild, all of which will be discussed in greater detail herein. The
Report also addresses some other ancillary but valid concerns, such as the "question of
which looks at the very crucial role of the Security Council to maintain international
security, and what is to happen when the Security Council fails to act.
---<"""'lVU

The

acknowledged that there is no doubt whatsoever that there is no better or more
body than the Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for
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humanitarian purposes, for it is the Security Council that should be making the hard decisions in
difficult cases about the possibility of overriding state sovereignty.361
Although the Commission acknowledges that the Security Council
international consensus on military intervention/

62

IS

at the heart of

it did point out that while the Security

Council does have the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security
matters, it does not have sole or exclusive responsibility. For example, Article 10 of the Charter
grants to the General Assembly general responsibility to deal with any matter within the scope of
UN authority.363 In addition, Article 11 of the Charter gives the General Assembly a "fallback"
responsibility specifically with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,
although it is to make recommendations only and not binding decisions. 364 The Commission
also pointed out that any action taken by the General Assembly must be done under the "Uniting
for Peace" resolution of 1950, which creates an Emergency Special Session procedure, which
was previously used in Korea in 1950, in Egypt in 1956 and in the Congo in 1960. 365
As the Commission further pointed out, all of the above indicates that even in the absence
of a Security Council endorsement, and with the General Assembly's only recommendatory in
nature, an intervention that had two-thirds vote in the General Assembly would clearly have

361

Id. at p. 49.

362 .
Id
363

Id at p. 48; see also, U.N. Charter, art. 10, which provides: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or

any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided

for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the
Vnited Nations or to the Security Councilor both on any such questions or matters." Article 12, which limits the

POwer of the General Assembly, provides in part: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute
. or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any
:;~OltUnel1ldati'(m

with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."

Id; see also, U.N. Charter art. II, which provides in part: "2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions

Id

to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United
or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with
35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such
to the state or states concerned to the Security Councilor to both. Any such question on which action is
shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion."
at 48.
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powerful moral and political support for action. 366 Nevertheless, the Commission mad,c ,~,:~.
that the task of the Report and the Commission's good work was not to find alternatives to the
Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work much better
than it has,367 which would be a welcome change.
One example is where the Commission in the Report calls upon the five permanent
members of the Security Council to agree to a "code of conduct" for the use of the veto power.
The Commission calls upon the permanent five members to avoid using the veto in those
instances where actions are needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis, and where

its vital national interests are not involved, to avoid obstructing the passage of what would
otherwise be a resolution with a majority of support for such action. 368
The Report also includes a section on "Operational Dimension" to be discussed in further
detail herein, which discusses the military interventions, namely (1) preventative operations, (2)
planning for, carrying out and following up military interventions, as well as (3) a doctrine for
human protection operations.

Within the discussion of "Operational Dimension," the

Commission spelled out four essential principles for military intervention which are to be
:considered before any action is taken: (1) the "just cause threshold"; (2) the "precautionary
s" for military interventions, that are: (a) right intention, (b) last resort, (c) proportional
and (d) reasonable prospects for success; (3) right authority (i.e., Security Council) and
) operational principles with clear objectives and a clear military approach during the military
"'I:)Clgernerlt. 369
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2.

A New Approach: Shifting the Debate

There is little question that in the last sixty years disparities have widened between the
presumed lawful conduct of sovereign states as defined in the UN Charter and actual state
behavior in international relations, as justified under the pretext of sovereign rights. 37o For
example, in the case of the crisis in Darfur, the government of Sudan has vigilantly tried to keep
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the ICC investigators, non-governmental
organizations and UN-sanctioned peace-keeping forces out of Darfur, claiming (despite
appearances to the contrary), that the number of deaths and displaced are "grossly exaggerated,"
and that any such outside "interference" is an infringement upon Sudan's sovereignty.37I
It is apparent that Sudan's claims of sovereignty are not what the original framers of the

Charter had in mind when they drafted it: that disreputable governments like Sudan could use its
power to do whatever it wished to its own citizens. 372 As previously posited, the United Nations

was founded because the world believed that a state should not be allowed to kill its own people.
The Charter and UN practice indicate that sovereignty entails a dual responsibility: one, the duty

to respect the sovereignty of other states and to refrain from interfering in their internal affairs,
d

two, the duty of the government to respect the fundamental rights of all peoples within the
and to take action to protect them. 373 Yet the debate about humanitarian intervention has
the two duties of government diametrically opposed to one another: how to reconcile the
of state sovereignty with the human rights necessity that a population should not be
"--<E,"'''..U by its own government. 374

,supra note 2, at 707.

Epoch Times, "u.N. Says Darfur Death Toll May Be 300,000; Sudan Denies, " THE EpOCH TIMES, (Apr. 22,
h!!p:llen.epochtimes.comlnews/8-4-22/69640.html, (last visited Feb. 13,2009).
,supra note 2, at 707.
at707.

103

The doctrine of "the responsibility to protect" is the key to rethinking the mean;1::3 ,',
sovereignty, that instead of being something sacrosanct, that sovereignty implies the need for
governments to exercise responsibility. A government's responsibility is not only to other states
as indicated above, but to its own citizens.
"The responsibility to protect" also redirects the discussion from whether or not there is a
"right to intervene." While both "the responsibility to protect" and "the right to intervene" have
as their ultimate goals the protection of the endangered citizens of a state, nevertheless, the
responsibility places the onus on a government to protect its people. If it fails in that duty to
protect, then it is imperative upon the international community to do what a government is either
unable or unwilling to do - especially in a case such as the crisis in Darfur, where a state is itself
the perpetrator of massive human rights abuses and/or atrocities. As the Commission said:
"What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or trampling
over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical protection for
ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable
to protect them.,,375
The Commission noted that the traditional language in the "sovereignty-intervention"
debate in terms of "the right to humanitarian intervention" or "the right to intervene" is unhelpful

for three reasons. First, the "right to intervene" focuses on the claims, rights and prerogatives of
the intervening states rather than on the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of the
action.

376

Second, "the right to intervene" focuses narrowly on the intervention itself, and does

not take into account any prior preventative efforts or subsequent follow-up assistance, both of
which have been in the past, neglected in practice. 377 Third, the language itself, "the right to
intervene" effectively "trumps" sovereignty with intervention at the outset of the debate, by

;;;------------

See ICISS Report, supra note 356, at 11.
ld. at 16.
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making any debate or dissent as to whether intervention should be undertaken at all, "al1ti.

.

humamtanan.

,,378

The Commission also indicated that in order for intervention for humanitarian protection
purposes to be accepted, including military action, then it is imperative that the international
community

develop consistent, credible and enforceable standards to guide state and

governmental practice. 379 The Commission indicated that any new approach to humanitarian
intervention needs to meet at least four basic objectives: (1) establish clear rules, procedures and
criteria (clearer than those previously existing) for determining whether, when and how to
intervene; (2) establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary and after all other
approaches have failed; (3) ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only
for the purposes proposed, is effective, and is undertaken with proper concern to minimize the
human costs and institutional damage likely to result, and (4) help eliminate, wherever possible,
the causes of conflict while enhancing the prospects for durable and sustainable peace. 380
Such clearly stated objectives are promising for future interventions for a number of
reasons. One, the objectives could better ensure that intervening states are not intervening on the
pretext of humanitarian purposes, only to effect regime change or any other improper purpose.
Two, if executed according to the Commission's objectives, even the most ardent critics of
intervention can be assured that intervention is not taken as a first resort, but as a last resort, after

all other measures have failed. Three, if objective rules are established for determining whether,
'When and how to intervene, it may reduce the likelihood of permanent members of the Security
;Council to veto an intervention, even if their pecuniary interests are involved, because a
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humanitarian cnSIS and a proposed intervention would have met the threshold

Cl~i ~'r:;~

established, no matter where the intervention was planned to take place.
The Commission also pointed out that the inconsistency with interventions and noninterventions in Srebrenica, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda and now Darfur, have made it abundantly
clear that the thinking of international relations and all that goes with it must be comprehensively
reassessed, in order to meet the challenges presented in the 21 5t century.381

With clearer

guidelines as set out herein, it is hoped that military intervention will be applied more
consistently based on objective criteria regarding those who are suffering, as opposed to whether
a state is connected to a super-power (such as Europe or the U.S.), or whether the crisis is taking
place in Africa or not. Although the Commission itself does not advocate it, is appears that if
such clear guidelines are followed, it could affirmatively answer the question as to whether
humanitarian intervention absent Security Council authorization could be permissible. 382
3.

The Specific Responsibilities of "The Responsibility to Protect"

The Report of the Commission indicates that the doctrine of "the responsibility to
protect" is multidimensional, as not only does it entail the responsibility to react, but also the
responsibility to prevent as well as the responsibility to rebuild.
a.

The Responsibility to React

The responsibility to react is the most critical aspect of the responsibility to protect, and

as such, is the most difficult to implement both politically and conceptually, in response to those
extreme situations of compelling human need. 383

When preventative or other corrective

Illeasures have been unable to contain internal violence and the government is unwilling or
}mabIe to remedy the situation, then more extreme measures to curtail the violence may have to

Duller, Jus Ad Bellum: Law Regulating Resort to Force, 30 WTR Hum. Rts. 8, II (2003).
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be undertaken by the international community.384 However, a number of excellent question:::
raised such as, what constitutes an "extreme" case?385

What threshold must be reached for

violations of human rights to trigger military action?

Who makes the determination that

intervention is necessary?
The answers to these critical questions lies in the six threshold criteria or "precautionary
principles" that the Commission laid out in the Report, which must be weighed in deciding
whether there should be military intervention. The six criteria are (1) just cause, (2) legitimate
intention, (3) last resort, (4) proportionality, (5) reasonable prospects and (6) legitimate

. 386
authonty.
(1)

The Threshold of Just Cause

Military intervention for human protection purposes must be taken when the cause is just
and when there is serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings or imminently likely
to

OCCUr.

387

In the Commission's view, intervention is justified in two broad set of

circumstances: to either halt or avert (1) large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with
genocidal intent or not, which is the product of deliberate state action, state neglect or inability to
act, or a failed state situation, or (2) large scale "ethnic cleansing," actual or apprehended,
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. 388 If either of these two
criteria are satisfied, then the "just cause" component of the decision to intervene is satisfied. 389

It should also be noted that the Commission determined that if there are human rights violations

;---------------------------------------------------------------------384 See
3 ld

Joyner, supra note 2 at 709.
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ICISS Report, supra note 356, p. 32-37.

3ss ld at 32.
389

M

ld.

107

falling short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing (i.e., systematic racial discrimination),
the just cause threshold is not met, nor is military intervention warranted. 39o
(2)

Right Intention

Because the primary purpose of a military intervention is to halt or avert mass
humanitarian atrocities, any use of military force designed to achieve other purposes such as
alterations of borders, advancement of political causes, overthrow of a government or occupation
of territory should be avoided39 I. What the Commission sought to achieve was intervention for
the purposes of protecting human life, the ultimate human right. An intervention based on the
four examples above, would arguably be an illegal assault on a state's sovereignty, unless the
reason for an occupation of territory or overthrow of a government is in furtherance of the
protection of a state's people. In such an event, it is recommended that there be a clear intention
from the outset to return the territory (in the case of occupation) to its sovereign owner at the
conclusion of the hostilities, or have such territory administered on an interim basis by the

UN.392
The Commission recommended that one way to ensure that an intervention is being
undertaken for the "right intention" is to make certain that a military intervention is always a

:'!J:ollective or multilateral intervention, as opposed to being operated by one state. 393 In addition,
ways to ensure that an intervention has the "right intention" is to look to whether it is
by the citizens of the state for whom the intervention is being taken, or is supported by
other countries in the region. 394 If there is support for a multilateral intervention by the
of the state where such abuses are being committed, and/or support in the region for
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military intervention, then theoretically, the Security Council would have no cause to

qu(,::r~ic]1

the legitimacy of such an intervention.
(3)

Last Resort

Before any intervention is undertaken, every diplomatic and non-military avenue for the
prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis must be explored. 395

The

responsibility to react with military force can only be justified when the responsibility to prevent
has been fully exhausted. 396 This may include diplomatic solutions, appeals to the UN, or even
economic sanctions. However, the Report does not require that every single available alternative
be exhausted before resorting to force; the Commission acknowledged that in some cases, there
can be reasonable grounds to believe that, in light of all circumstances, the measure if attempted
would not have succeeded. 397
Where there is a conflict between a state party and a rebel group, as in Darfur (although,
not the origin of the genocide), the Commission stressed the importance of negotiations between
the two parties before any type of military action is taken. 398 This is because, at the heart of any
conflict between a state party and a rebel group, is the issue of the rebel group achieving its
political and cultural autonomy. Any long-term solution cannot be achieved without some type
of negotiations, either before or afterward.
In the case of Darfur, there have been ongoing negotiations between the Sudan
government and rebel groups, and even some peace agreements. However, peace agreements
have not always lasted very long. 399 In any event, although a peace agreement between the

SUdan government and rebel groups can only help the situation in Darfur, nevertheless, it should

---
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be remembered that it is not the source of the crisis - although the government has used SO-;2"',::
attacks by rebel groups as a pretext to attack unarmed and innocent civilians.
(4)

Proportional Means

The threshold of proportional means refers to the scale, duration and intensity of any
planned military intervention necessary to achieve the humanitarian objective in question.

4oo

The level of forced used should be commensurate with the scale of the original provocation, and
should be strictly limited to what is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the intervention.

401

Further, the Report stressed that international law must be strictly observed in such situations. 402
The Commission was wary against an intervention making matters worse or engaging in
military action for an improper purpose, such as overthrowing the existing government, or
engaging in "all out war"

403

when perhaps a few targeted strikes may be necessary to halt the

loss of life. Any military action undertaken for humanitarian purposes must also be limited in
duration to the time absolutely necessary to stop the atrocities from taking place, or to halt their
execution. 404
In the case of the crisis in Darfur, a military intervention would only need to target the
Sudanese government and the army - as well as the janjaweed What would make the most
sense is intervention directed towards those thresholds where the government and the janjaweed
are likely to be, such as the northern part of Darfur where many refugees have been driven out.

------------------------------~---------------------------------------)98
399 l d. at 36.

'. See notes 155, 164 and 177 supra, and notes 558-564, infra.
ICISS Report, supra note 356 at 37.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Joyner, supra note 2 at 714.
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The point is that international law has evolved such that the rights of people merit protecti2::>

It is clear that any military intervention should be only to the extent that it saves lives.
(5)

Reasonable Prospects for Success

The Report also makes clear that military action can be justified only if it stands a chance
of success, that is, to halt or avert the atrocities or suffering that triggered the intervention in the
first place. 406 The Commission's rationale is that military action is not justifiable if actual
protection cannot be achieved, if embarking upon the intervention would make matters worse

than if there were no intervention all, or if a military action would trigger a larger conflict. 407
The Commission pointed out that given these guidelines, it is unlikely that an
intervention would be successful against a major power, such as one of the five permanent
members of the Security CounciI. 408

However, in the Commission's view, simply because

military intervention cannot be mounted (successfully) in every corner of the world, is no reason
not to mount military interventions at all. 409
In the case of the Darfur humanitarian crisis, given the lack of sophistication of most of
the armaments used to attack civilians, it would be fairly easy for a multilateral force with more
sophisticated weaponry to successfully take on the Sudanese army and the janjaweed and end the
~atrocities fairly quickly.

There would need to be no regime change; however, such an

could serve the purpose of sending a powerful message to the international
:i~lmnlunitv

- that such human rights abuses and atrocities are no longer tolerable, and steps will

Report, supra note 356 at 37.

III

(6)

Legitimate Authority

The Commission makes abundantly clear throughout the Report that when authorization
is needed for humanitarian purposes, the first stop must be the UN Security Council, especially
since Article 2(4) makes clear that the Charter includes the basic non-intervention principle.

41o

However, where intervention is to take place, Article 2(4) makes it clear that "to ensure prompt
and effective action by the United Nations," it confers upon the Security Council the "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.,,411
Chapter VII of the Charter sets out what that responsibility entails, which sets out in
Article 39 the action the Security Council may take when it "determine [s] the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.,,412 Such measures may include
those short of the use of force such as embargoes, sanctions and the severance of diplomatic
relations as described herein, as stated in Article 41. 413 However, where the Security Council
determines that such non-military measures are likely to be inadequate, under Article 42, "it may
take such action by air, sea or land forces as my be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security," therein resorting to or permitting the use of military force. 414
A couple other important provisions should be noted, although they mayor may not have
applicability in the case where a military intervention for humanitarian purposes is contemplated.
Article 51 allows for military force as "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence

if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN," and requires that any action taken as a

-----------------------------------------------------------------------409 Id.
410

Id. at 47, citing Art. 2(4), which provides in part: "all Members shall refrain ... from the threat or use offorce
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
~rposes of the United Nations." The Report also cites Art. 2(7), which prohibits the United Nations from
mtervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Id
Id.
412/d
·413
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result be immediately reported to the Security Counci1. 415 Chapter VIII also acknowledges the:
existence and security role of those regional and sub-regional organizations that may become
involved, but expressly limits the power of such organizations in that, "no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
. CounCl.
'1 ,,416
the Security

The Report also acknowledges that while the Charter vests with the Security Council the
"primary" responsibility of peace and security matters, nevertheless it is not vested with the sole
authority to do so. Article 10 of the Charter gives general responsibility to the UN General
Assembly with regard to any matter within the scope of UN authority, and Article 11 gives the
General Assembly a "fallback" responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international
peace and security, however, only to make recommendations - not binding decisions, under the
"Uniting for Peace" provision. 417 It should also be noted that in order to prevent a "split" among
the major organs of the UN, the Charter prohibits the Security Council from discussing the
matter at the same time, ifit is being considered by the General Assembly.418
The Commission recognized that the UN is the principle institution for building,
~nsolidating and utilizing the authority of the international community, as it was set up to be the
.---u,n·.." of order and stability, the framework within which the members of the international

negotiated agreements of the rules of behavior as well as legal norms of proper conduct
order to preserve the society of states. 419 The authority of the UN is not founded upon the

citing Art. 51.
at 48, citing Chapter VIII.
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notion of coercive power, but by its role as the "arbiter of legitimacy.,,42o It is the cone.;
legitimacy that is the key link between the exercise of authority and the recourse to power.

421

The Commission also noted that any attempt to enforce authority can only be made by
the legitimate agents of that authority - namely, the UN.

422

Any collective intervention

authorized by the UN would be regarded as legitimate because it is duly authorized by a
representative international body.423 No doubt, such decisions to resort to force are not made
lightly, and the request for UN authority would be made in the context of serious consideration
of any such decision. Once upon a time, the great powers altogether transferred the authority to
settle issues of international peace and security. It is then up to the UN to use that authority to
maintain international peace and security.
The Commission found in consultations around the world, that there was overwhelming
consensus that the Security Council plays a central role in determining when, where how and by
whom military intervention should be undertaken, as well as any other measure. 424 The question
then becomes how to make the Security Council work better in order that a military intervention
can be undertaken when a situation is presented that warrants such intervention. In the case of
the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, the Security Council has taken very little action to halt or avert
the atrocities, although in March 2005, it did refer the role of the government perpetrators to the

ICC prosecutor for further investigation and possible prosecution. 425 However recently, leaders
of other African nations have appealed to the ICC prosecutor not to prosecute Sudan President

----------------------420 1d.
421

422 ld.

4/d.
4/d.
4is 1d. at 49.

UPress Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court,
.N. Doc. SC 8351 (March 31, 2005), referring to S.c. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005), as adopted by the

~~ecurity Council on March 31, 2005.

The prosecutor of the ICC formally requested an arrest warrant for Sudan

.. Sldent Omar al-Bashir in July 2008.
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Omar al-Bashir. 426 It remains to be seen what will follow from any ICC investigation of ~his
crisis.
b.

The Responsibility to Prevent
~:~r-t.W
In the Report, the Commission iterates its strong belief that the responsibility to protect
implies an accompanying responsibility to prevent. 427

The Commission made clear that

prevention of deadly conflict lies primarily with sovereign states and the institutions contained
therein, and there must be a firm commitment to ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities for
all citizens, which provides a solid basis for conflict prevention. 428 The Commission further
opined that efforts to ensure accountability and good governance, protect human rights, promote
social and economic development and ensure a fair distribution of resources are the necessary
· 429
means to prevent confl ICt.
However, as in the case of the CrISIS in Darfur, the Commission recognized that all
governments may not achieve these noble, if not somewhat lofty goals.

As such, the

Commission also indicated that conflict prevention is not merely a national or local affair,
because the failure of prevention could have potential international consequences and costS. 430

& such, the Commission indicated that support from the international community is crucial for
§(lnflict prevention. Support can come in many forms, such as developmental assistance, e£ferts
"~'PIlItiBe 8H~~8l't fur local inititl:~i'¢c, efforts to help address root causes of potential conflict,
t~~

One World US, "Don't Arrest Sudan President, Say African Leaders, .. supra note 12 ; see also, AllAfrica.com,
. Africa Urges Suspension of Bashir Arrest Warrant, .. supra note 12.
Report, supra note 356 at 19.
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/

and support for local initiatives that promote good government, human rights, mediation
reconciliation in the event conflict arises.

?1d

431

Showing a commitment to conflict prevention on an international scale has two notable
benefits: one, international support for prevention efforts could allow for inducements as
punitive measures if a state is not willing keep tensions from erupting into a full-scale conflict.

432

Second, the credibility that international actors gain by trying to help a state avoid conflicts is
especially important in the event that reaction to a conflict necessarily involves coercive
measures as armed force. 433

The Commission noted that although the point of preventative

measures is to reduce and hopefully eliminate the need for intervention, but where a situation has
gone beyond successfully preventing conflict or a full-scale catastrophe, such efforts can be a
necessary precondition for responding effectively to conflict.

434

The Commission also noted that in 2000, both the Security Council and the General
Assembly adopted resolutions recognizing the vital role of the United Nations system in conflict
prevention, and pledging to enhance their effectiveness. A "Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations,,435 indicated that punitive measures or armed force may be avoided by
utilizing more effective prevention, with the United Nations as the "clearinghouse" for collection
assessment of such early warning information that could detect whether a genocide or other
conflict is about to take place. 436
For effective prevention of conflict, the Commission indicated that three essential

'"l:l'' '·'··....
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have to be met. First, there has to be knowledge of the fragility of the situation and

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
Report of Panel on UN Peace Operations, U.N, Doc, A/55/305-S/200/809, (Aug. 21,2000),

116

the risks associated with it, an "early warning." Second, there must be an understanding 0;:
policy measures that may effectively ameliorate the situation - the "preventative toolbox."
Third, there must be a willingness to apply those measures - the issue of "political will."
(1)

Early Warning

The Commission indicated that for early warning to be effective there must be more
official resources devoted to early warning and analysis, which requires reliable and accurate
infonnation.

Although many ad hoc resources have been available, (including UN

peacekeepers), they have not always been effective. 437 This has given rise to a new breed of
non-governmental organizations, namely, those groups dedicated exclusively to conflict
prediction. 438 Such groups as Human Rights Watch, who have in the past dedicated most of their
resources and efforts to monitoring human rights violations, have now expanded their efforts to
include early warning about conflicts that could potentially result in massive violations of human
rights or genocide. 439

While these groups have at times provided effective information,

nevertheless, the problem is that these organizations still need time to coordinate among
themselves to effectively mobilize their constituents globally to work with the media and more
governments. 440
(2)

Root Cause Prevention Efforts

The Security Council - the UN body charged with the maintenance of international peace

'and security - has stressed the importance of responding to the root causes of conflict and the
to pursue long-term preventative strategies. The Charter itself provides guidance for such
term strategies. Article 55 of the Charter recognizes that addressing problems related to

ICISS Report, supra note 356 at 21.
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international economic, social, cultural, educational, human rights, health and related probl .•
is essential to creating conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful

and friendly relations among nations.44I

There is a growing consensus that armed conflicts

cannot be understood unless the "root causes" of conflict, such as poverty, political oppression

and uneven distribution of resources are considered. As the Secretary-General stated in his 2001
report, "Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General," "[e]very step taken
towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth is a step toward conflict
·

prevent Ion.

,,442

The Commission suggested that achieving the Secretary-General's goals may mean
measures such as addressing those political needs not met, tackling economic deprivation and the

lack of economic opportunities, strengthening legal protections and the rule of law, or embarking
upon needed reforms to the military or other state service institutions. 443 Had the UN taken a
close look at the root causes of the conflict that has lead to the atrocities in Darfur, it would have
found that the source of the conflict includes all of the above-suggested roots of conflict,
especially political oppression and economic deprivation/lack of economic opportunities. The
aims of the Sudan government to oppress one group of people in order to create a pro-Arab
government can be said to be one of the main root causes of the conflict that has lead to the
genocide in Darfur.
(3)

Direct Prevention Efforts

The direct prevention "toolbox" speaks of essentially the same Issues as root cause
efforts - namely political/diplomatic, economic, legal and military, but different
to achieve resolution of these issues. To achieve resolution of these issues may involve
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either(l) straightforward assistance, (2) positive inducements or where necessary, (3)

threatCl1el~

"punishments" in order to get a state to address these concerns and keep local tensions from
becoming a national conflict.

444

This may include political or diplomatic solutions with the

assistance of the UN, direct economic prevention measures may include incentives such a future
funding or investment if a state can resolve its internal problems.

445

Also, direct legal measures

such as mediation or arbitration may be utilized to resolve a domestic dispute. In the past,
tribunals have been utilized to focus the world's attention on state perpetrators of human rights
abuses, with an eye towards sending a signal to other potential state human rights abusers. The

ICC has also an effective measure as a threatened prosecution for genocide and other crimes
against humanity, may prevent future conflicts. However it remains to be seen what will happen
once the ICC issues arrest warrants for Sudan president Omar al-Bashir, and whether it will have

any impact on the Darfur humanitarian crisis.
Finally, one measure that has gained international support in recent years is economic
sanctions. 446 Such economic sanctions as the threatened removal of funding or divestment or
investment avoidance can effect change, as it helped South Africa change from a system of
apartheid to a democratically controlled government.
While all of these suggested measures have been effective in the past and are certainly
Worth trying, the Commission notes there may be problems. One problem as that expressed by

the SUdan

government is that governments are reluctant to accept "international preventative

~trategies," as that could lead to ever-increasing outside "interference." There are two answers to

this. The first is that international policy makers must remain sensitive to the particularities of

ICISS Report, supra note 356 at 23.
1d. at 23.
[d.

Id.
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the state in question, and not seek to apply measures that do not fit the situation or stat;:'

c,<

hand. 447 The second is, if a state took every effort with early preventative measures, there would
be no need to escalate such measures to such a punitive extreme such that

sa~ctions

or military

action is instituted. 448 A state should make every effort at the outset to ameliorate the situation in
order to avoid the conflict from erupting into a situation with international implications, where
the whole world may get involved.
c.

The Responsibility to Rebuild

The responsibility to protect also implies that there is a responsibility to rebuild. As
previously stated, any military action should only last as long as needed to contain the conflict. 449
This means that when military action is taken no matter how long it lasts, because a state's
capacity to discharge its duties may be compromised, there should be a genuine commitment to
helping to build a durable peace, promoting good governance and sustainable development. 45o
This involves many facets, starting with a post-intervention plan, because many issues need to be
considered before any military action is ever commenced.

They are (1) post-intervention

obligations, (2) administration under UN authority and (3) local ownership and the limits to
occupation.
(1)

Post-Intervention Obligations

The post-intervention obligations that need to be considered before military action is
are multi-faceted and complex.
--~V,l1U(lllU'll

Overall, ensuring sustainable reconstruction and

will involve the commitment of sufficient funds, resources and as well as close

with the local people, may mean the intervening authority staying in the country for

Section II, subsection 8 (3), (a)(4) herein, supra.
Report, supra note 356 at 39.
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some time after military operations cease. 451 One facet of consideration is post-conflict

pe11C;'-

building, which refers to those actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace
and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.
Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested in his 1998 report, "The Causes of
Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa," that
"peace building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring
elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, as
well as creating conditions for resumed development.,,452 The Secretary-General also indicated
that to avoid a return to conflict "while laying a solid foundation for development," emphasis
should be placed on critical priorities such as, encouraging reconciliation; demonstrating respect

for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness; promoting national unity; ensuring the safe,
smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; reintegrating
ex-cornbantants; curtailing the availability of small arms and mobilizing domestic and
international resources for economic recovery and construction, and noted that "every priority is
linked to every other, and success will require a concerted effort on all fronts.,,453
The Commission noted that a few key institutional structures should be in place before
armed intervention begins in order for the above-suggested priorities to be instituted effectively.
One is the provision of basic security by the intervening force for all members of a population,
,~regardless of ethnic origin or relation to previous source of power in the territory, protection of

and property.454

It also means the successful disarmament, demobilization and

'mH!gnltiolfl of members of military and security forces, and the phasing in of civilian police

The Secretary-General, The Causes a/Conflict and the Promotion 0/ Durable Peace and Sustainable
··'UlJme.nt in Africa, at ~ 63, (April 16, 1998), www.un.orglecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html.
at~ 66.
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forces to maintain security as the intervening force withdraws.

455

As has been seen since' ','-

this was the primary problem of U.S. operations in Iraq, namely, the failure to plan for

post~

intervention reconstruction.

An effective judicial system for successful justice and reconciliation is also needed to
maintain order after an intervening force has stopped human rights violations. If an intervening
force's mandate to guard against further violations is to be successful, it must be enhanced by a
system that will bring any ongoing violators of human rights to justice, otherwise the
intervention operation loses credibility.456
Also important to post-intervention operations is the means to encourage economic
growth, the recreation of markets and sustainable development, which means that the intervening
authorities should find a basis as soon as possible for ending any coercive economic measures
applied to the country before or during intervention.

Intervening authorities also have the

responsibility to manage as swiftly and smoothly as possible the transfer of development
responsibility and project implementation to the local leaders, as quickly as possible. This will
ensure that it is in fact the local popUlation that is primarily responsible for rebuilding
infrastructure that an intervening force or authority has no specific knowledge or experience to
sUccessfully rebuild.
(2)

Administration Under UN Authority

This section of the responsibility to rebuild specifies that guidelines for the behavior of
Intervening authorities can be found under Chapter XII of the UN Charter and should be
followed, in order to enable reconstruction and rehabilitation to take place in an orderly

;---------------------------------------------------------------------4ssiCISS Report, supra note 356 at 40-41.
416 Id. at p. 41.
Id
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fashio n.457 The most relevant provision is Article 76, which indicates that the aim of the systel:'
is to promote the "political, economic, social and educational advancement of a people of a
territory, to encourage human rights, to ensure the equal treatment of all peoples in the UN in
social, economic and commercial matter; and also to ensure equal treatment in the administration
of justice.,,458 Chapter XII is also particularly relevant to those interventions where the root of
the conflict is self-determination (i.e., Sudan). Acting under the authority of the UN also creates
an oversight function of sorts. Given that the primary goal of the responsibility to protect is to
respond to threats to human life, and is not a tool for achieving political goals ofthe local groups
involved,459 adhering to the authority created under Chapter XII will ensure that the intervention
and post-intervention operations do not themselves become a basis for separatist claims, and
instead carry out the purposes for which the responsibility to protect and rebuild were created.
(3)

Local Ownership and the Limits to Occupation

The responsibility to rebuild recognizes that the requirement for the intervening force to

stay on in the country long enough to ensure sustainable reconstruction and rehabilitation has
both positive and negative implications. 46o

One of the obvious positive effects is that an

intervention can help restore the rule of law by protecting the territory's constitutional
arrangements that have presumably been violated, and allow the sovereign to regain authority
Over operations of the territory. However, if an occupation or UN authority over a territory that

has

been subject to an intervention is unnecessarily prolonged, then the effect is that the

ld. at p. 43.
ld. at p. 43, citing Art. 76 of the U.N. Charter.
ld.
Id. at 44.
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sovereignty is seriously compromised, and in some cases may suggest a "trusteeship"
. wh'ICh thUN'
situatIOn,
e
WIS h es to avOl'd .461
Another pitfall of a prolonged occupation is that if poorly administered, could result in
the occupying force or authorities being viewed at the "enemy," inimical to the success of longterm rehabilitation efforts. Equally, a reconstruction and rehabilitation program that does not
involve local personnel or excludes local priorities could create an unhealthy dependency on the
intervening authority, or become a financial drain on the intervening authority.462 As such, the
Commission recommended that a balance be struck between the authority of the intervenors, and
the long-term interests of the local population and country where the intervention took place. 463
As in the case of the intervention in Kosovo, it is essential to strike a balance between the
responsibilities of international and local actors. 464

International actors usually have the

resources to help provide a secure environment while the rebuilding process takes place, but
must be careful as to not confiscate or monopolize political responsibility on the ground. 465 They
must take steps to set up political processes between conflicting parties that develops a
competent system within a framework that promotes and encourages cooperation among former
antagonists. 466

A competent system will also facilitate the transfer of responsibility from

international agents to local agents, while minimizing the risk of former adversaries falling back
~into old patterns of hatred and eventually conflict, or of the international authority having to

'mediate local tensions. 467 All of the above, if executed successfully, is consistent with the long-

124

term aim of international actors in a post-conflict situation, that is, "to do themselves out of a

. b,,468
JO .
C.

What "The Responsibility to Protect" Means to the International Community

"The responsibility to protect"

IS

an emerging legal doctrine in the international

community that elevates human rights to the level to which it was originally intended paramount to almost all other considerations, including sovereignty. While state sovereignty
remains a cardinal principle of contemporary international law,469 and this has created a tension
between the concept of state sovereignty and human rights, nevertheless, the law cannot allow a
state to commit human rights abuses against its people with impunity. With the rise of human
rights as an issue taking greater precedence in international relations, human rights conditions
within a state now transcend national boundaries and have become a common salient concern
among nations in the international community, and under internationallaw. 47o
"The responsibility to protect" codifies this growing consensus. It states that human
rights conditions of peoples of a state are no longer unquestionably accepted as the internal
affairs of that state, insulated from the reach of international law. It also states that while every
state has not only territorial and governmental sovereignty, that is not the end of it; it also has the
responsibility to its people to protect its people from harm and other human rights abuses, and
certainly, not to perpetrate them. Arguably, "the responsibility to protect" is why the UN was
founded in the first place - to say to the world that a state is not permitted to kill its own people.
The responsibility to protect also reminds each state that even though they retain
over their internal affairs and their territorial integrity, nevertheless when voluntarily
-... -....."" in the international community, they have also effectively forfeited some of that soId.
See Joyner, supra note 2 at 717.
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called "absolute" authority through signing onto the international agreements that protect]; " '
rights. That means the protection of human rights extends within their own territories, An v
conditions or limitations placed on a state's sovereignty by signing onto such international
agreements are relative, conditional and self-imposed. "The responsibility to protect" merely
"codifies" this concept.
The responsibility to protect starts before the carnage begins.

471

If it is to be fulfilled, a

government must strive to prevent and conditions that imperils its people through the
mechanisms of its sovereignty. It the government fails in its duties to exercise its fundamental
duty to protect its people, either through an inability to act or through malicious intentions, then

that government forfeits any entitlement to sovereignty that might prohibit any other state from
intervening into its internal affairs in order to stop the bloodshed. 472
The effect of the responsibility to protect is to remind states that by joining the
international community, they have effectively removed human rights conditions from being a
matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, and converts such conditions to a
matter of concern to the international community. The responsibility to protect provides the
rules as to how states should behave in avoiding those acts that constitute human rights abuses or
atrocities in the first place; but if they do not, the international community must respond if a state
is unable or unwilling to abate or stop such conditions. It is not a license to intervene recklessly;
mstead, it is a roadmap for new world order in the emerging precedence of human rights above

all else. Hopefully, it is a roadmap that will be followed particularly with regard to the crisis in
Darfur, to lead the UN and the international community "out of the wilderness" as to what the
international community should stand for, what it should not tolerate, and what it should do
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when faced with situations that not only (potentially) threaten international peace and

sec,-'.r:t~:·,

but also threaten (or kill) a large number of innocent people who have the right to participate it'
the common humanity in peace.
D.

The Way Forward

Finally, the last Chapter of the Report "The Responsibility to Protect: The Way
Forward," discusses mobilizing the political will needed both domestically and internationally in
order to carry out the recommendations in the Commission's Report.

The Commission's

objective with the Report was to have a concrete and political impact.

With that, the

Commission made a number of written, specific recommendations on how each major organ of
the United Nations (the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General) can
best utilize the Report going forward,473 to prevent humanitarian crises from becoming ongoing
tragedies.
To the General Assembly, the Commission recommended that the General Assembly
adopt a declaratory resolution embodying the basic principles of the responsibility to protect, and
to contain four other basic elements: (1) an affirmation of the ideal of sovereignty as
responsibility; (2) an assertion of the threefold responsibility of the international community of
states - to prevent, react and to rebuild - when faced with human protection claims in states that
are either unable or unwilling to discharger their responsibility to protect; (3) a definition of the
threshold (large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended) which human
protection claims must meet if they are to justify military intervention, and (4) an articulation of

~-------------------------------------------------------------------

.,/d

ld at 74-75.
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the precautionary principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasoEc.:i]C
prospects) that must be observed when military force is used for human protection purposes. 474
To the Security Council, the Commission recommended: (1) that the members of the

Security Council should consider and seek to reach agreement on a set of guidelines, embracing
the "Principles for Military Intervention" summarized in the Synopsis (of the Report), to govern
their responses to claims for military intervention for human protection purposes, and (2) that the
Permanent Five members of the Security Council should consider and seek to reach agreement
not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interest are not involved, to
obstruct passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes
for which there is otherwise majority support. 475
To the Secretary-General, the Commission recommended that the Secretary-General give
consideration and consult as appropriate with the President of the Security Council and the
President of the General Assembly, as to how the substance and action recommendations of the
Report can best be advanced in those two bodies, and by his (or her) own further action. 476
The Commission noted that with the Report, it has met its goals of reconciling two
objectives, namely, strengthening not weakening the sovereignty of states, and improving the
i~;;~lpac:itv

of the international community to react decisively when states are either unable or

ing to protect their own people. 477 The Commission also expressed optimism that with the
map" as set out in the Report, that the international community will improve its overall
--··'·'I<,11I".,S

and ability to protect those in mortal danger.478 The Commission also entreated upon

international community to "step up" and meet the challenges that a large scale humanitarian
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crisis presents, or else the international community as protector of our common humanity, (,[:;;.,2

fail.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
REEVALUATION AND REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS
TO PROMOTE AND MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY
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"We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom ... have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims."
-- United Nations Charter

r.

Overview of Efforts Towards Reassessment and Re-evaluation of the Role of the UN
While the UN did little or nothing during the one hundred days of the Rwandan massacre

in 1994, it has been remiss ever since. After all, the cardinal mission of the United Nations is "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge ofwar.,,479 Since then, there has been quite a bit
offocus on the cause and effect of armed conflict that leads to humanitarian crises such as
genocide and ethnic cleansing, in addition to looking at future prevention.
After the Rwandan massacre occurred, the UN held a number of meetings, generated a
number of reports on the subject of security in the modem era, and how the lack of security can
lead to such humanitarian crises. This chapter will look at the impact of the 2000 Millennium
Summit of the United Nations, which created a "blueprint" in which Member States made a
commitment "to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace.,,480 The 2000 Millennium Summit was one of the most important actions taken by the UN
after the Rwandan massacre of 1994, not only for its recognition of the continuing threat of
genocide, ethnic cleaning and other crimes against humanity some fifty-plus years after the UN

---------------------479

" The Secretary-General, "Prevention ofArmed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-Generaf' (hereinafter,

~::evention ofArmed Conflict "), United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, p. 9, U.N. Doc. A/55/985Q04001/574, (2001).
ld
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was established, but also for its critical analysis of the root causes of genocide, ethnic cleansing
and other crimes against humanity that result from internal wars and conflict.
In addition, there have been five reports which have been generated since the 2000
Millennium Summit which not only examines how genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes
against humanity have redefined "security", but also the respective roles of the UN, other nongovernmental organizations, governments and private actors play in seeking an end of the
proliferation of such humanitarian crises. These reports include (1) "We The Peoples: The Role
of the UN in the 21 st Century, Report of the Secretary-General"; (2) "Prevention of Armed
Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General," (2001);" (3) "Progress Report on the Prevention of
Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General," (2006); (4) "In Larger Freedom," also
'prepared by the Secretary-General, and (5) the Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility."
In addition, the 2005 World Summit held at UN Headquarters in September 2005 also
reassessed and reprioritized the goals as set out in the 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals.
Two of the stated priorities to come out of the World Summit were the "promotion of peace and
security," and the "responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
'cleansing and crimes against humanity." Altogether, if the goals and recommendations of the

1000 Millennium Summit, the 2005 World Summit as well as the four documents discussed
:herein are achieved, the UN could be well on its way to achieving the goal of ending genocide

and other crimes of humanity in the modem era.
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II.

The UN Millennium Summit and the Millennium Development Goals
In September 6-8, 2000, conflict prevention was one of the many prominent topics of

focUS during the 2000 Millennium Summit of the United Nations, at which leaders from all over
the world reached a consensus of determination to establish just and lasting peace all over the
world in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

481

What is truly interesting is that the

focus was not only on conflicts as between two or more states, but more importantly, recognized
the potential for internal conflict within a state as a threat to international security.
Overall, it was agreed that conflict prevention lies at the heart of the mandate of the
United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, and conflict prevention is
preferable to curing the results of conflict.

482

It was also agreed that the most effective means of

conflict prevention was to develop long-range strategies incorporating political, economic, social

and other measures focused on reducing or eradicating the underlying causes of armed
conflict. 483 The results are embodied in the eight goals developed at the 2000 Millennium
Development Summit. 484
The eight Millennium Development Goals,485 to be achieved by the target date of2015,
ilnclude: (1) halving extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieving universal primary education; (3)
women and promoting equality between women and men; (4) reducing the undermortality by two-thirds; (5) reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters; (6) reversing the
of diseases, especially HIV/ AIDS and malaria; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability,

GA Res. 55/2, "United Nations Millennium Declaration," U.N. Doc. NRES/55/2, as adopted by the UN
Assembly on Sept. 18, 2000 .
. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "We the Peoples: supra note 353, at p. 44.
Secretary-General, "Prevention ofArmed Conflict," supra note 479 at p. 10.
note 481, supra, and note 486, infra.
abbreviated as "MDG's".
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and (8) creation of a global partnership for development with targets for aid, trade and deb:

· [486
reIIe
.
The basic premise of the Millennium Development Goals is that world leaders recognize
their responsibilities to not only promote sovereignty of States, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, but also to become more effective in maintaining international peace and
security by devoting resources and tools towards conflict prevention (hence issues that sow the
seeds of conflict), peaceful resolution of disputes and peacekeeping, all through international
cooperation. What is also interesting to note, is that at the 2000 Millennium Summit world
leaders came to the realization that security in the modem era has taken on a new meaning - one
that understands that in some cases, the root causes of conflict are not necessarily focused on the
weapons of warfare.

A.

The Meaning of "Security" in the Modem Era

While the Millennium Development Goals speak of alleviating societal ills that over time

can cause internal conflicts that lead to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against
humanity, nevertheless, the key focus of the goals remained on security in the modem era. The
concept of security and conflict prevention is an evolving one. 487 In the traditional view of
security, security pertained preeminently to states, their borders and their ability to protect
themselves from external aggression. 488 During the Cold War, the focus in security and conflict
prevention was on the weapons race, mostly between two super powers and their allies.

;--------------------fI.l! Fact Sheet, "The Millennium Development Goals and the United Nations Role, " www.un.org/millenniumgoals,
q,lIStvisited Feb. 13,2009).
ita The Secretary-General, "Prevention ofArmed Conflict," supra note 437 at p. 3.
; Joyner, supra note 2, at 706-707.
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It has been over sixty years since any ofthe world's major powers have been engaged :n
world war. 489 Nowadays, the concepts of security and conflict prevention has taken on a new
Security and conflict prevention are no longer solely focused on international wars and
physical defense of state borders, but are now focused on protection of welfare of the citizens of
~states and the root causes of internal conflicts and strife that lead to large-scale humanitarian
y

crises such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, not simply their violent symptoms. 490
Some of the root causes include poverty; lack of respect for human, civil and political
rights; lack of inclusion in governmental institutions and processes which disallows participation
all citizens; increasingly scarce resources; deprivation of fundamental freedoms, and
of the right to development. 491 If indeed the international community is successful
achieving most if not all of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, then it is possible

;'• •thRt

the most common causes of conflict and hence, the devastating results thereof, would be

"",,,,,,,,,.,,...,uy) rendered obsolete.
B.

"We the Peoples:" Security in the Post-Cold War Era

In a 2000 report written in anticipation of the Millennium Summit, "We the Peoples: The
of the United Nations in the 21 st Century," the Secretary-General drew on the words of the
Charter to point out that the United Nations, "while it is an organization of sovereign States,
for and must ultimately serve ... the needs and hopes of peoples everywhere. ,,492 The
- General also noted that to do so, "we must aim ... to perfect the triangle of

Kofi Annan, "We the Peoples, " supra note 353, at p. 45.
at p. 45-46.
Secretary-General, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Security. Development and Human Rights For All. Report
Secretary-Generalo/the United Nations/or Decision by Heads o/State and Government in September 2005,"
"'''"I"m'r, "In Larger Freedom), at ~ 12, U.N. Doc. Al59/2005 (March 21, 2005).
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development, freedom and peace.,,493 To that end, the Secretary-General enumerated the
components of what would best assure security in the post-Cold War modem era.
In the chapter entitled "Freedom from Fear," the Secretary-General points out that since
the 1990's, wars have been mainly internal and extremely brutal, claiming the lives of more than

5million people. 494 At one time security meant defense of a territory from external attack; now,
it is synonymous with the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence. The
Secretary-General recommended that the best way to achieve security is through a "humancentered" approach.
This "human-centered" approach not only looks at the threats created by weapons of
mass destruction as well as small arms and weapons, but also the threats created by poverty,
resource depletion, water scarcities and environmental degradation, all of which may result in
social and political tensions that eventually lead to conflict or strife. The Secretary-General then
outlines six preventative strategies to meet the security needs of the modem era.
1.

Preventative Strategy One: Prevention as a Means of Maintaining Security

First and foremost, security begins with prevention. The Secretary-General noted that
prevention not only addresses the violence of conflicts, but also their root causes, the most
obvious of which are noted above. In order to prevent deadly conflicts, there must be a better
understanding of their root causes, since no two conflicts are the same and therefore, no single
strategy will be universally effective.

495

The Secretary-General noted that for poor countries at

, War, poverty is often coupled with sharp ethnic or religious divisions, the rights of the minority
POpulation being subordinated by the government, government being insufficiently inclusive, or
of available resources favors the dominant population. In some cases, as noted below,

Secretary-General Annan, "We the Peoples," supra note 353 at p. 43.
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internal conflict is also driven by economics. Globalization and the presence of multination;-.
'1

corporations in such places as Nigeria,496 the Sudan and other African countries in order to

.

exploit available resources have also lead to egregious human rights abuses, including murder.
Whereas war and other internal conflicts may be exceedingly devastating for some, it has been
profitable for private actors and other opportunists who have been complicit in an ongoing
conflict.

497

Drugs, weapons, oil and other commodities of trade have contributed more than their

fair share to the internal strife that has claimed the lives of more than five million people since

1990. A current example, of course, is the crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan. A review of
two of the most recent crises highlights how the above-indicated factors have created and
continue to perpetuate a humanitarian crisis.
a.

Deprivation of Rights and the Right to Development

While poverty and denial of human rights cannot be said to "cause" a civil war, internal
conflict, terrorism or organized crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability and
violence.

498

Similarly, war, conflict and humanitarian crises are not the only reasons that

countries are trapped in poverty, but they do undoubtedly set back development. 499 For
example, in the lead up to the Rwandan massacre, because members of the Tutsi tribe were
preferred by the former Belgian colonists, when the non-preferred Hutu tribe finally seized
POwer, they systematically deprived the Tutsis of political participation and blamed them for the

~---------------------------------------------------------------------------

./d at p. 45.

See, Case No. 155/96, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social

~ v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, (200 I), in which the African Commission for Human & Peoples' Rights
found that Nigeria was in violation of Articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18( 1),21 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights when the government of Nigeria, involved in oil exploration and production, caused environmental
degradation and health problems resulting from the contamination of the environment of the Ogoni People, and lead
~~7the deaths of many Ogoni, including the execution ofOgoni activist Ken Saro Wiwa.
Secretary-General Annan, "We the Peoples.' The Role of the United Nations in the 2 t" Century," supra note 353
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Secretary-General, "In Larger Freedom," supra note 492 at ~ IS.
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country's ills, up to the time they coerced civilian Hutus to attack and kill 800,000 of their ..~.
Tutsi citizens.
In the case of the current crisis in the Sudan, as a result of the Arab government's
favoritism of Arabs, the indigenous (black) peoples of Darfur have been subjected to years of
political marginalization. As such, the cycle of poverty for black Darfurians occurs due to a
number of factors: lack of economic opportunities for large numbers ofthe population due to
privatization, leading to job losses for many workers; lack of services particularly in the areas of
education and health; the deterioration of existing hospitals and schools, including extreme
conditions of no pay for teachers and health care professionals for work; and lack of reliable
means of transport and infrastructure, which results in high prices for fuel and other necessities.
In addition, as the ever-expanding Sahara Desert has forced Arab cattle herders to
populate Darfur, and drive out black farmers who have traditionally occupied such lands.
Khartoum has responded by granting political power and good jobs to Arabs at the expense of
the black population, in addition to depriving black farmers of their livelihood. The government
has continued to foster a policy of suppression of a "minority" culture by the "majority" or selfproclaimed "national" culture, all toward the end of political marginalization and lack of
representation of blacks in government functions. 50o
None of these factors can possibly lead to realization of the right to development for all
Darfurians or even sustainable development, as black Darfurians are deprived of any and all of
the tools needed to develop economically, or to sustain themselves. This is in addition to the fact
that black Darfurians are given practically no political or economic opportunity whatsoever to
aChieve even sustainable development, thus leaving many to scrape for their next meal. It goes
~----------------. environment & Development Challenges News, Resource and Environmental Aspects of the Ongoing Genocide
InDarfur, Environment & Development Challenges News, (March 2005).
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without saying that a policy of chasing black Darfurians off of their land simply does not

k,<

itselfto the creation of renewable resources such as food, water or basic necessities supplies.
b.

How Oil Drives Genocide

Although the Sudanese government has objected to any investigation into the genocide,
preferring to explain the slaughter as an ancient rivalry between nomadic herding tribes in the
north and black African farmers in the south, all while denying responsibility for acts of the

janjaweed, nothing could be farther from the truth. The fact is that the genocide in the Sudan is
also being driven and funded by revenue derived from oil exploration and production.
In 1978, Chevron discovered oil in southern Sudan.

The government redrew

jurisdictional boundaries to exclude the oil reserves from the southern jurisdiction, which began
the 21-year war between the government and rebels in the south.

In January 2005, a peace

accord was reached with the government and the SPLlM, allowing the south to operate under its
own civil law, and oil revenues were to be divided between Khartoum and the SPLIM territory.
Unfortunately, Darfur - an oil rich, predominantly black area of the Sudan, was left out
of the accord. So another reason for attacks on villages and civilians in Darfur was justified -- to
clear the way for drilling and pipelines. Some of the land seized from black Darfurians has been
reportedly given to Arabs from Chad. 50l In April 2005, seismic studies indicated that Sudan had
a sizable oil reserve, though not as large as the six Persian Gulf countries. 502 Nevertheless, the
discovery of oil reserves has clearly wreaked havoc on the Sudan and its people. The revenues
to Khartoum have been approximately one million dollars a day, most of which has been

~-----------------S02 D.

Morse, Oil Drives the Genocide in Darfur, Counter Currents, (Aug. 20,2005), www.countercurrents.org.
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[unIleled into anns, in order to rid Sudan of its non-Arab population and reap the benefit:;

itself. 503
Not surprisingly, revenues derived from oil production have resulted in a concentration of
wealth for the elites, kickbacks and bribery, and has lead to destruction of regional economies.

In some cases the oil companies themselves contribute to the destruction of local villages. Roads

and bridges built by oil finns have been used to attack remote villages, and have even
contributed to the murders of locals in order to clear lands for drilling and pipelines. 504
c.

The Impact of Humanitarian Crises on the Environment

As indicated, a number of factors contribute to humanitarian crises, and in each instance,
there is an adverse impact on the environment. In the crisis in Darfur, the ongoing drought
creating an arid, non-arable land has lead to the years-long fight between Arab cattle herders and
black farmers. It is this fight over scarce resources that has laid the foundation for Darfur to
erupt into the full-scale humanitarian crisis that it is. The attacks themselves, designed to kill or
drive out a population by destroying agricultural lands and water supplies will have an untold
long-term impact on the environment.
As previously noted, Sudan is now in the business of oil exploration. Drilling, laying
pipelines, and the residual effects of running such oil explorations operations can also devastate

an already-devastated environment suffering from a severe drought. If the little available water
is being utilized for oil exploration operations, it can be said that oil exploration itself is also
to the increasing desertification of the Sudan. Deforestation in order to make way
oil exploration and production is also a contributing factor to the devastation of the
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environment. It is also surely to deprive indigenous people of the ability to maintain

rene\v(i:~~k

resources.
2.

Preventative Strategy Two: Protection of the Vulnerable

The Secretary-General also noted that another preventative strategy for security is
protection of the vulnerable. Despite the existence of a number of international conventions and
covenants designed to protect the most vulnerable citizens, particularly women, children and
refugees, women are vulnerable to violence and sexual exploitation, children are forced into
slave labor or being conscripted into the armies that cause bloodshed, if in fact they are not
themselves killed. As to refugees, as recently seen in Darfur and along the Chad border,
refugees are attacked in the camps that are designed to assist them and provide refuge from the
violence.
International conventions have traditionally looked to states to protect their civilian
populations, but this tradition has been threatened in three significant ways. 505 First, as in the
case of the Sudan and Rwanda, states or state actors are often the perpetrators of violence against
a civilian popUlation, the very population they are obligated to protect. 506 Second, non-state
combatants, especially in a state whose government has collapsed, are either ignorant or wholly
icontemptuous of humanitarian law or human rights. 507 Third, international conventions such as
Women's Convention or the Children's Convention do not adequately address the specific
of vulnerable groups such as internally displaced persons, women and children in complex
ies such as that presented in Bosnia, Rwanda, and now the Darfur region of the

Secretary-General Annan, "We the Peoples," supra note 353 at p. 46.
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To combat this problem, the Secretary-General suggests that stronger legal standard, ,
needed to centralize humanitarian and human rights law, to protect humanitarian workers, and
noW a third very important purpose - to regulate the actions of private and corporate actors, who
are involved in internal wars and conflicts in increasing numbers,509 In the wake of
globalization, given the alarming rate at which private and corporate aCtors are discovered to
have contributed to the root causes of conflict or are complicit in the violence, an international
convention regulating such private actors having such key roles in ongoing conflicts may be an
idea whose time has come.
3.

Preventative Strategy Three: Humanitarian Intervention

A third preventative strategy as suggested by the Secretary-General pertains to addressing
the dilemma presented by humanitarian intervention to stop atrocities such as genocide and
ethnic cleansing. Critics of humanitarian intervention indicate that it could become a cover for
gratuitous interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states or that it could result in
movements that provoke governments into committing gross violations of human rights or
external interventions to aid their cause. 510 However, the Secretary-General raises an excellent
point: if humanitarian intervention is an "unacceptable assault on sovereignty,,,SII then how is the
world to respond to systematic humanitarian crises that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 or the
ongoing crisis in the Sudan?
As the Secretary-General notes, such a question presents quite a dilemma for those who
do not believe that humanitarian intervention is the best means to stop genocide and other crises.
However, the Secretary-General also correctly points out that no legal principle - not even
sOvereignty -

should ever shield crimes against humanity such as genocide or ethnic

;--------------------l)/d
ld at 47-48.
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cleansing.512 Where peaceful attempts to stop such crimes have been exhausted, it is impe:'(~;>'
that the Security Council take action on behalf of the international community. In fact, it appears
that what the Secretary-General stated, is that humanitarian intervention could be a form of

maintaining security
Despite protestations from nations opposing humanitarian intervention that it is an
unwarranted interference into sovereignty, nevertheless, it must remain an option to stop mass
murder where all other peaceful attempts have failed. 513 Fortunately, humanitarian intervention
may becoming an emerging norm, given that the costs of such humanitarian crises are so much
greater than if the conflict had been prevented or stopped before becoming a full-scale
international crisis.

4.

Preventative Strategy Four: Strengthening Peace Operations

A fourth preventative strategy includes strengthening peace operations. Of course, this
assumes that they are ever started. The objective of peace operations and peace building is to
assist the parties engaged in conflict to pursue their interests through political channels. 514 This
includes providing emergency relief, demobilizing former fighters, reintegrating former fighters
into society, clearing armaments such as landmines, stabilizing government, rebuilding
economies and promoting equitable and sustainable development practices. 515 Furthermore,
POst-conflict peace building has helped to prevent the breakdown of peace agreements and to

bUild the foundations for sustainable peace. 516
Although peace operations have had some successes such in Namibia, Mozambique, the
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, there have been some tragic failures such as that in
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Rwanda, Srebrenica

SI7

and now, the Darfur region of the Sudan. Due to the lack of comm"~ .

ofrnilitary forces from Member States, and the usual last minute ad hoc manner in which pe22c>
building operations are put together, they have not been as successful as they could. Because of
this, the Secretary-General put together a high-level panel to review all aspects of peace
operations, and to suggest ways that peace operations may be improved politically and
operationally, as well as reviewing the option of force where peaceful prevention fails. sl8
5.

Preventative Strategy Five: Targeted Sanctions

A fifth suggested preventive strategy for security is targeted sanctions. However,
sanctions have had an uneven track record. Although there has been success in states such as
South Africa where sanctions brought an end to the oppressive Apartheid regime, there are many
instances where sanctions have not induced compliance with Security Council resolutions. 519 In
some cases, little effort has gone into monitoring or enforcing sanctions, or there has been little
or no assistance from the international community with enforcement. This has rendered the
notion of sanctions in the case of the most egregious human rights abuses - meaningless. The
other problem that sanctions presents is that it is those that suffer the most, not the political
powers that inflict suffering - that truly benefit from the effects of sanctions. Those in power
can exploit sanctions by profiting from black market activity, and exploit sanctions as a pretext
for eliminating domestic sources of political opposition. 52o
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" ld. See also, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
AMore Secure World: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change," (hereinafter, "A More
Secure World), 2004, http://www.un.orglsecureworld/report.pdf. The Report explored the possibility that the use of
f~rce (or the threat thereot) can be used in the instance where peaceful prevention fails.
A prime example is the Security Council's March 2005 resolution calling for sanctions of asset freezes and travel
r~strictions against individuals in the Sudan unless it ceases its activity of human rights abuses against its own
~IVi1ian population. The Security Council was supposed to appoint panel members to identify persons responsible,
12~t failed to do so.
Secretary-General Annan, "We the Peoples," supra note 353 at p. 50.
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Fortunately, a few nations such as Switzerland, Germany, Canada and the United
."_,y,,n11'Y1
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have been working on plans for more effective sanctions such as arms embargoes or

boycotts, as well as plans for better implementation. 521 It remains to be seen if the UN
Council will take cues from these forward-thinking countries and put in place effective

'.:l:afiiCUC>llS

that could end current and future crises.
6.

Preventative Strategy Six: Pursuit of Arms Reduction

The sixth suggested preventative strategy for security is the pursuit of arms reductions.
the years since the end of the Cold War, there have been both gains and setbacks in achieving
goal of total disarmament. Among the gains are the Ottowa Convention banning landmines
the Chemical Weapons Convention both being entered into force, and the conclusion of the
ve Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has resulted in the strengthening of nuclear safeguards
the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons by half. 522 However, attempts at arms
~""'UvU'-'ll

have also had some setbacks. This includes proliferation of covert nuclear weapons
nuclear testing in South Asia, the unwillingness of some key states to ratify the
've Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as the newest threats of chemical and

The key problem, as the Secretary-General points out, is the increase in the availability of
arms and light weapons. Currently, it is these weapons that kill the most people in modem
and conflicts, and have killed more people and caused more carnage than the atomic bombs
on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. 524 These arms are heavily traded and
O--V'''HUlv

on the global market. They are responsible for the human rights abuses currently
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taking place in the Sudan and previously in other humanitarian crises, and their availabillt:
the market has exacerbated armed conflicts that have sometimes lead to large-scale humanit('.r:,n
crises. After the cold war, many of the small arms surpluses wound up in some of the most
dangerous conflict zones, including many of the states experiencing conflict and humanitarian
crises in Africa.
The other problem is that although the majority of the world's trade in small arms is legal
(some 50-60%), a large portion of the sales are not. 525 The task of controlling the circulation and
availability of theses arms is made more difficult due to the lack of security in some countries,
and the lack of responsibility in some others. 526 The Secretary-General aptly points out that in
order to gain control of the illicit small arms, governments need to take a more proactive
approach. Two ways to accomplish this is to for governments to make the sale and transfer of
such arms more transparent, or to utilize buy-back programs that have been successful in
countries such as Albania, El Salvador, Mozambique and Panama.527 Buy-back programs have
allowed individuals to exchange weapons for such life essentials as farming tools and other
implements, sewing machines, construction materials, and whole communities to be provided
.
. 528
WIt. h schools, health-care servIces
an d roa d repaIrs.
Nuclear weapons also remain a threat to security. While many of the world's nuclear
weapons are in the hands of the major powers as the United States and Russia, many of them are
not (i.e., South Korea, Iran). Currently, the Strategic Arms Reduction talks are stalled and there

are no negotiations at all concerning the thousands of weapons of nuclear power that are
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presumed to be in the possession of smaller dangerous states. 529 The Secretary-General pro.· .
convening a major international conference to discuss and propose ways to eliminate nuclear
dangers. It is a noble idea, but in light of the current developments in the world, (the so-called
"standoff' between the United States and Iran), it is highly unlikely that such a convention wi':
take place anytime soon.
Ill.

Reports: Armed Conflict and Threats to Security in the Modem Era

A. "Prevention of Armed Conflict" (2001): A Report of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations on the State of Security in the Post-Rwandan Massacre Era
In a report by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as presented to both the UN General
Assembly and the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that when elected, he "pledged
to move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention." The 2001
report, "Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General" points out as one of its
basic premises that "conflict prevention is one of the primary obligations of Member States as set
forth in the Charter of the United Nations." The Secretary-General also asserts that the United
Nations 53o has a moral responsibility to ensure that genocides such as that perpetrated in Rwanda
are prevented from ever happening again,531 but also points out that all organs of the UN 532 as

well as governments, other non-governmental organizations and private actors must act in
COncert bring about the necessary changes so that such crises do not arise again.

;;----------------------IJo

Id. at 53.

While much of the focus of this paper is on (possible) necessary military action as authorized by the Security
Council to stop humanitarian crises, it is important to understand that the General Assembly also plays an important
role in the prevention of anned conflict. The General Assembly has a broad authority to (I) consider conflict
prevention in all its aspects; (2) develop recommendations for peaceful resolution of conflict, as appropriate; (3) call
the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security. See
~I~o, the Secretary-General, "Prevention ofArmed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-Generaf', supra note 479, p. 3.
132 The Secretary-General, "Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-Generaf', supra note 479, p. 10.
Id. In addition to the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Secretary-General also indicates that other
lIN organs such as the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice as well as other internal
departments of the UN can playa vital role in the achievement of conflict prevention.
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The Secretary-General points out that in his view the Charter identifies two defining
elements of the philosophy underlying the collective security system. First, prevention of an:Jd
conflict is far more desirable and cost-effective strategy to ensure lasting peace and security than
trYing to stop or alleviate its symptoms after conflict has begun; and second, as provided in
Article 2, paragraph 3, "armed 'international' conflicts are best prevented by 'peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered. ,,533
The report also points out the necessary evolution regarding the concept of 'collective
security' currently taking place in the twenty-first century. The former Secretary-General noted
that in the last part of the twentieth century, collective security was pursued through reactive
means, and almost always defined in military terms; whereas in the twenty-first century,
'collective security' should imply a preventative obligation for the international community to
address tensions, grievances, inequality, injustice, intolerance and hostilities at the earliest stages
possible, before peace and security are endangered. 534 The former Secretary-General suggested
that in order for the UN to move from a culture of "reacting" to crises, it must create an effective
preventative strategy which requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses both shorttenn and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental,
institutional and other measures taken by the international community, and makes a number of
recommendations toward that end. 535
Although the report discusses how the UN can better serve the international community
in becoming more effective in preventing crises, nevertheless it should be reiterated that the
Primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with the national Governments, with civil
~------------------Id. at p. 9. It should also be noted that while the Article 2, paragraph 3 specifically refers to international
Conflicts among states, it is clear from the context of the report that the Secretary-General contemplates that internal
;3~nflicts may also endanger international peace and security.
Id
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society playing a key role.

536

The Secretary-General made a number of recommendations on

hoW efforts of the United Nations system could be enhanced with the cooperation and active
involvement of the Member States. Three such recommendations include (1) more cooperation
between governments and the key organs of the UN (namely the General Assembly and Securit)Council), (2) more cooperative action as between the General Assembly and the Security
Council and (3)a more proactive role of the Security Council.

537

Again, a plan of prevention can

only be effective where the multidimensional root causes of conflict are identified and addressed.
This may be easier said than done, since often with long-term conflicts that erupt into
humanitarian crises the government has not ventured either to identify or alleviate the root cause
of conflict, and in some instances such as the crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan, is actually
the perpetrator of conflict.
The rationale of the former Secretary-General in highlighting the concerted efforts of the

UN, governments, non-governmental organizations and private actors in preventing conflict is to
demonstrate that all of these actors playa role in overcoming the root causes of conflict. One of
the major culprits responsible for conflict is, as indicated above, the lack of sustainable
development. Obviously, sustainable development cannot take place in the midst of actual or
potential conflict,538 and an actual conflict can and will destroy the achievements of national
development. 539 As the former Secretary-General points out, "effective conflict prevention is a

prerequisite for achieving and maintaining sustainable peace, which in tum is a prerequisite for
SUstainable development. 540 As noted above, where a society is successful in its civil
~------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Report is divided into many sections, at the end of which the Secretary-General makes a number of
~~commendations which are too numerous to repeat here.
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institutions, and is achieving sustainable development for its entire people, the likelihood or
conflict is greatly reduced.
It appears the key point the former Secretary-General makes in this report is that by
assisting national Governments and local counterparts in finding solutions to problems by
offering support for the development of national and regional capacities for early warning,
conflict prevention and peace-building, the UN is in fact helping itself to achieve its overall goals
of prevention of conflict and maintenance of international peace and security. In other words, by
preventing from conflict and genocide from ever taking place, the UN and the international
community can avoid the human and societal costs of restoring the peace after the damage is
done.
B. "Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict" (2006): A Follow-up Report
of the Secretary-General
In 2006, the Secretary-General prepared a follow-up to his 2001 report on the Prevention
of Armed Conflict. 541

The Secretary -General's report found that in a number of areas,

significant progress had not been made.
For example, the former Secretary-General noted that in Resolution 57/337, "Prevention
of Armed Conflict" as issued by the General Assembly,542 called upon Member States and the
international community to abide by the resolve of the Millennium Assembly to make the United
Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by providing the resources and tools
needed for conflict prevention,543 and noted the need to strengthen the capacity of the UN for
early warning, collection of information and analysis of potential conflict. 544 The SecretaryGeneral reported that unfortunately, no significant progress had been made, and that the UN still
~------------------141 See U.N. Doc. A/60/891, 18 July 2006, as presented to the General Assembly on July 18,2006.
143 See U.N. Doc. AlRES/57/337, 18 July 2003, as adopted by the General Assembly on July 18,2003.
ld. at p.4.
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s

lacked the capability to analyze and integrate data from different parts of the international sys~'vlll
into comprehensive (and usable) early warning reports and strategies on conflict prevention.

S45

The Secretary-General also found that a further review of progress indicated that the UN's
capacity to use its leverage to prevent armed conflict in conjunction with other actors is not [tilly
being harnessed.

546

He also noted that conflict prevention did not yet have a permanent forum

for regular discussions with the intergovernmental system, and stressed the importance of the
system to act together in a more deliberate manner, to make the most of "comparative
advantages" and consider a system of incentives that make preventative action a more
7
' c h'
compe 11 mg
Olce. 54

The Secretary-General made a number of recommendations to ameliorate the lack of
progress and commitment to the prevention of conflict, and called upon Member States to more
comprehensively address the primary sources of tension for conflict-vulnerable regions and
countries. 548

Such recommended measures include (1) the regulation of trade in natural

resources that fuel conflict (such as oil), (2) reduction in the sale and illicit flow of small arms
and light weapons, (3) finding common ground on the use of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, (4) addressing such ongoing problems as environmental degradation, migration, and
the abuses of human rights, as well as (5) attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. 549
The Secretary-General called upon Member States to accede to, ratify and comply with
international human rights, humanitarian and other legal instruments relevant to the prevention
of armed conflict,550

He also invited the international community as a whole to more explicitly

See note 541, supra, at p. 27, in which the Secretary-General references Resolution 57/337, annex paragraph 35.
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(and effectively) embrace the "responsibility to prevent" by exploring and making

effecti,~·

'.'

of peaceful means to assist States in living up to their obligations regarding the protect}c" of

. popuIat'IOns. 551
theIr
C. Making Good on the Millennium Development Goals' Future Promise to End
Genocide and Promote International Security: Two Reports
In the last two years, the UN has issued two very crucial reports in anticipation of the

2005 World Summit which made a number. of bold policy statements regarding the ability to stop
genocide such as the current crisis in the Sudan. The first report from the Secretary-General, "In
Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All,,,552 was
specifically addressed to leaders attending the September 2005 World Summit.

It raised a

number of concerns regarding genocide and other crimes against humanity and whether they
should also be viewed as threats to international peace and security, as well as the precise role of
the Security Council in taking steps to stop such crimes. "In Larger Freedom" is also laudable
for its reference to the 2004 report from the Secretary-General's commissioned High-level Panel
on Threats,

Challenges

and

Change,

"A

[M]ore

[S]ecure

[W]orld:

Our

[S]hared

[R]esponsibility,,,553 which explicitly states that the UN Charter is not as clear as it could be
when it comes to saving lives within countries in situations of mass atrocity. A summary of the
most important findings of both of these reports is discussed in further detail below .

.

~-------------------

!d. See also, Chapter Four supra, herein.
The Secretary-General, "In Larger Freedom," supra note 353.
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1.

"In Larger Freedom": Analysis of the Responsibility of the S~"
Council to Prevent and Stop Genocide and Crimes Against Humanit?

Then Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to his report "In Larger Freedom" to

5-,

the enduring relevance of the Charter of the United Nations, and to emphasize that its purposes
must be advanced in the lives of individuals, and encapsulates the idea that development,
security and human rights are interdependent. 554 The Secretary-General indicates that "larger
freedom" implies that men and women have the right to be governed by their own consent, under
law, in a society where all individuals can freely speak, worship, live and associate, free from
fear and want. 555 The Secretary-General also makes the point that as the world's only universal
body with a mandate to address security, development and human rights issues, the United
Nations has a special burden to ensure these basic fundamentals are not violated or completely
obliterated.
One of the most notable points of focus in the report, "In Larger Freedom,"

IS

the

Secretary-General's excellent question:
"Where threats are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority to the
Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international
peace and security. As to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against
humanity, are they not also threats to international peace and securitls' against which
humanity should be able to look to the Security Council for protection?" 56
The Secretary-General also made bold statements about the role of the Security Council
in stopping genocide and other crimes against humanity, by first noting that in today's world, no
State no matter how powerful can protect itself on its own, nor can any State, weak or strong,
realize prosperity in a vacuum, and that all States must act together in effecting global change

and facing imminent threats to peace and security. The Secretary-General included genocide and
~-------------------

sSs The Secretary-General, "In Larger Freedom," supra note 353 at ~ 14.
ss/d at~ 15.
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and facing imminent threats to peace and security. The Secretary-General included genocide.- .~.... '
other crimes of humanity as such threats in "In Larger Freedom," when he states that he
embraces a broader vision of a more comprehensive concept of collective security, one that
tackles new threats and old and that addresses security concerns of all States.

557

The Secretary-General also noted that such threats to peace and security in the twentyfirst century include not only international war, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, but
also civil violence, organized crime, poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation,
since all of these can have equally catastrophic effect of causing death or lessening life chances
on a large scale, as well as undermining States as the basic unit of the international system. 558
The Secretary-General also noted, echoing that of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), that the task is not to circumvent the Security
Council in considering collective force for humanitarian purposes, but to find ways to make the
authority of the Security Council work better. The Secretary-General recommended that the
Security Council adopt a resolution establishing a four-part set of standards to be utilized when
considering authorizing use of military force in a humanitarian crisis,559 in answer to the lack of
consensus as to whether States have the right or the obligation to use force protectively to rescue
the citizens of other States from genocide or other comparable crimes against humanity.560

~--------------------

ss/d at ~ 73.
ss/d at ~ 78.
The Secretary-General also suggested a four-part set of standards indicate that the Security Council should come
lOa common view on (1) how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; (2) the proper purpose of the proposed military
action; (3) whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat and (4) whether
there is a reasonable chance for success. ld at ~ 126.
M at ~ 122.
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2.

"A More Secure World": How the UN Charter Alone is Insufficient
Protect Against Human Rights Abuses

t{~

The 2004 report from the Secretary-General's commissioned High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, "A [M]ore [S]ecure [W]orld: Our [S]hared [R]esponsibi lity,,,561
articulates a need for a more comprehensive concept of security, one that looks at new threats

and old and that addresses the security concerns of all States. The report is quite explicit in its
statements that the UN Charter is not as clear as it could be when it comes to saving lives within
countries in situations of mass atrocity.

The report accurately points out that the Charter

"reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, but does not do much to protect them," and cites as

an example Article 2.7, which prohibits intervention "in matters which are essentially within the
. . d"lctIon 0 f any state. ,,562

JUriS

The report reiterates that Chapter VII of the Charter grants power to the Security Council
to maintain or restore international security.,,563 However, the report also accurately notes that
the Security Council has not been very consistent or effective in situations like that in Darfur or
Rwanda in 1994, and that in the past the principle of non-intervention in so-called "internal
affairs" as genocide and ethnic cleansing have been used to protect genocidal acts or other largescale violations of international humanitarian law. Much of the Security Council's inaction is
due to a divide in the international community as to whether the Security Council's Chapter VII
powers authorizes a "right to intervene" in acts of sovereign states that occur within their
borders.
Some adamantly believe that the Security should intervene in humanitarian crises; others
believe that the Security Council should not meddle in the affairs of sovereign states. However,

---------------------l61 High-Level

Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A More Secure World, " supra note 518, Section 3,

~Chapter VII o/the Charter o/the United Nations, Internal Threats and the Responsibility to Protect."
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counters this argument by correctly pointing out that through ratification cf

'J~c

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
), States have agreed that genocide, whether committed in a time of war or a time of
peace, is a crime under international law. 564 Since its adoption, the world has come to recognize
that genocide is a threat to security to all and should not be tolerated. 565 The Panel hammers this
point home by pointing out that "the principle of non-intervention internal affairs cannot be used
to protect genocidal acts or large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale
ethnic cleansing. ,,566
Fortunately, the Report also points out that the tragedies in Somalia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, have focused the international community not
on the sovereignty of these nations, but on their respective responsibilities to their own citizens
and to the larger international community. 567

As a result, the Report discusses that state

:sovereignty carries with it an obligation of a state to protect the welfare of its own citizens and
:tneet its obligation to the wider international community.568
The Report also discussed the emerging norm of a collective international "responsibility

310 protect" via military intervention as a last resort, and authorized by the Security Council, for
3-

state against genocide or other large-scale crimes against humanity where, as in the Sudan,
government is unwilling or unable to prevent or contain it. 569 The Report also notes a
recognition and acceptance among States that where governments are vested with the
responsibility of protecting its people from such catastrophes and they are either
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
}.janda, supra note 349, at 5.
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unwilling or unable to stop it, it is up to the larger international community to shoulder
responsibility to engage in order to prevent and respond to such violence, and where neceSS.JlY,
get involved in rebuilding lives shattered by such violence. 57o Thus, it is not so much "the right
to intervene," but the responsibility of every state to protect people suffering from unavoidable
catastrophe such as mass murder, rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and/or

. and exposure t 0 d'Isease. 571
dell'b erate starvatlOn
The Panel emphatically endorsed this emerging norm, as brought to the international
community's attention through the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS),572 reiterating that the Security Council has been consistent or effective in
dealing with tragedies such as those in Somalia, Rwanda and now Darfur as example, often
acting too late, too hesitantly or not at all. 573 But that can change. Both the Security Council and
the larger international community have now come to accept that under its powers under Chapter
VII, and in pursuit of the emerging norm of collective international responsibility to protect from
mass atrocities, that the Security Council can, and should, authorize military intervention to stop
humanitarian crises if it is prepared to declare that the situation is one that is a threat to
international peace and security and involves breaches of internationallaw. 574
Of course, such a decision must be based on not only the legality of the decision, but also
the common perception of its legitimacy - that such a decision is well-founded and for the right
reasons, morally as well as legally.575 The Panel noted that if the Security Council is to win the
respect it must have in the collective security system, it should follow a suggested set of

-------------------------------------------------------------------------l69 ·
HIgh-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A More Secure World, " supra note 518, Section 3,

"ehapter VII a/the Charter a/the United Nations,
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572 Nanda,

supra note 349, at 5.
See Chapter Four, supra.
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Internal Threats and the Responsibility to Protect."

guidelines that address not whether force can legally be used, but whether, as a matter

of~·

_

conscience, it should be used. 576 The Panel proposed a list of five guidelines that the SCC':J~q·
Council should always address or take into consideration, when deciding to authorize or endorse
the use of military force. Many of these guidelines mirror those set out by ICISS in its 2001
report.
The first is the seriousness of the threat, whether the threat is a threatened harm to a State
or human security and is clearly and sufficiently serious. In the case of internal conflicts, the
Panel suggests that the Security Council should determine if the threat involves genocide and
other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law.
The second guideline is proper purpose, whether the primary purpose of the proposed military
action is to halt or avert the threat in question. The third guideline is last resort; whether every
non-military option for meeting the threat in question has been explored, with reasonable
grounds for belief that other measures will not succeed.
The fourth guideline explores whether the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed
military action is the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question. The Panel seemed to
also suggest that the action should not exceed the necessity of response to the threat. The fifth
guideline is balance of consequences, whether there is a reasonable chance that the military
action would be successful in meeting the threat in question. The Panel raised the concern as to
Whether the consequences of action are likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.
The Panel further suggested that these guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be
embodied in resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.577
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If the Security Council followed the above-stated guidelines, then not only would it r;se
in the esteem of the international community for taking decisive action in the face of large-scale
humanitarian crises, but many lives would be saved. It has its chance now; it could finally take
action to stop the killings in Darfur and set the standard for action that could possibly prevent
and stop future humanitarian crises. It would finally show the world that human rights, security
and the lives on innocent people - are once again paramount to the concerns of government
sovereignty and profiteering.
IV.

The 2005 UN General Assembly World Summit and the Humanitarian Crisis in the
Darfur Region of Sudan
Although the U.S. government long ago utilized the term "genocide" to describe the

Sudan crisis,578 the United Nations has taken very few pro-active steps to stop it or to prevent
future humanitarian crises.
However, the UN took one significant step toward dealing with such humanitarian crises.
In September 2005, the United Nations ("UN") General Assembly held a World Summit at the

UN Headquarters in New York in order report, assess and re-prioritize the goals as established in
the 2000 Millennium Conference, also known as the 2000 Millennium Development Goals. 579
Although one of the stated priorities to come out of the World Summit was the "promotion of
peace and security,,,S80 the UN has failed to ameliorate the Sudan crisis through diplomatic
negotiations that could have ended the violence and prevented countless deaths. The question

rn H.R. Res. 467, 108th Congo (2004); S. Res. 133 108 ili Congo (2004).

I

79 See Chapter Five, Section II herein. The eight Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by the target date
0[2015, include: (I) halving extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieving universal primary education; (3)
empowering women and promoting equality between women and men; (4) reducing the under-five mortality by twothirds; (5) reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters; (6) reversing the spread of diseases, especially HIV/AIDS
and malaria; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability, and (8) creation of a global partnership for development with
targets for aid, trade and debt relief. See, www.un.orglmiIIenniumgoals/documents.htrnl, (last visited Oct. 22,

~~06).

2005 World Summit High-Level Meeting of the 60ili Session of the General Assembly, Sept. 14-16,2005, World
Summit Outcome Document, ~~ 69-72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/l (Oct. 24, 2005).
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nOW,

as the crisis continues on, is whether the UN can and should salvage the situation by

military or other intervention in order to stay true to its goal of the promotion of peace and
security.
A.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document

The most important product of the 2005 World Summit is the Outcome Document, which
provides that one of the obligations of States is to settle their disputes by peaceful means in
accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 581 Theoretically this includes States that have
internal civil war and other disputes within their borders. But what of the instance where the
government is engaging in armed attack against an unarmed civilian population? Where there
appears to be no clear, armed enemy attacking the government, or in the case of the Sudan,
where there is a civil war in one part of the country and genocide in another, pacific settlement
may not always be effective. Although the UN intervened in the conflict between the SLAIM

and the government in the southern part of the Sudan,582 it has not been very effective to
encourage the government to cease its authorized attacks upon unarmed civilians and now,
refugees. 583

1.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document - Two Key Goals

As discussed in greater detail below, the September 15,2005 Outcome Document from
the 2005 UN World Summit, a high-level plenary meeting of the 60th Session of the General

Assembly,584 indicates that all participating Members resolved to establish "a just and lasting

-;;;-------------

5822005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 580 at ~~ 73-76.
UN News Centre, Darfur's Displaced Remain Traumatized and at Risk of Rape, Harassment, supra note 86; see
also, Reuters, Darfur Refugees Live Within Sight of Their Homes, supra note 99.
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peace all over the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
united Nations.

585

The Outcome Document also indicates Members' rededication to support all efforts to
uphold the sovereign equality of all States, to respect the territorial integrity and political
independence of Member States and to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 586
Summit participants also resolved to create a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic world/ 87
and further resolved to undertake concrete measures to find ways to implement such findings as
the outcome of the 2000 Millennium Summit588 as well as other major United Nations
conferences and summits so as to provide multilateral solutions to problems in the four following
areas: (1) development, (2) peace and collective security, (3) human rights and the rule oflaw
and (4) strengthening of the United Nations. 589 However, for the purposes of this paper, only
two of these goals will be discussed: the commitment to peace and collective security, as well as
human rights and the rule of law.
a.

The Goal of Promoting Peace and Collective Security

The Outcome Document, a powerful document in its own right, not only reiterates the
obligation of all Member States to refrain in their international relations from the use of threat of
force or the use of force, in any manner inconsistent with the UN Charter,590 but also reiterates
that it is the Security Council which is most responsible for the maintenance of international
l8l

Id at~ 5.
Id
l87
l8 Id at ~ 16.
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8 The basic premise of the Millennium Development Goals is that world leaders recognize their responsibilities to
not only promote sovereignty of States as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also to
become more effective in maintaining peace and security by devoting resources and tools towards conflict
prevention (hence issues that sow the seeds of conflict), peaceful resolution of disputes and peacekeeping, all
~ough international cooperation.
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peace and security, as well as dealing with threats to the peace. 59 ! As discussed in furthe:
below, the Outcome Document makes it quite clear that not only do Member-States have an
obligation to protect civilian populations from such crimes as genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and other crimes against humanity, but, where all peaceful means of doing so have
failed, Member-States must be prepared to take timely, decisive and collective action, through
the Security Council, to ameliorate the situation. However, no matter how promising

humanitarian intervention may sound as means to end a humanitarian crisis, application of the
policy over the years has been somewhat problematic.
b.

The Goal of Committing to Human Rights and the Rule of Law

The goals as stated in the section "Use of Force Under the Charter of the United Nations"
of the Outcome Document, reiterated the obligation of all Member States to refrain in their
international relations from the use of threat of force or the use of force, in any manner

inconsistent with the UN Charter. 592 Surprisingly, the Outcome Document is also quite direct in
describing the responsibilities of Member-States to protect its civilian population.
As to Member-States' responsibilities to its own people, first of all, the Outcome
Document seems to presume that the issue of how a Member-State treats its own people has been
Covered in the various human rights documents such as the Charter itself, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (and the additional International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - the
"International Bill of Rights" - see below), as well as the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, passed by the United Nations General Assembly in

----------------------------------------------------------------------I'll) I
191
192

d at~ 77.
Id at ~~ 77-80.
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December 1948,593 and that all Member-States should continue to honor their obligations uni.';;i·
those treaties as to the protections of basic human rights of their people. In addition, the
Outcome Document specifically states that each Member-State has the responsibility to protect
its populations from such crimes as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity, and points out that the international community, through the United Nations, also has
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to
protect civilian populations from such crimes, and where necessary, be prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, should peaceful
. d equate. 594
means be ma

Although former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made clear that the goals of the
World Summit was for the UN to "fully adapt[] to the needs and circumstances of the twentyfirst century,,,S9S the goals pertaining to the use of force not only reaffirm the primary
responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, but
also reaffirms the authority of the Security Council "to mandate coercive action to maintain and
restore international peace and security,,,s96 (emphasis added), to protect vulnerable populations

subject to massive human rights abuses and atrocities. The time is now for the Security Council
to revisit the reason for its existence, and exercise this authority. As stated in the Outcome
document, the Security Council can and should exercise its authority including military action
Where necessary, to stop genocide at once, as the resulting humanitarian crisis in the Sudan has

had far-reaching consequences that affect many facets of life for the Sudanese and other Africans

in the regions that get caught in its deadly trap.
~;;;------------. Known in short as the "Genocide Convention."
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 580 at ~ 137.
The Secretary-General, "In Larger Freedom, " supra note 492 at ~ 153.
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 580 at ~ 79.
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V.

The United Nations: Designed To Promote International Peace and Security
The UN was borne out of World War II, mostly as a result of the absolute collapse of the

League of Nations. It is, by design an organization whose purpose is not only to promote
peaceful international relations among sovereign states, but also to protect the population of
peoples within those states.
The UN Charter is made up of many parts, but perhaps the most critical sections of the
Charter come in the middle of it: Chapter IV on the General Assembly, and Chapter V which
deals with the composition, functions, powers (and voting procedures) of the Security Counci1. 597
It should be noted that while resolutions of the General Assembly have the effect of being

nothing more than "recommendations," on the other hand resolutions of the Security Council are
binding upon all Member-States of the UN. 598 The Charter also vests with the Security Council
the most important function of the UN, and therefore the reason for its creation: the maintenance
of international peace and security.599 Member-States of the UN grant the Security Council the
right to act on their behalf in carrying out such duties associated with the maintenance of
international peace and security, and Member-States are obligated to follow such decisions. 6oo
Thus, it is no accident that the Security Council is the most powerful organ of the United
Nations; it is the one which is best able to address issues that threaten the "global geopolitical
equilibrium. ,,601
What the above indicates is that the United Nations was not necessarily created to
establish or reaffirm the rights of sovereignty, but to protect human rights and maintain
International peace and security; in other words, to maintain world order. It is no accident that
~--------------------

598Id at 35.
.
599lJN Charter, Chapter V, Article 24.
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the United Nations was designed to act as the main arbiter of disputes among independent
nations. Events of the recent past, namely, the 2000 Millennium Developments Goals, the
creation and report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the

2005 World Summit as well as a number of reports redefining the role of the United Nations, the
Security Council and the General Assembly, all demonstrate that the United Nations did pause to
reflect and reconsider the very important role it plays in the international community.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
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J. Kagan, The Obligation to Use Force to Stop Acts of Genocide: An Overview of Legal Precedents, Customary

~?rms and State Responsibility, 7 San Diego Int'!. L.J. 461, 469 (Spring 2006).
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CHAPTER SIX:
THE NEW UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL:
"THE WAY FORWARD" IN REMEDYING AND
PREVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS?
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"The creation of the Council would accord human rights a more authoritative
position, corresponding to the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the
United Nations."
-- Former Secretary General Kofi Annan

1.

The Report of the Secretary-General: Proposal of a New Human Rights Council
The idea for the creation of an improved human rights body in the UN was first proposed

in then Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Addendum to his report, "In Larger Freedom," in which
the Secretary General proposed as part of the overall reform of the United Nations, a change in
the structure of the United Nations human rights machinery by upgrading the Commission on
Human Rights into a full-fledged Council that would raise human rights to the priority accorded
to it in the UN Charter. 602 Over the years, many statements had been made about the declining
international credibility of the Commission, with politicization, selectivity and double standard
being the common complaints about its waning effectiveness. 603 In order to strengthen the UN
human rights machinery, the Secretary-General stated quite eloquently, as follows:
"If the United Nation is to meet the expectations of men and women everywhereand indeed, if the Organization is to take the cause of human rights as seriously as
those of security and development, the Member States should agree to replace the
Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council ...
. The creation of the Council would accord human rights a more authoritative
position, corresponding to the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the
United Nations .... Those elected to the Council should undertake to abide by
the highest human rights standards.,,604
This view was also taken by many Member-States and non-governmental organizations,
that it was vitally important to strengthen, improve and reform the existing human rights

----------------------

602 The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of
the Secretary-General, Addendum, 11 I, U.N. Doc. AIRES/59/2005/Add. I (May 23, 2005) (hereinafter "In Larger
~eedom -Addendum).
UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council, Summary of Open-Ended Informal Consultations Held
by the Commission on Human Rights Pursuant to Economic and Social Council Decision 2005/217, Prepared by the
Chairperson of the Sixty-First Session ofthe Commission, (Follow up to the Outcome ofthe Millennium Summit), 1111
12, U.N. Doc. A/59/847, E/2005173 (June 21,2005), (hereinafter "Summary of Open-Ended Informal
""V''L~u/f nflrl"~ ").
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mechanism, in particular that relating to the work of the Commission on Human Rights, its
procedures, the human rights treaties bodies as well as the Office of the High Commissioner on
Human Rights.

6oS

The Secretary-General's proposal to elevate the Commission on Human

Rights to a standing Human Rights Council (as a subsidiary of the General Assembly) and to
increase its authority as well as accord human rights a higher priority was supported by many
States and delegations. Reference was also made to the interrelatedness of human rights,
development and security, as highlighted in the Addendum to the Secretary-General's report. 606
In the Addendum to his report, the Secretary-General proposed that the new Human
Rights Council be a standing body, elected by the entire membership of the General Assembly,
able to meet regularly and at any time to deal with imminent crises, as well as allow for timely
and in-depth consideration of human rights issues. 607 The Secretary-General noted that being
elected directly by the General Assembly, a major organ of the UN, would make the Council
more accountable, as well as representative, and would have greater authority than the
Commission on Human Rights, a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Counci1. 608
The Secretary-General also proposed as a key function of the new Council, a "peer
review" function, in which the members of the Council evaluate the fulfillment of all member
States of their respective human rights obligations, giving equal attention to civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. 609 The peer review
mechanism is designed to complement but not replace existing reporting procedures under
human rights treaties. Under reporting procedures of human rights treaties, such procedures
arise from legal commitments and involve close scrutiny of the law, regulations and practice

;----------------------------------------------------------------------,.",,5 Id. at ~ 3.
•
606 See supra note 603, Summary of Open-Ended Informal ConsultatIOns, ~ 9.
6O/d. at ~ 8.
.
See supra note 602, In Larger Freedom - Addendum, ~ 4.
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with regard to specific provisions of applicable treaties by independent expert panels. 6IO Peer
review, on the other hand, is a process where States would voluntarily enter into discussions
regarding human rights in their respective countries, based upon the obligations to provide and
protect those rights arising under the UN Charter and as expressed in the Universal
Declaration.

611

As the Secretary-General aptly states about the new Human Rights Council's

function:

"It should have an explicitly defined function as a chamber of peer review. Its main task
would be to evaluate the fulfillment by all States of all their human rights obligations.
This would give concrete expression to the principle that human rights are universal and
indivisible. Under such a system, every Member State could come up for review on a
periodic basis. Any such rotation should not, however, impede the Council from dealing
with any massive and gross violations that might occur. Indeed, the Council will have to
be able to bring urgent crises to the attention of the world community.,,612 (Emphasis
added.)
Crucial to this system of peer review is the notion of universal scrutiny, whereas the
performance of all Member States in regard to all human rights commitments is subject to
assessment by other States. 613 Such a system would also help avoid the politicization and
selectivity for which the Commission on Human Rights has been criticized in the past, and will
touch upon the entire spectrum of human rights - namely, civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights. 614 In addition, the finding of the peer reviews would allow greater international
assistance and policy advice on human rights situations, and would hold all elected members
accountable for their human rights commitments. 615
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In addition to the peer review system, the Secretary-General also proposed that the
lIuman Rights Council fulfill the additional functions of Member States coming together to take
action when and where serious human rights situations develop (such as Sudan), by adopting
country-specific resolutions.

616

In addition, the Secretary-General suggested that the Human

Rights Council should, like the Commission, have the capability to meet in extraordinary session
should a majority of members agree. Such authority of the new Council would also allow the
High Commissioner for Human Rights to call for action and support from a United Nations

· b0 dy. 617
standmg
The Secretary-General also proposed that the new Human Rights Council playa more
pivotal role in overseeing and contributing to the interpretation and development of international
law on human rights, a critical part in the development of standards central to the United Nations
system for the protection of human rights. 618 Furthermore, such a function of the new Council
would reinforce the work of the treaty body system, which has also made significant
contributions to the development of internationallaw.

619

Overall, as concluded by the Secretary-

General, a new Human Rights Council could strengthen the human rights work of other UN
organs, agencies and programs such as the Security Council, ECOSOC and the new
Peacebuilding Commission. 62o It was also hoped that the new Council could analyze and draw
attention to those gaps in implementation and mainstreaming of human rights issues throughout

616
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the United Nations system, as well as assist in the support and generation of contributions
developing countries in order to avoid human rights abuses and violations.
II.

fOT

621

The Creation of the Human Rights Council

A.

The 2005 World Summit: A New Human Rights Council Is Established

In the September 15, 2005 [Final] Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, the
participants of the World Summit established that a Human Rights Council be established as a
subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, elected by the entire membership of the General
Assembly, the composition of which is to be made up of regional representatives. 622 While the
Outcome Document is not as detailed as to the methodology that the new Human Rights Council
is to utilize as the Secretary-General's Addendum to his report, the Outcome Document does
indicate that the new Council, (1) shall be responsible for promoting universal respect for the
protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and (2) the Council should
address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations (such
as genocide), and make recommendations thereon. 623 Much of the details of the functions of the
Human Rights Council was left to the General Assembly to decide in a later resolution, as
indicated below.
In addition, the new Council is responsible for, in addition to those duties as enumerated
in the Outcome Document, promoting the full implementation of human rights obligations
undertaken by States, and undertake a universal and periodic review of each State's fulfillment
of its human rights obligations and commitments, as well as assuming the role and
621

Id at~ 17.
The regional representative membership of the Human Rights Council shall be made up as follows: Africa,
thirteen members; Asia, thirteen members; Latin America and the Caribbean, eight members; Eastern European
states, six members; Western European states and all other states (including the U.S.), seven members. Members of
the Council shall serve for a period of three years and shall not be eligible for immediate re-election after two
~onsecutive terms.
23 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 580 at ~~ 157- I 60.
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responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights relating to the work of the UN High
commissioner for Human Rights, as previously designated by the UN Economic and Social

CounCl'1 .624
B.

Mandates and Functions ofthe New Council

On April 3, 2006, General Assembly Resolution 60/251 resolved that all mandates,
mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights, including the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and other special procedures
of the former Commission on Human Rights, were to be assumed by the new Human Rights
Council, as of June 19,2006. 625 The former Commission on Human Rights concluded its sixtysecond and final session on March 27, 2006. 626
According to Resolution 60/251, the new Council will (and currently does) consist of
forty-seven Member States, based in Geneva, Switzerland, elected by secret ballot by the
majority of the members of the General Assembly, and based upon equitable geographical
distribution. 627 The Resolution also calls upon each Member State to make pledges and
commitments to the protection of human rights which they are expected to live up to. Further, as
noted above, each Member, by accepting membership in the Human Rights Council, agrees to
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See, supra note 580.
See, UN General Assembly, G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. AlRES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).
626 Office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, www.ohchr.orgiengIishlbodies/chr/index.htm. (last visited
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~2006, www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=18411 (last visited Dec. 26, 2006).
625

172

have its human rights record reviewed 628 under the "peer review" system as proposed by the
secretary-General in the Addendum to his report "In Larger Freedom.,,629
In addition to those duties as indicated in the Outcome Document, the new Council will
be responsible for (1) promoting the full implementation of human rights obligations undertaken

by States; (2) undertaking a universal and periodic review of each UN Member State's
fulfillment of its human rights obligations and commitments; (3) addressing situations of
violations of human rights, as well as gross and systematic violations and making
recommendations thereon; (4) promoting human rights education, learning and advisory services,
technical assistance and capacity-building; (5) serving as a forum for dialogue for human rights
issues; (6) making recommendations and reports to the General Assembly on the
accomplishments of the Council, the development of international law in the field of human
rights, and the promotion and protection of human rights, and (7) assuming the role and
responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights as its relates to the work of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, as previously designated to the Commission by the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).630
The Council also assumes, (and where necessary) is resolved to improve and rationalize
all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of the Commission of Human Rights in
order to maintain a system of Special Procedures, previously utilized by the Commission. 631
Such Special Procedures refer to a diverse range of procedures established to promote human
rights in relation to specific themes or issues, or to examine situations in specific countries. 632
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The Outcome Document also required that an overall review of the Council's first year ofv.;c '
take place within one year of the Council's first session, which took place on June 19,2006.

633

During the First Session, the Council issued a number of resolutions on a variety of
human rights issues (including establishing working groups of the Commission on Human
Rights, and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights), elected officers, made decisions on such procedures as periodic review and
dialogue on human rights, as well as reporting procedures to the General Assembly on the First
Session of the Human Rights Council. 634
C.

Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and the Rule of Law

In the 2005 Outcome Document, Member States also reiterated their commitment to "the
protection and promotion of all human rights, the rule of law and democracy, as well as the
obligation of all States to fulfill their obligations to promote universal respect for, and the
observance and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance
with the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as all other instruments
relating to human rights and internationallaw.,,635 More specifically, the Outcome Document
reiterated that States, in conformity with the Charter, shall respect human rights and fundamental
freedoms without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language or religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property birth or other status.

636

(Emphasis added.)

As to Member-States' responsibilities to its own people, first of all, the Outcome Document
presumes that the issue of how a Member-State treats its own people has been covered in the
various human rights documents such as the Charter itself, the Universal Declaration of Human

----------------------See, UN General Assembly, Report of the Human Rights Council. U.N. Doc. Supplement No. 53 (A/61/53).
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Rights (and the additional International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - the "International Bill of
Rights" - see Chapter Five, herein), as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
ofthe Crime of Genocide, passed by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948,637
and, that all Member-States should continue to honor their obligations under those treaties as to
the protections of basic human rights of their people.
Furthermore, as previously noted, the Outcome Document specifically states that each
Member-State has the responsibility to protect its populations from human rights abuses and
crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and points
out that the international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect civilian
populations from such crimes, and where necessary, be prepared to take collective action, in a

timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, should peaceful means be
inadequate. 638 (Emphasis added.)
The Outcome Document also provides that one of the obligations of States is to settle
their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with Chapter VI ofthe UN Charter. 639
Theoretically this includes States that have internal civil war and other disputes within their
borders. But what of the instance where the government is engaging in armed attack against an
unarmed civilian population? Where there appears to be no clear, armed enemy attacking the
government, or in the case of the Sudan, where there is a civil war in one part of the country and
genocide in another, pacific settlement may not always be effective. Although the UN
intervened in the conflict between the SLAIM and the government in the southern part of the

--------------------::7 Known in short as the "Genocide Convention."
8 2005

World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 580 at ~ 137.
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sudan,64o it has not been very effective to encourage the government to cease its authorize:;
attacks upon unarmed civilians and now, refugees.

641

Besides the use of force, can the rule of

law itself be an effective tool to stop genocide and other instances of mass human rights
violations? Thus far, the answer is not always, as genocide continues to occur despite the
existence of the Genocide Convention, but the final answer remains to be seen. However, with
the creation of a new Human Rights Council, at long last there is promise that the UN can and

will better monitor those states that commit egregious human rights violations, such as Sudan,
and hold them accountable.
III.

The Human Rights Council: Efforts to Date

It has been nearly three years since establishment of the new Council, and the results
regarding the Council's attention to the crisis in Sudan have been mixed, but nevertheless
promising. In June 2006, the new Council took up the issue of the Peace Agreement between the
government and rebel forces in the Sudan, indicating that Sudan must continue its commitment
to the Peace Agreement in order to rebuild infrastructure needed for lasting peace. 642
A.

The New Council: A Promising Start on the Issue of Human Rights Violations
and Genocide in Sudan

After its establishment, the attention by the new Council to the human rights situation in
Darfur has been interesting and promising. At its first regular session held on June 26, 2006, the
new Council held discussion on issues as identified by the President of the Council, based on
consultations with Member States of the Council as well as observer States. One of the issues
discussed was the Darfur Peace Agreement between the government and rebel forces in Sudan.
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 538 at ~~ 73-76.
News Centre, Darfur's Displaced Remain Traumatized and at Risk of Rape, Harassment, supra note 86; see
also, Reuters, Darfur Refugees Live Within Sight of Their Homes, supra note 99.
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642 Darfur Peace Agreement signed May 5, 2006, Abuja, Nigeria,
h!m:llaliafrica.com/peaceafricairesources/view/OOO 10926.pdf, (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
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The Council indicated that Sudan must continue its commitment to the Peace Agreement in
to rebuild infrastructure needed for lasting peace.

643

The reports as summarized below indicate

that not only is the crisis in Darfur worsening, but that the crisis continues to stay at the forefront
of the Human Rights Council's dialogue of those most egregious human rights violations taking
place in the world today.
1.

Second (Regular) Session of the Human Rights Council - First Part

In September 2006, (the first part of the second regular session), the Council addressed
the human rights abuses in Sudan, when the Special Rapporteur presented a report following her
first mission to the Sudan in October 2005.

644

First of all, the Special Rapporteur concluded that

in Darfur, innocent civilians were continuing to suffer a number of human rights abuses
including arbitrary arrests, being held incommunicado by security forces, torture, ill-treatment
and mass killings. 645
In addition, the Special Rapporteur also noted that discrimination and marginalization
based upon ethnicity continued, depriving certain groups of basic needs as access to food,
shelter, health care and education, as well as rape and sexual violence against women, all by the
hands of government forces and militia. 646 Interestingly, the representative of Sudan, appearing
as a concerned country,647 disputed many of the claims made by the Special Rapporteur and tried

Id.
644 The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Sima Samar, presented her report to the
Human Rights Council on September 27, 2006.
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to put forward "its best face" by indicating that it fully supported and was in the process of
implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement. 648
However, despite mixed comments from members states as to Sudan's commitments to
both Peace Agreements,649 the Special Rapporteur suggested that Khartoum was not taking a
proactive stance in aiding in ending human rights abuses, and as a matter of fact, humanitarian
organizations were being denied access to deliver aid to those groups most in need. 65o The
Sudanese representative replied by blaming many of the problems as cited by the Special
Rapporteur on armed rebel groups.651
Despite the mixed reaction to the Special Rapporteur's report on recent human rights
abuses, what is important is that the new Human Rights Council shows promise of the crisis in
Sudan being discussed in the open, on the world stage. It is still too early to determine if these
discussions will yield the key objective - to shame the Sudanese government to stop the killing
of its unarmed citizens, and to cease the above-noted human rights abuses. What is also
promising is that there is a more organized observation and reporting mechanism that will allow
a special mission to visit a state where human rights violations are taking place, and such
observations are regularly reported to a larger body for discussion and follow up. It remains to
be seen whether discussion at the Human Rights Council level with lead to action. Nevertheless,

it is encouraging to see that the UN has dedicated a new subsidiary organ to review, monitor and
(hopefully) take action against such abuses. The notion that human rights are being elevated to
the level of importance it garners in the UN Charter is reason to have hope for the end of such
humanitarian crises as that in Sudan.

~-------------------649
65

See supra note 644.
See supra note 644.

Old.
I d.

65 1

178
.111

2.

Second (Regular) Session of the Human Rights Council: Resumed

In November 27-29,2006, the second session (resumed) of the Human Rights Council
was held, in which the Council held an interactive dialogue with the Special Adviser to the
Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide. Many crises in the world were discussed,
including the situation regarding the occupation of Palestine by Israel, as well as the ongoing
humanitarian crisis in Sudan. During this interactive session, many Member States made
comments in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and two states, Poland and Norway, both
expressed grave concern over the "dramatic human rights situation and atrocities committed in
Darfur," and backed a call by the Secretary-General to hold a special session of the Human
Rights Council on Darfur. 652 Australia expressed disappointment that more of the gravity of the
situation in Darfur was not addressed, and that the Council failed to discuss more about the
situation in the final document in which the Council pledged its support for the Darfur Peace
Agreement. 653 There were also many comments made by special observers from nongovernmental agencies such as United Nations Watch, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International that insisted that the situation in Darfur had worsened in the recent past, and urged
the Council to take more proactive steps to closely monitor the situation as well as to protect the
civilian population. 654
No surprise to anyone, Sudan took the position that there was an intentional campaign to
offer false information and inaccurate data to the Council about Sudan, and denied that hundreds
of thousands of people had been killed. 655 Sudan also offered (likely to much skepticism) that
the Peace Agreement had lead to very positive changes, and that statements regarding the
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worsening security situation since the signing of the Peace Agreement were highly
656

exaggerate d.

However, Louise Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
confirmed that the source of information upon which the assessment of the situation in Darfur
was based came from the Council's own Rapporteur on Sudan, as well as the reports of the
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). According to Ms. Arbour, the reports released were
based on first-hand experiences of those on the ground as part of UNMIS, given on a systematic
basis, and based on first-hand verified information gathered from testimonies as well as on-site
visits. Information was also cross-checked with local authorities for veracity and accuracy. In
addition, the High Commissioner added that she herself made a number of short visits to the
region, and was given the opportunity to speak to victims of human rights violations. Although
the High Commissioner did not rely on her short visits as a definitive evaluation of the facts,
nevertheless, they were supported by the presence of other humanitarian experts present and
providing assistance in the region. 657
At the close of the second session, the Human Rights Council resolved that, as to the
situation in Darfur, it call upon all parties that had not yet done so to sign the Darfur Peace
Agreement, and called for all parties to put an end to ongoing human rights violations and
violations of humanitarian law, as well as calling for all parties to allow the unhindered return of
displaced persons to their homes. 658
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3.

The 4th Special Session ofthe Human Rights Council

In July, August and November 2006, the Human Rights Council held three special
sessions, in which the situation of Israeli military incursion into occupied Palestine territory was
specificallyaddressed. 659 However, in answer to previous calls of the Secretary-General for a
special session on the situation in Darfur, on December 12-13,2006, the Human Rights Council
held a fourth special session on Darfur, in which it resolved a number of items. Before it made
its final resolutions, the Council received an oral statement from Louise Arbour, UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, on the state of the current situation in Darfur.
Ms. Arbour first noted that the ongoing "unrelenting" tragedy in Darfur demanded the
"commensurate engagement and vigilance of the Human Rights Council.,,66o Ms. Arbour
pointed out that the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement was not being honored, and pointed to a
number of instances indicated that the violence has exacerbated since late 2005. 661 Ms. Arbour
noted that as of December 12,2006,80,000 people had been forced to flee their homes within
the previous six-weeks time period, and that several hundred civilians, including women and
children had been killed. 662 Ms. Arbour further reported that mass rapes and other egregious
human rights abuses were continuing unabated, and that as a matter of fact, a lack of
accountability had caused the perpetrators of such massive human rights abuses to "hold sway"
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over the Darfur region. 663 Ms. Arbour further reported that the conflict has now spilled over"-::"
has engulfed parts of Chad and the Central African Republic, suggesting that the crisis is slowly
becoming a regional crisis.

664

Ms. Arbour was careful to also point out that the previously reported patterns of abuse 665
had only exacerbated since 2005, and cautioned the Human Rights Council (as well as the rest of
the UN) to refrain from looking upon the escalation in the crisis as merely an escalation of "tribal
rivalries. ,,666 Ms. Arbour further noted that in spite of investigations and recommendations from
the International Commission ofInquiry on Darfur, despite the UN Security Council's referral of
the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court and targeted sanctions that the Security
Council imposed against Sudan, the crisis continues still. Ms. Arbour concluded her oral address
with an urgent plea that the Council pay serious attention to the crisis in Darfur, and that the
Council take affirmative action at the conclusion of its fourth special session to put an end to the
crisis. 667
In its final resolution at the conclusion of the fourth special session, first the Council
expressed its concern for the seriousness of the human rights situation in Darfur, and repeated its
call for any parties who have not signed the Darfur Peace Agreement to sign on. 668 The Council
also welcomed the cooperation of the government of Sudan with the Special Rapporteur, and
called on the government of Sudan's continued cooperation with the Human Rights Council and
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the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 669 To that end, the Council decide:,'
dispatch a High-Level Mission to Darfur in order to assess the human rights situation and the
needs of Sudan to resolve it, requested the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for
Human Rights to provide logistic, technical and administrative support to the High-Level
Mission. 67o Further, the Council requested that the High-Level Mission report to the Council at
the Council's fourth (regular) session on its findings. 671 Although the fourth regular session has
not yet taken place, it remains to be seen what the High-Level Mission will find and recommend.
B.

Recent Developments at the Human Rights Council

On March 30, 2007, the Human Rights Council adopted without a vote at its Fourth
Regular Session, Resolution 4/8 on the follow-up to decision S-4/10 1 of December 13, 2006, as
adopted by the Council at its Fourth Special Session.

1.

Commission of the Group of Experts

In Resolution 4/8,672 the Council convened a group of seven mandate holders to ensure
the effective follow-up and to foster the implementation of resolutions and recommendations on
Darfur as adopted by the Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other UN institutions,
as well as to promote the implementation of relevant human rights mechanisms. 673 The Group of
Experts made a number of short and medium-term recommendations that were identified in their
first report. 674 The Group of Experts was presided over by Ms. Sima Samar, the Special
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Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Sudan as designated by the Council, and was
composed of a number of individuals charged to review specific human rights issues such as
violence against women, the human rights of internally displaced persons, as well as experts on
the question of torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. 675
On June 20, 2007, the Council extended the Group of Experts' mandate to review the
human rights situation in Darfur for another six months, requesting an update to the Council in
September 2007. 676 In its interim report of September 22, 2007,677 the Group of Experts
indicated that at that time, it was not in a position to provide an interim report based on the
information received to date from the Government of Sudan. The Group of Experts instead
recommended allowing additional time to the Government of Sudan to implement
recommendations, and to allow the Group of Experts to gather additional information from all
reliable sources concerning the status of implementation of recommendations. 678
In resolution 6/34,679 the Council requested the Special Rapporteur ensure effective
follow-up and to foster the implementation ofthe remaining short-term and medium-term
recommendations identified in the first report of the Group of Experts, through an open and
constructive dialogue with the Government of the Sudan, also taking into account the final report

675 The Group of Experts consisted of Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions; Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed
conflict; Yakin Erturk, Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences; Hina Jilani,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders; Walter Kalin,
representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons; and Manfred Nowak,
Special Rapporteur on the question oftorture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Mr.
Kalin served as Rapporteur for the Group of Experts. See Report of the Ninth Session of the Human Rights
Council, supra note 672 at p. 4.
676 See, Statement of Sima Samar to the Human Rights Council Introducing the Darfur Experts Group Final Report
on 11 December 2007, December 11, 2007.
677 See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/617, Interim Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur Prepared by the Group of
Experts Mandated by the Human Rights Council it its Resolution 4/8, Sept. 22, 2007, as presented to the Sixth
Session of the Human Rights Council on September 22,2007.
678
Id. See also note 674, supra.
679 Human Rights Council Resolution 6/34, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
the Sudan, adopted without vote on December 14,2007.
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of the Group of Experts,680 the replies ofthe Government thereon, and also include infonnation
regarding the same in her report to the Council at its Ninth Session.

681

The Special Rapporteur

prepared a report on the situation of human rights in Sudan on the status of the implementation
ofthe short and medium tenn recommended actions, and presented it at the Ninth Session of the
Human Rights Council. 682
2.

Status of Implementation of Recommendations by the Group of Experts

Overall, the Special Rapporteur concluded that effective implementation of
recommendations by the Government of Sudan has been slow. The Special Rapporteur opined
that the Government needed to engage fully in an open and constructive dialogue on such
concerns, and take more concrete steps to improve the human rights situation in Darfur. As to
those activities the Government had undertaken to implement the recommendations, the Special
Rapporteur noted that in only a few areas were necessary steps taken to fully or to a significant
degree in order to have a tangible impact. 683
In other instances, activities were undertaken, but little or no tangible impact has been
noted or reported or only initial steps were taken toward implementation, with little follow-up.
The Special Rapporteur also noted that infonnation on the human rights situation provided by
UNAMID and other UN agencies, bodies and programs with operational competence in Darfur
as well as other relevant sources reflected an extremely critical situation that requires immediate

680 See U.N. Doc. AIHRC/6/1 9, Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur Prepared by the United
Nations Experts Group on Darfur, as presented to the Resumed Sixth Session of the Human Rights Council on
November 28, 2007. The Group of Experts concluded, in summary, that a number of recommendations had first
steps towards implementation taken by the Sudan Government but not fully implemented, or were not implemented
at all.
681 See U.N. Doc. AIHRC/9/13/Add. I, Report Prepared by the Special Rapporteur (in short), supra note 672.
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action, as the available information is not consistent with the Government's assessment of
impact on the ground of activities undertaken to date. 684
a.

Protection of the Civilian Population

As to the status of implementation of recommendations on the protection of the civilian
population, induding those internally displaced persons, the Group of Experts proposed that the
Government of Sudan issue and enforce clear orders to the armed forces or any militias under the
Government's control that it was prohibited from making any civilians or civilian objects
(including cultivated land, livestock) the target of attacks or to launch indiscriminate attacks
(including, aerial bombardments and burning of villages). 685 The Government indicated that it
had taken a number of measures including, (1) approval of a new Armed Forces Act, which
included a chapter on the protection of civilians under international humanitarian law, (2)
undertaking a national study on humanitarian law, (3) held workshops with members of armed
forces and police forces, prosecutors and judges on international humanitarian law principles, (4)
issuance of rules to enforce discipline in the armed forces. 686
Unfortunately, the information received on implementation of such measures indicated
that the orders and strengthened legal framework has not had any impact as far as attacks on
civilians and civilian objects by either government forces or the government aided militia, and
that such attacks continued. 687 The civilian population in Darfur was reported to remain largely
unprotected against such attacks. As of September 2008, there was an estimated 2.5 million
internally displaced persons, with an additional 250,000 seeking refuge in Chad. Approximately
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150,000 persons were displaced in the early part of2008, in addition to the 780,000 since the
signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006.

688

In addition to ongoing attacks, the Darfur population is also at risk related to sudden
displacement, the lack of services and the lack of protection from armed forces and militias, with
women still being subject to harassment, intimidation and sexual and physical assaults within the
camps.689 There have been a number of reports of attacks by militia groups as well as the
SLAlMM and other armed persons on refugee camps. In addition, the proliferation of weapons
in addition to the presence of armed forces around the camps have greatly endangered internally
displaced persons within the camps, with some internally displaced persons caught in the middle
of fighting between two warring factions. 690
b.

Protection of Women Against Violence

The Special Rapporteur also reported on the status of the Government's efforts to
ameliorate other human rights abuses in the Report, a few of which are highlighted herein.
As to protection of women against violence, the Government reported a small number of cases of
sexual and physical violence by members of the armed forces or police and that of 12 cases
reported, only eight had been prosecuted. 691 The Special Rapporteur suggested that a more
effective definition of "rape" needs to be added to the law, as under application oflaw, rape was
amended to include adultery.692 The Special Rapporteur also suggested that increased efforts are
needed to seriously address these crimes as women and girls especially those in internally
displaced camps, are particularly vulnerable to attack. 693 The Special Rapporteur noted that
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there have only been a few cases where the perpetrators of rape have been prosecuted, and
government authorities are not responding appropriately to reports of attacks. 694
However, there was some good news. The Special Rapporteur did report that steps were
taken to give those women and girls who were raped access to medical care whether they chose
to report their case or not. 695 This has been fully implemented, with government authorities
disseminating information, having state committees monitor compliance and providing ongoing
training. 696 In addition, gender and family protection units in Northern and Southern Darfur have
received women police officers who will investigate gender-based crimes. 697
While all of this appears to be a good start to ameliorate future cases, nevertheless these
measures unfortunately do not begin to touch "the tip of the iceberg" as to the thousands of
unreported cases of systematic and ongoing rape that have occurred since the Darfur violence
began almost six years ago. It is hoped that the Government will continue to honor its
commitment to these recommendations, and protect a very vulnerable population.
c.

Other Humanitarian Issues Addressed

The Special Rapporteur also noted in the Report that as to the issue of children being
conscripted into the armed forces, the Government has sponsored a bill, The Child Act 2008,
which clearly defined a child as a person not reaching the age of 18, and revoked signs of
maturity as a criterion for defining a child. 698
As to protection against summary executions, arbitrary detention, disappearance and
torture, the Special Rapporteur has found that Government security apparatus continued to
commit these human rights violations, and that such abuses were targeted towards community
694
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leaders and persons perceived to be tied to rebel groups.699 There have also been reports th2t
detainees have been tortured or ill-treated, despite Government claims that no detainees have
been tortured and all detainees have been given access to lawyers. 7oo Unfortunately, no
information was provided the Special Rapporteur on concrete measures taken by the
Government, nor has UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan) granted access to detention centers.
Although human rights monitors have been granted limited access to Government detention
facilities, violations of detainees continue. 701
While there are a number of other compelling human rights issues raised in the Report,
one other issue needs to be noted. The Special Rapporteur reported that protection of human
rights workers from harassment and attack has become a growing problem, in that a number of
workers have been killed, hundreds of workers abducted, hundreds of humanitarian vehicles
have been hijacked, and humanitarian premises have been assaulted by armed persons. 702 In
addition, access to victims of attacks and internally displaced persons in camps has become
increasingly difficult and dangerous for humanitarian workers. 703 However, the Government did
finalize in September 2007 the General Directory of Procedures for non-governmental
organizations operating in Northern Sudan, including special provisions for Darfur, as to gaining
access to civilians and refugees. 704
Finally, as to accountability and justice, the Government failed to provide any
information to the Special Rapporteur as to actions taken to combat impunity for attacks on
civilians and other crimes. Legal immunities for armed state agents continue to be enshrined in
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law, and as a matter of fact, the new Police Act grants immunity to police and other armed
persons against crimes, which is purportedly lifted upon the request of the aggrieved party. 70S
Unfortunately, there is much skepticism that the law will be applied as the Government claims,
given the Government of Sudan also informed the Special Rapporteur of its refusal to accept the
competence of the International Criminal Court to investigate cases in Sudan. 706
IV.

Conclusion
What is promising about the Human Rights Council is that there is a more organized

observation and reporting mechanism that will allow a special mission to visit a state where
human rights violations are taking place, and then such observations are regularly reported to a
larger body for discussion and follow up. It remains to be seen whether discussion at the Human
Rights Council level will lead to action. The High-Level Mission to Sudan mayor may not have
encouraging news, or make substantial enough recommendations that will lead to the end of the
crisis once and for all. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to see that the UN has dedicated a new
subsidiary organ to review, monitor and (hopefully) take action against such abuses. The notion
that human rights are being elevated to the level of importance it garners in the UN Charter is
reason to have hope for the end of such humanitarian crises as that in Sudan. After all, it is
difficult to hide, let alone deny, an egregious, ongoing humanitarian crisis when it is presented
for all to see on the world stage.
As Paul Kennedy notes, despite all of the setbacks and "ghastly actions" against human
rights in the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries, nevertheless there has been a bigger
advance in the idea and practice on national and international human rights in the last sixty-plus
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years than in any comparable period in all of history. 707 Yet, although the gap between thos(~
rights enjoyed by a citizen of Sweden as compared to those granted to a citizen of Sudan is stm
quite wide, nevertheless, what is encouraging is that there is now a collective world effort to
close the gap. 708
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"To sum up, Ladies and Gentlemen, as an international community we have a clear
obligation to prevent genocide. I believe that collectively we also have the power to
prevent it. The question is, do we have the will?,,709
-- Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan

If the United Nations is to avoid becoming the Grand Guinol of the twenty-first century
and restore the organization to the stature it held when it was created, then the Security Council,
the General Assembly or both, must be willing to use every tool at its disposal, include armed
intervention, to stop the human rights atrocities that have been ongoing in the Darfur region of
Sudan immediately.
The genocide in Sudan violates a number of protected rights under the Universal
Declaration, as well as other international human rights treaties. Such egregious violations
should prompt the Security Council to stop debating whether "genocide" has occurred, whether
UN troops are really needed, whether the prosecution of Sudan President Omar al-Bashir
somehow magically put an end to the Darfur crisis, and take immediate action to intervene and
stop it once and for all. It is the role of the Security Council to maintain, and where necessary,
restore peace and security; to date, the Security Council has not fully realized this role. It has

not taken aggressive enough action to stop the genocide in Darfur - the proof is that it still
continues.
The fact that the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is the tangential result of a previously
existing armed conflict is no reason not to intervene. Although a civil war (of sorts) is occurring
in Sudan, it is clear from all accounts that the government is using the ongoing conflict with

709 The Secretary-General, Genocide is a Threat to Peace, Requiring Strong unite Action, Address to the Stockholm
International Forum, Stockholm, Sweden (Jan. 26, 2004), in U.N. Chronicle Online Edition,
!mp:llwww.un.orgiPubslchronicle/2004/issueIl0104p4.asp, (last visited Feb. 16,2008), as cited by Erin Doherty,
The United Nations' Toolbox to Fix Genocide in the Twenty-First Century, 30 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 485
(2007).
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"rebel" forces as a pretext to attack innocent, unarmed civilians and drive them out of the Datfd)
region in favor of establishing a pro-Arab Sudan, committing mass murders, rapes and other
atrocities along the way.
Although a number of interventions have taken place since World War II, the legal basis
for humanitarian intervention has not been clear, which has lead to uneven results in Kosovo and
Rwanda. Such disparate treatment of two of the greatest tragedies of the twentieth century has
lead scholars to try to establish a potential legal framework to respond to such tragedies, despite
the fact that the international community has been so uncomfortable with the notion of
humanitarian intervention, that it had not, until recently, been able to adopt a coherent
framework for interventions. 7 10
The concept of humanitarian intervention and whether it is a viable option in the face of
genocide and other human rights atrocities has made a dramatic shift in the last sixty-plus years.
Grotius recognized that a state's sovereignty is not absolute. However, sovereignty became a
vexing issue in that many scholars viewed humanitarian intervention as an assault on
sovereignty, or as a pretext of one state to wage war with another to effect regime change. The
rationale is that legal recognition of (unilateral) humanitarian intervention would undermine the
United Nations' authority under the Charter, to curtail aggression. 7li Taken to an illogical
extreme, under this theory the Sudan government would have a credible legal case for defending
Sudanese national sovereignty to allow the Darfur genocide and other ethnic cleansing. 712

710 Williams and Stewart, Humanitarian Intervention: The New Missing Link in the Fight to Prevent Crimes Against
Humanity and Genocide? Supra note 345, at p. 102.
7\\ Samuel Jones, Darfur, The Authority of Law, and Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 39 U. To!. L. Rev. 97,
107 (2007).
7\2 David Aronofsky, The International Legal Responsibility to Protect Against Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity: Why National Sovereignty Does Not Preclude Its Exercise, 13 ILSA J. Int'I & Compo L 317,318
(2006).
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Such an assertion becomes unsustainable when examined in relation to the aims of the
UN Charter, under Articles 1(3),55, 56, which speak of the obligation to protect and preserve
human rights, as well as maintaining international peace and security.713 International legal
scholars have even recognized that the member states' pledge to preserve human rights is not
entirely devoid oflegal obligation. 714
After Kosovo, Bosnia and two genocidal campaigns in the Balkans, at the urging of then
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the international community developed the concept of "the
responsibility to protect," which turned the traditional notion of sovereignty on its head. "The
responsibility to protect" not only recognizes a state's sovereignty, but with sovereignty comes
responsibility - to the people of the state. Where the state is unable or unwilling to undertake
this responsibility and protect its people from crimes against humanity and other human rights
abuses, the international community - including the United Nations - may intervene to protect a
state's people.
With the rise of human rights as an issue taking greater precedence in international
relations, there is growing consensus human rights conditions within a state are no longer merely
an "intrastate issue." Such issues now transcend national boundaries and have become a concern
among nations in the international community, and under international law. 715 The responsibility
to protect" codifies this growing consensus, stating that human rights conditions of peoples of a
state are no longer unquestionably accepted as the internal affairs of that state, and out of the
reach of international law. It also states that while every state has not only territorial and
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governmental sovereignty, with sovereignty comes the responsibility to its people to protect its
people from harm and other human rights abuses, and certainly, not to perpetrate them.
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, as well as many of the reports that
preceded it, speaks to goals of peace and security through pacific means, multilateralism, as well
as understanding the root causes of poverty. While these are indeed noble goals to aspire to,
nevertheless, they may not always be effective to stop a full-scale humanitarian crisis. The
international community should also take note that the Outcome Document speaks to the use of
collective force (if necessary) as authorized by the Security Council in the goal to eradicate
genocide and other crimes against humanity. The Security Council can and must take the lead in
the emerging collective security system to prevent and stop genocide, ethnic cleansing and other
such crimes against humanity.
With the new Human Rights Council, it is encouraging to see that the UN (at the urging
of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan) has dedicated a new subsidiary organ to review,
monitor and (hopefully) take action against such abuses. The notion that human rights are being
elevated to the level of importance it garners in the UN Charter is reason to have hope for the
end of such humanitarian crises as that in Darfur, or the prevention of a new crisis from erupting.
The effectiveness of the Council is that such egregious, ongoing humanitarian crises are
presented for all to see on the world stage, which gives governments such as Sudan little
credibility to deny the existence of such atrocities. Furthermore, the monitoring function of the
ongoing crisis by the Special Rapporteur and the Group of Experts as to the human rights
situation in Darfur allows the Council, the Security Council, the General Assembly, other UN
organs and the international community to see that the Government of Sudan has not made all
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the efforts it should have to ameliorate the crisis, thus giving rise to the justification that more
aggressive means may be justifiable and necessary to halt human suffering.
The best way to deal with the crisis is for the Security Council to authorize (or the
General Assembly to recommend) an integrated form of intervention that integrates
peacekeeping, peaceful measures (such as monitoring by the Human Rights Council) and
military measures against both the Sudanese army and itsjanjaweed militia. 716 The mandate of
such an integrated form of intervention should include protecting those civilians, internally
displaced persons and those refugees in Chad from further attacks by both the army and the
janjaweed. However, with such strict guidelines in existence as those discussed in this paper

herein, a unilateral force if willing, should also be granted the authority to intervene militarily to
stop the killing.
After 1 million people were butchered in Rwanda, many promIses were made, but
nothing was done. Yet again, we are witnessing another full-scale humanitarian crisis, and little
action is being taken. While pacific means of resolving such large-scale crisis is noble, it has
been for the most part, ineffective. It is apparent that not only does such a large-scale crisis
affect life and fundamental human rights, but it also has an impact on the economy, sustainable
development, and the environment. It is the role of the Security Council to maintain, and where
necessary, restore peace and security; to date, the Security Council has not fully realized this
role. It has not taken aggressive enough action to stop the genocide in Darfur - the proof is that
it still continues. The Security Council would be well within its World Summit goals - and the
dictates of the UN Charter, if it took more aggressive steps to stop genocide before it becomes a
full-scale humanitarian crisis that the world would be hand-wringing over later. Not only would
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a threat of use of force where necessary and subject to Security Council discretion avert a crisis
before it starts, but it can save lives.
Further, taking action to stop an internal crisis such as genocide can prevent it from
destabilizing an entire region, or leading to an internal conflict that could have unforeseen
catastrophic consequences. Had the Security Council - or anyone else for that matter - taken as
aggressive a stand in Rwanda and now the Sudan, as NATO did in Bosnia, nearly one million
Rwandans, and nearly half a million Sudanese would still be alive today. The reason why the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur is the greatest crisis of the 21 st Century (arguably Rwanda is
greatest crisis of 20th Century, with almost 1 million people being killed in 100 days) is not so
much due to the numbers of those killed, raped, maimed or displaced (although those numbers
are quite compelling), but because of how long the crisis has gone on, without the United Nations
- either the Security Council or the General Assembly - taking action to intervene and stop it.

The atrocities that occurred in World War II answered the question as to whether a
sovereign state can kill its own people; whether it is in the name of an armed conflict or not. The
answer is a clear and unequivocal, no. It is time for the United Nations to once again, become
the standard bearer for the international community, and lead by example. The United Nations
should stop the pronouncement of outrage, "throw down the gauntlet" and end the crisis in
Darfur now by either sending in a peacekeeping force with a military action mandate, or
authorize a multilateral force. By ending the crisis immediately, the message can be sent that
such human rights atrocities and abuses will no longer be tolerated.
We have put our faith in an international organization to set the standard of conduct
among states. It is why the United Nations, its resulting organizations and its Charter and related
documents were created - it is why we adhere to those standards today.
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I.

Overview of Recent Developments
With the exit offonner Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2007 and the election of Barack

Obama as President of the United States in November 2008, there is a mixed result with regard
to the future of the United Nations continuing on the refonnist path that Kofi Annan started
almost twelve years ago.
There is good news and bad news with regards to recent developments. The good news
is that U.S. President Barack Obama has nominated Dr. Susan E. Rice as an ambassador of the
United States to the United Nations. Ambassador Rice is a welcome change from the
ambassadors under the previous administration of George Bush, including John Bolton, who
sought to marginalize and perhaps eventually replace the United Nations.
On January 29,2009, Ambassador Rice signaled a shift from the Bush administration's
approach to the International Criminal Court in her first appearance before the Security Council,
when she aptly described the Bush administration's policy on Darfur as "bluster and retreat."
"Bluster," for the lip service paid to the issue, and "retreat" for never following up its tough
rhetoric with any meaningful political, diplomatic or military action. 717 With such blistering
criticism ofthe prior administration's policies on Darfur (or lack thereof), it appears that the U.S.
could be changing its policies on the ICC. This theory is also supported by the fact that
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was a sponsor of legislation on Darfur during her tenure in the

U..
S Senate. 718
Ambassador Rice also let the Security Council know that President Obama is committed
to building strong international partnerships to tackle such global challenges such as enhancing
global peace and security, combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation, preventing genocide,
717 Mark Leon Goldberg, Ohama's Darfur Test, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Jan. 29, 2009),
h!tp:!!www.prospect.org!cs!articles?article=obamas darfur test, (last visited Feb. 12,2009).

200

alleviating poverty and promoting sustainable development, and supporting respect for human
rights, democracy and human dignity.719 Ambassador Rice also signaled that the United States is
"determined to prevent those conflicts that escalate into mass atrocities, acting early and
decisively when they occur, and assuring that peacebuilding and post-conflict assistance
consolidates peace durably once conflict ends."no Ambassador Rice also indicated that, "as
agreed to by member states in 2005 and by the Security Council in 2006, the international
community has a responsibility to protect civilian populations from violations of international
humanitarian law when states are unwilling or unable to do so. But this commitment is only as
effective as the willingness of all nations, large and small, to take concrete action."nI
However, it is questionable how the Obama administration will react when and if the ICC
has arrest warrants for President Omar al-Bashir. Secretary of State Clinton indicated in her
answers to written questions by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her confirmation
process, that the Obama administration "will end hostility towards the ICC and will look for
opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that will promote US interests by
bringing criminals to justice."n2 While this is certainly encouraging, it does leave open the
question as to whether the U.S. will fully participate in and support the ICC. The Clinton
administration originally signed onto the Rome Statute in 2000, but in May 2002, the Bush
administration suspended the U.S.'s signature to the Rome Statute. n3 Thus far, it appears that
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719 Press Release, Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, US Permanent Representative, on Respect for
International Humanitarian Law, in the Security Council, January 29, 2009, (Jan. 29,2009),
http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/pressreleasesI20090129020.html. (last visited Feb. 12,2009).
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722 See, The American Non-governmental Organization Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ("AMICC"),
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Secretary of State, January 2009, http://www.amicc.orgldocsiKerrvClintonQFRs.pdf.
723 AMICC, Administration Update, (undated), http://www.amicc.orglusinfo/administration.html. (last visited Feb.
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the Obama administration will likely undertake a full policy review of U.S. policy towards the
ICC before making any decision,724 but is likely to sign onto the ICC once again.
Recently, in a meeting with the Security Council at the ICC, the African Union urged the
ICC to suspend its indictment of Sudanese President al-Bashir, indicating that an indictment of
President Bashir could jeopardize the peace process in Darfur. 725 As recently as February 9,
2009, the Sudanese Ambassador to the United Nations indicated that the Government of Sudan
would move forward in the peace process even if the ICC seeks the arrest of President Bashir.
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Given Sudan's track record on the peace process in Darfur, it hardly seems credible that the
Government is "all of a sudden" interested in seriously pursuing peace in Darfur. This appears
to be another delaying tactic by the Government to deal with the human rights situation it
created, in that the Government is using the UN's power to suspend an arrest warrant for a year
under the pretext of trying to finally bring peace in the region. Other countries such as the U.S.
and France see this nothing more than a delaying tactic, and support that the ICC move forward
with an arrest warrant for President Bashir. If anything, an arrest warrant for President Bashir
will signal to the Sudan government that the ICC is serious about pursuing an investigation and
prosecution of the Sudan government for genocide and other crimes against humanity that have
been ongoing for the past six years.
Furthermore, although the African Union has urged the ICC to suspend its indictment of
President Bashir, the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Austria and Croatia have indicated that
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725 Associated Press, A U: Suspend Indictment Against Sudan President, (Jan. 30, 2009),
l!..ttp:llwww.google.com!hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jy5ANZK3DW7Rs7wJEvnnsWJbg.html. (last visited Feb.
1,2009).
726 Associated Press, Envoy Says Sudan Wants Peace in Darfur Even /fCourt Seeks Arrestfor President, (Feb. 9,
2009), www.startribune.comltemplates/print this story?sid=39336662, (last visited Feb. 12,2009).
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they oppose a deferral under Article 16 of the ICC statute. 727 As a matter of fact, French Deputy
Ambassador Jean-Pierre Lacroix indicated after a closed-door meeting between the UN Security
Council and African and Arab delegations that there is no support of an initiative to implement
Article 16 procedures. 728 Britain's Africa minister Mark Malloch Brown had earlier indicated
that it was unlikely that anything could happen that could lead to an Article 16 deferral. 729
However, to no surprise, the other two permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and
China joined with the African and Arab delegations in voicing support for a deferral, in the
interests of peace. 730
Although the news of increasing efforts to bring peace to Darfur is encouraging (albeit
incredible), there is good news with regard to the Human Rights Council's efforts to investigate
the human rights situation on the ground. On September 24, 2008, the Human Rights Council
ended its Ninth Session by deciding, (among other things), that it would extend the mandate of
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan until June 2009. 731
This is a welcome development indeed. Given the Special Rapporteur's reports to the
Council that the recommendations by the Group of Experts 732 for improvements in the human
rights situation on the ground in Darfur have either been slow in implementation or not
implemented at all, it would be most helpful to the human rights situation if the Human Rights
Council remain engaged, to make sure that the Government of Sudan is following through with
Reuters, Us., France, UKOppose Suspending Bashir Darfur Case, Feb. 12,2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE51 C09S20090213, (last visited Feb. 14, 2009). The text of
Article 16 of the Rome Statute states as follows: "No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the
Council under the same conditions."
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http://www.globalsecurity.org!militaryllibrary/news/2008/09/miI080924-unnews02.htm. (last visited Feb. 13,2009);
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those recommendations, and that the Government is sincere in its claims of wanting to bring
peace to the region. Plus, the extension of the Special Rapporteur's mandate does give the
Government recognition for those steps that have been taken, and some room to encourage
improvement. 733 As long as the Human Rights Council continues to monitor the Government's
efforts to improve the human rights situation, the more likely that innocent and displaced
civilians are to see an improvement in the conditions on the ground, and in their everyday lives.
The extended mandate of the Special Rapporteur is warranted, as there have been recent
reports of fresh attacks upon civilians in Darfur. On January 24,2009, Sudanese government
planes bombed a rebel-held town, Muhajeria, that the JEM rebel forces seized control of in early
January 2009. 734 In the attack, government aircraft dropped two bombs on the town's western
edge, setting homes on fire and killing a child in one of the blazes. 735 The attacks sent
approximately one thousand civilians fleeing their homes and taking shelter near a UNAMID
camp and slept in the open fearing further attacks. 736
The UN High Cornmissioner for Refugees also recently declared that an attack upon
civilians in a Darfur refugee camp in August 2008 violated international law. 737 The attack
occurred on August 25,2008, when Sudan security forces opened fire on a crowd in a
displacement camp in Kalma, killing 33 people. 738 The attack was alleged to have occurred as a
result of residents in the 80,000 person camp attempting to block government forces from
See Chapter Six supra, herein.
See note 628, supra.
734 Earthlink News, Darfur Peacekeepers: Government Plane Bombs Town, Jan. 25, 2009,
http://my.earthlink.netichanneUnews/print?guid=20090215/497bffe03ca6155262009012.htm, (last visited Jan. 25,
2009). It appears that the Justice and Equality Movement OEM) has emerged as the most powerful force against the
Government's forces and thejanjaweed, given that the JEM seized control of Muhajeria from another (now
splintered) rebel group, the Sudan Liberation MovementiAnny (SLMlA), who signed a peace deal with the
government in 2006. The SLMlA's leader, Minni Minawi, has since been appointed as a presidential adviser. Id.
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searching for arms or drugs. 739 The Government claimed that it had evidence that the Kalma
camp was being used to accumulate weapons, although a report issued after the attack occurred
indicated that there was no credible evidence to support the Government's claim, nor that there
was any evidence to support the Government's claim that the crowd posed an imminent threat to
security forces, causing them to fire upon the crowd. The UNHCR declared that government
troops acted unlawfully and in violation of international law when they fired upon the crowd. 740
It appears that once again, the Government used the pretext of defending itself from "rebel"

forces as justification for attacking innocent civilians. These new attacks in the Southern Darfur
region caused great concern for the United Nations and African Union joint chief mediator for
the peace process in Darfur, as the renewed attacks violates the Humanitarian Ceasefire
Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur of 2004, and also constituted a violation of a number of
Security Council resolutions, and called for an end to any new clashes. 741
Despite reports of recent attacks, there is good news. The Head of the United Nations
Mission in the Sudan, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, reported to the Security Council that he believed
that 2009 could be a "make or break" year for a comprehensive peace agreement and for the
prospect of peace. 742 Mr. Qazi indicated that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in
2005 by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLNM) was
quite fragile,743 but was optimistic of lasting peace as there was a peace referendum on the ballot
for 2011, which he believed would be most attractive to people in Southern Sudan, as it could
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promote unity and revenue sharing in oil profits. 744 Mr. Qazi also indicated that a disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process for those serving in the army or police, which could set
up a model that could be used region-wide. 745 It is questionable whether all parties can come to
the table to sign a peace agreement that would become a final agreement that would bring lasting
peace.
All of these recent developments indicate that while there is plenty to be optimistic about,
nevertheless, one has to keep in mind the plight of innocent civilians in Darfur, and that their
troubles seem never-ending. As such, any claims by the Sudanese government that it is working
towards a peace agreement should be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism, especially when
I

the Government renews its attacks upon civilians in a region which is clearly the subject of the
2005 Peace Agreement.
Also, another big unknown is how the United States will lead the international
community, now that the Bush administration is no longer in power. Thus far, there has been a
strong indication from Obama administration officials that the U.S. is willing to participate in the
international community once again to fight against human rights abuses, and work as a partner
with the United Nations. It remains to be seen whether President Obama will actually commit
the United States to a solution in Darfur (by the possible appointment of an envoy), or to join and
participate in either the Human Rights Councilor in the International Criminal Court.
Like the United Nations, the U.S. should lead by example by embracing these institutions
that could finally bring an end to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. It has been less than one
month since President Obama has taken office, but thus far, the U.S. has made more progress on
the international front in one month than it has in the eight years of the Bush administration. As
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far as any further progress from the Obama administration, the world can only hope, but time
will only tell.
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